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PREFACE
My aims in this study are twofold : to compare the thought of Shankara
and Ramanuja in order to discover which, if either, is more consistent
with the contemporary Vedanta ethic of love and social service, and to
compare the thought of both with certain central strands in Christian
thought where an ethic of love is also preached. The conclusion which
emerges in the course of the argument is that an ethic of love can be
sustained only when the concept of agency is made central and that both
traditions face similar problems which require the development of an
adequate 'metaphysics of the personal', i.e. a metaphysical scheme in
which reality is shown to be such that the values implicit in taking
seriously the reality of the empirical world and the individual person
and his actions are justified.
The starting point is a divergence in the interpretation of religious
experience and hence in the implied account of the person, which occurs
^ both in Christianity and in Hinduism. This is exemplified in the
philosophies of Shankara and Ramanuja. In Shankara's case religious
experience is interpreted in terms of the realisation of the identity
of the individual self with the universal self, Brahman. This aim may
be termed self-realisation. Ramanuja repudiates this interpretation of
religious experience on the grounds that the supposition that the
individual self is identical with the universal self affords the
individual no hope : he cannot identify himself as the entity which is
to achieve liberation. We start from the reality of the relationship
between the worshipper and God and hence affirm the reality of the
individual self and its distinctness from the deity. The values implicit
in this interpretation of experience are those of interpersonal
relationship. Thus the values of self-realisation and the values of
interpersonal relationship are set in contrast within Vedanta philosophy.
Although the rank and file of Hindus are mainly theists of some sort,
the values espoused by philosophical exponents of Vedanta are generally
based, in contemporary thought, on what v/e have termed the aim of self-
realisation, i.e. Shankara's non-dualism. It is argued that the values
implicit in Ramanuja's theism can be subsumed under the umbrella of
monistic non-dualism. I have contended that this is not the case and
that the reverse position is more accurate. The concept of the self as
the spectator of the world is dependent on the concept of the self as a
conscious agent in the world. Nevertheless, in my examination of
Ramanuja's philosophy I have concluded that although there can be no
doubt of the sincerity of his desire to justify the reality of the
empirical world and the individual selves, yet the metaphysical
presuppositions which he shares with Shankara preclude him from doing
so adequately.
On the Christian side we have a comparable divergence of meaning in the
< philosophical analysis of the concept of a person. In this case the
main emphasis falls on the values of interpersonal relationship.
Although the corollary of this is that the self as acting subject must
be regarded as the starting point of philosophical speculation, yet the
tendency of philosophers has been to treat the self as primarily a
knowing subject and hence as a spectator of action rather than as agent.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the issues dealt with in this
work are wide-ranging. It may provoke the criticism that too much has
been dealt with in too little detail and that important issues have
received scanty treatment. It is certainly the case that the nature of
the subject is such that to deal adequately with it would require
several lengthy volumes. In view of this it might be thought more
prudent to have considered only one aspect of the theme and given this
detailed treatment. I believe, however, that the different points
raised are so inter-related that in order to gain a proper understanding
of the issues involved, it is necessary to deal with them all in a
single study. The philosophical issues involved in contemporary
Hinduism have their roots in classical thought. Yet their ramifications
are relevant to Christian thought, and both Hinduism and Christianity,
in their respective analyses of the religious consciousness, must take
account of contemporary philosophical analysis of the nature of the self.
The actual plan of the work treats the occurrence of contrasting accounts
of the nature of personal existence, i.e. the self as knower and as
agent, within three of the 'key ideas' of Hindu thought : Brahman,
atman and dharma and moksha - in other words, the ultimate reality, the
self, and the end or aim of life. Here we have a progression of ideas.
An account of the nature of ultimate reality influences the interpretation
which is put on religious experience and hence on the individual self.
It is in the light of one's conception of what constitutes the reality
of the self that a meaningful account of the end of life can be given.
In each Chapter I have compared the characteristic ideas of Shankara and
Ramanuja with similar developments of thought within Christianity. My
conclusion is that neither Shankara nor Ramahuja provide a metaphysics
adequate to the demands both of religious experience and of practical
life. Shankara stresses the transcendence of the ultimate reality and
value at the expense of its intelligibility and relevance to this life :
Ramanuja, while insisting on the importance of the empirical world of
plurality, fails to provide an adequate means of individuating the
separate selves and hence of guaranteeing their uniqueness and value.
The overall conclusions are thus both negative and positive. Both
Shankara and Ramanuja are found wanting. Yet from the study of their
writings we find important similarities in the problems facing
contemporary Hindu and Christian theologians in the attempt to interpret
their traditional messages in a contemporary setting. This affords the
possibility that, while maintaining their distinct individualities,
each faith may profit from some insight drawn from the other tradition.
As Greek philosophy became absorbed into Christianity so too may Hindu
philosophy, and from the study of the 'process theology* of Christianity
both traditions may come to talk more intelligibly about God.
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
The Purpose Of A Comparative Study
•The primary purpose of a comparative study is faithfully to describe
the different approaches to, and the various methods employed in the
systematisation of, the same or similar data, experiential and
speculative ..... Attempts at evaluation ..... should proceed .....
on the basis of the common purpose of the systems compared and .....
in the light of the aims of philosophy as a discipline with its
peculiar methods and special history.
It may be as well to consider at the outset what we hope to gain from
a comparative study. The first aim is exegetical. That is to
consider the conception of the personal as it occurs within the
particular framework of each tradition of thought. Since it was
from within the context of Hindu thought that my attention was first
directed to problems connected with the conception of the personal I
have endeavoured to facilitate its exegetical development within
Hindu thought by considering in turn certain 'key' concepts in which
its significance is clearly expressed. Thus we proceed from the
study of Brahman to that of the Atman to that of Dharma and Moksha.
The second aim is critical. I hope to show that, despite differences
in emphasis, there is yet sufficient similarity in certain
developments of thought within each tradition to make a dialogue both
fruitful and constructive. I shall argue that contemporary currents
of thought in each tradition are facing similar questions which demand
similar answers and that only an adequate conception of the personal
can provide a satisfactory answer.
1 N.K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Shankara's Theory of Knowledge,
Banaras Hindu University Press, 1962, p.148.
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Objections
It may be objected that it is impossible to evaluate critically
religious conceptions. Each side is convinced of the correctness of
its ideas and in the absence of any acceptable set of independent
criteria, criticism can only be the substitution of one religious
dogma for another.
This is not the whole story however. In order to understand anything,
whether it be another religion, way of life, or simply someone else's
problem, there must be an attempt to 'get inside' the relevant
framework of thought and to see matters from the other's point of
view. To understand a theory or a way of life, however, is not
necessarily to accept it. One may come to see that it contains
inconsistencies, even within its own terms of referencej or one may
come to question the terms of reference, the assumptions whioh make
the basic framework of thought. This may be because there are areas
of experience with which these assumptions are incapable of dealing.
I shall argue that the Hindu treatment of the question of the personal
is inadequate because it fails to give a satisfactory analysis of
action.
How do we in fact decide, the objector might pursue, what is
an adequate analysis of any feature of human experience? Is this not
just a matter of preference, depending on what we see as important in
life? In the face of the difficulties in the way of any attempt to
reach agreement on fundamental matters concerning human existence this
may seem the ideal attitude to adopt - in theory. In practice,
however, it i3 a fact that people do expend time and energy in trying
to convince others that one mode of life is better than another or one
set of convictions preferable to another. One may think that much of
their effort is misguided, and so it may be. But suppose that all their
efforts is misguided. Suppose that the parent is wasting his time
debating the value of different methods of child-discipline, or the
teenager in considering the merits of pop and pot. To suppose that
every choice can be ascribed ultimately to preference is to oversimplify
the complexity of human life. The upshot of this is that we must
continue to argue our case and endeavour to point in support of it to
areas of human experience where we think agreement may be possible.
The Field Of Study
The conception of the personal is obviously an extremely wide and even
vague subject of study, and particularly so when dealt with in the
context of two separate traditions of thought. In order to say
something constructive within a reasonable space it has been necessary
to limit the topics dealt with. Since my interest originated from
within the field of Hindu thought, I have centred my exegetical
discussion around the Hindu thinkers, Shankara and Ramanuja. These
thinkers represent the opposing views of strict monism or non-dualism
and theism. It is an important task of contemporary Hindu thought to
harmonise these two positions in order to present both a coherent
account of the world as a whole and a satisfactory account of personal
and social ethics. The question of the nature of the personal is
crucial here and in the critical side of my study I have been concerned
to argue that only by recognising that to be personal is to be
essentially an agent will progress be made in solving both the
metaphysical and the ethical issues. On the Christian side I have not
concentrated on any specific philosophers within the traditional
thought of the Church, but rather I have endeavoured to give positive
expression to what I believe to be the Christian insight that the self
is primarily an agent who finds himself in interaction with others.
The overall aim has been to demonstrate that each tradition is in need
of an adequate metaphysics of the personal and to show the direction
in which such a metaphysics might be developed.
The relation between 'person' and 'personal' requires some elucidation.
Although the present study is concerned with the 'personal* as a
religious conception in Hinduism and Christianity, it obviously cannot
completely ignore non-religious discussion of the concept of a person.
Particularly it cannot ignore the vast amount of recent analysis of the
nature of the person and of the criteria for personal identity.
The terms 'person' and 'personal* are what Waisaoan called 'open-
ended* : the criteria for ascribing them to anything are not cut and
dried and it is possible to argue over doubtful cases. Part of the
vagueness in the terms may be brought out by considering that 'person'
may be used simply to refer to a specific type of individual in a
non-emotive way or it may be used in a highly evaluative context to
refer to a specific manner of acting of the individuals classified as
persons. Thus, there are five persons in the room; before being
introduced they were mere nameless faces, but since meeting them I am
forced to regard them as persons, i.e. in a personal manner. In
general it is regarded as praiseworthy to act in a personal manner,
but this need not always be the case. There are many situations in
life which call for the adoption of an impersonal attitude. The
sergeant major in the army, for example, must adopt an impersonal
attitude to his recruits if he is to make soldiers out of them. Two
opposing evaluations of 'personal' are illustrated in the phrases
'personal attention' and 'There's no need to be personal' said in
reply to a criticism.
What is the connection between these different shades of meaning of
•person' and •personal'? An obvious reply is that it is persons who
act in a personal manner. This needs qualification, however. One
may be a person and yet act impersonally. And entities other than
persons may meaningfully be said to act personally. For example,
Firm A is to be commended in treating its employees as persons while
Firm B simply sees them as names on a payroll. It may be helpful here
to distinguish between the non-emotive and the emotive use of these
terms by reserving •person* for non-emotive contexts and •personal'
for emotive contexts. This has several advantages. It allows us to
recognise the non-emotive nature of contemporary philosophical analysis
of * person'. With some notable exceptions, contemporary philosophers
have had no particular axes to grind with regard to the evaluation of
persons though they have been interested in the application of their
analyses to traditional religious dogmas such as the survival of the
soul. It also allows us to recognise that the phrase 'the conception
of the personal' within a religious context, has an essentially
emotive ring. Here indeed the evaluative element is primary and is
dependent largely on the particular interpretation offered of the
nature of religious experience. A large part of the thesis will be
concerned with this point so it need not be further elaborated here.
It is enough to note that the evaluation of the person determines the
analysis of the person rather than vice versa. A further advantage in
reserving the term 'personal' for emotive contexts is that it allows
us to recognise clearly that it is not only entities describable as
•person®' which may be designated 'personal'. This is important for
the theistic tradition which sees Gk>d as personal, but not as a person.
From what has been said it can be seen that discussion of the concept
of a person in a non-religious context is not necessarily relevant to
discussion of the conception of the personal in a religious context.
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The starting point for the one is our experience of identifiable
individuals of a certain type;the starting point for the other is an
experience or complex of experiences which are taken to be
constitutive of the ultimate reality and value. In order to
understand the latter we must first understand the context of beliefs
in which it occurs.
Shankara and Ramanuja represent two opposing evaluations of the
conception of the personal within Hindu thought and two different
aocounts of religious experience. It is too easily assumed by
philosophers who are familiar only with the Christian religion that
the characteristics of religion are the same in all contexts. For
example, John MacMurray says in his book, The Self As Agent, that it
is characteristic of religion that it behaves towards its objects in
way3 suitable to personal intercourse. This may be true of
Christianity, but it is hardly true of Advaita Hinduism. It must also
be said that a similar mistake is often made by Hindu writers. For
example, Devaraja says 'The philosophers of ancient and medieval India
had a surer grasp of the fundamentals of religious life and
consciousness than their counterparts in almost any other place and
time. Having analysed the specific religious attitude of
consciousness which constitutes the ..... being of the witness self,
Indian philosophy sets about to furnish the metaphysical concepts
which would explain and justify the incidence of that consciousness
in the universe.'*
Here we have two diametrically opposed views of the nature of religion
and correspondingly different views of the nature of the personal.
MacMurray sees the heart of religion in personal relationship :
Devaraja finds it is the isolation of the 'witness-self'. The
1 Op. Cit. pp.iv-v.
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implication of the former view is that the personal always involves
the realisation of an 'other* and a relationship with it, whereas the
latter view is that the essence of the personal can only "be realised
in splendid isolation. To complicate the situation, however, Hinduism
also has a vigorous theism which emphasises the relationship between
the worshipper and God. This we shall see implies a view of the
nature of the personal which does not entirely tally with the ideal
of the witness-self and likewise a different account of the nature of
the religious consciousness.
To return to the Christian standpoint, 'personal' in its emotive
sense has played a major role in Christian tradition in terms of such
influential ideals as that of the supreme value of the person or the
individual as such. This is typified in Kant's injunction that each
person should be treated as an end in himself. To appeal to the
consideration that someone is a person is not primarily to say
something about him which could be tested and verified, but rather to
specify the sort of behaviour which may be expected of him and the
sort of treatment which ought to be given him. It is to evaluate him
by placing him within a conceptual framework based on Christian thought
and tradition.
It is not enough, however, to recognise that 'person' in a non-emotive
sense and 'personal' in an emotive sense can be regarded as distinct
concepts. If any particular conception of the personal is to be
applied to persons, it presupposes the possibility of an account of the
concept 'person'. A religious understanding of 'person' cannot regard
itself as immune from criticism from non-religious directions. An
attempt must be made to render compatible both religious and non-
religious experience. This must always be a two-way traffic : neither
side can be presumed to have the advantage over the other.
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An example of the way in which the conception of the personal
presupposes an account of the concept 'person' is given in the religious
understanding of morality. The "believer's understanding of morality
is part and parcel of his religious understanding in general. (This
may be accepted without prejudice to the question of the logical
connection between fact and value, a subject which has also received
close attention in recent philosophy.) The theist is committed to the
acceptance of the ultimate identity of fact and value. This is
expressed by Thomas Aquina3 when he says,
'G-oodness and being are identical in reality, but the term goodness
conveys what the term being does not, namely, the quality of being
desirable.
The believer directs his life in the light of his religious
understanding and, therefore, the long-term motivation of his actions
must be sought in his understanding of the conception of the personal.
This is the standpoint from which he views his life. If, for example,
it is the standpoint of a knowing subject then any account given of
the concept 'person* must be consonant with the adoption of this
standpoint. This leads to the question of whether it is possible to
give an account of the concept 'person' in terms which regard a person
as primarily a knowing subject. 'Neutral' philosophical analysis has
an important part to play here. By 'neutral' analysis I mean an
analysis which is neither pro- nor anti- the religious standpoint in
question, but which seeks to connect it in a positive way with the
totality of experience. In the Chapters which follow I shall endeavour
to clarify Shankara and Ramanuja's conceptions of the personal and to
ask whether they may be regarded as compatible with a coherent account
of the concept 'person*.
1 Summa Theologica. la.v.l.
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Shankara And Ramanuja
The main subjects of the comparison will be the two Hindu philosophers,
Shankara and Ramanuja. They represent two main streams of Hindu
philosophical thought. The term •Hinduism* represents such a vast
agglomeration of tradition and practice that it may present an
over-simplified picture to speak simply of two main streams of Hindu
thought. There are six systems of thought in classical Hinduism of
which Vedanta, the school to which both Shankara and Ramanuja belong,
is one. In addition, there are numerous other sects and traditions.
The most important and well-known of the classical systems from the
modern philosopher's viewpoint is undoubtedly the Vedanta and the
Vedanta includes both Shankara's monism and Ramanuja's theism.
Shankara lived in the 8th century AD and is the acknowledged
representative of the monistic or non-dual Vedanta philosophy :
Ramanuja lived in the 11th century AD and is likewise the outstanding
exponent of the theistic Vishishtadvaita school of Vedanta philosophy.
Both Shankara and Ramanuja teach that there is only one ultimate
principle behind the universe : but while Ramanuja holds that this
principle admits of internal differentiation, Shankara denies this.
Shankara believes in the ultimate unreality of differences and,
therefore, in the ultimate unreality of individual persons or selves
separate from the Absolute. Ramanuja believes in the reality of
difference and, derivatively, in a plurality of real selves which are
separate and distinct from the Absolute. The Absolute for Shankara,
being devoid of all attributes whatever, cannot have any personal
attributes, but for Ramanuja, the affirmation of the real nature of
difference, allows him to say that the Absolute is personal in
character and has personal attributes.
From the Western Christian point of view this is of considerable
/e
interest. Within this tradition it has generally been taken for
granted that the terms God and ultimate reality refer to something
which is personal. There have, of course, been dissenters, but within
the mainstream of Christianity Scripture has taught that God loves and
cares for the world, and philosophers from Plato onwards have wished
to ascribe mental qualities such as knowing and willing to God. The
recognition of the complete otherness of God from anything to be found
in the world was tempered with the conviction that God could be
correctly described in terms drawn from human experience since the
characteristics of humanity were in some way a copy of the divine.
Thomas Aquinas, for example, says that -
•the divine substance exceeds by its immensity every form which our
intellect attains'.^"
But he also in his doctrine of analogy insists that human terms are
applicable, if inadequately, to the deity. For example,
•When it is said that God is good, the sense is that what is
meant by goodness in creatures pre-exists in God, and indeed more
2
intensely.•
The conviction that the Christian God is personal in character has been
coupled with the belief that the relation between the soul and God is
ultimate : even in mystical ecstasy God and the soul remain different
though indissolubly united. This difference in identity has given the
metaphor of the marriage relationship great appeal in Christian
literature. What these considerations amount to from the Christian
point of view is the conviction that religious experience is essentially
personal in character, that it involves an interchange between the
object of worship and the worshipper which is of the nature of an
1 Summa Contra Gentiles. 1, 14.
2 Summa Theologica, la, xiii, 2
//
interchange between persons, and resulting from this, the conviction
that the personal is in some way the highest evaluative category that
there is. It is of interest, then, to realise that within one
religion, viz. Hinduism, there can be two basic and conflicting
evaluations of the personal. In other words, the personal as it is
understood within the Christian tradition, cannot be treated, likewise,
as an essential category in Hindu thought.
Although the question of the personal has played a different role in
Hindu thought from that whioh it has played in Christian, yet it has
been made the subject of considerable philosophical scrutiny and it
may, therefore, be of interest to Christian philosophers of religion to
study the way in which the conception of the personal has been dealt
with from a philosophical point of view within an alien religious
context.
Shankara and Ramanuja are ideal examples to take for this sort of
discussion. They share a common background, common assumptions and
common aims and yet they differ on issues which are vital to religion
and which can be given a philosophical treatment.
They are both, of course, Hindus. They, therefore, to a very large
extent share a common tradition of beliefs and practices. Both were
devout practitioners and missionaries of their faith, travelling the
length and breadth of India, debating with rival schools and founding
monastories. Both were philosophers or philosophical theologians, i.e.
they were concerned to give a reasoned account, explanation and
justification of their faith. As philosophers and Hindus they shared
the belief that the most important religious and philosophical enquiry
that could be made was the enquiry into the nature of ultimate reality.
This enquiry was not merely ontological in nature, for the ultimately
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real was equated with the ultimate in value. The starting point for
this enquiry was the scriptures and in particular the Prasthanatraya,
comprising the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita and the Brahma Sutras by
Badarayana, all of which were regarded as authoritative by both. The
Brahma Sutras, or Vedanta Sutras, as they are often called, are a
highly condensed and systematic account of the contents of the
Upanishads which are intended to explain the various doctrines
contained in these scriptures. The condensation and systematisation
has proceeded to such an extent, however, that they are well-nigh
unintelligible without a commentary. One of the main preoccupations
of later Hindu philosophers was that of writing commentaries on the
Brahma Sutras.
Other presuppositions which were shared by Shankara and Ramanuja were
the belief in samsara, i.e. the transmigration of the individual soul
from one life to another as a result of its ignorance of the true
nature of things i this belief was linked to the belief that the
phenomenal world of nature consisted of an eternal cycle whioh had
neither beginning nor end and which was composed of vast cycles of
creation, maintenance and dissolution of the universe : the belief in
karma, the causal, moral law of the universe which shapes the destiny
of the individual soul in accordance with its deeds, each action
producing its appropriate effeot : the conviction that the end of life
is moksha or liberation from samsara and the law of karma : and,
finally, the belief that the way to achieve liberation was by means of
knowledge. This background of thought and belief was presupposed as
axiomatic by both thinkers, i.e. discussion might be, and was, carried
on over the precise interpretation of the doctrines, but the doctrines
themselves were not considered to stand in need of independent
justification.
My choice of Shankara as a major expositor of Hindu thought might be
criticised on the grounds that central issues in his philosophy have
been agreed by scholars to have been influenced by contemporary
Buddhist teachings. Does this invalidate his importance to the Hindu
tradition? This is not such a problem as it may appear. Two points
may be made. In the first place, Shankara and Ramanuja were chosen
for this study because they are the two traditional exponents of issues
that are alive in contemporary Indian thought. Philosophy in India has
always had a practical motivation, for example, to show that the world
is such that moksha is possible. In the past moksha has generally been
conceived in other-worldly terms. In contemporary Hindu circles the
economic and social development of this world have assumed a larger
importance and the problem has become that of showing that the traditional
metaphysics is capable of providing a justification for what may seem a
different ethical outlook. In particular, the problem of the * other*
becomes crucial. Unless the other person is recognised as important
and worthy of love then programmes of social service become meaningless.
This links up with the issue of monism versus theism and Shankara and
Ramanuja are the obvious choice as expositors of classical Vedanta
philosophy. From this point of view the question of Shankara1s
indebtedness to Buddhism becomes irrelevant, as however he may have been
influenced by Buddhist thought, his teachings have certainly formed a
main part of Hindu thought since. This is borne out by the fact that
thinkers like Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan have felt a need to consider
and to reinterpret what he says.
The second point to be made is this : granted that Shankara was
influenced to a major extent by Buddhist thought, yet this Influence is
not so alien as might at first appear. Buddhism took root on the same
soil as Hinduism and sprang up as a reaction to some of the more
conservative elements of Hinduism. Both religions share common beliefs
such as the belief in reincarnation, in the law of karma, and in the
possibility of release from empirical existence. Although certain
aspects of Shankara's thought had undoubtedly been previously
developed in a similar manner by Buddhist philosophers, yet the seeds of
both doctrines may be traced back to the Upanishads, where they coexist
with all the other views which were being discussed at that period.
The Conception Of The Personal In Christian Thought
We have already mentioned some basic differences between the Hindu and
the Christian viewpoints. In the Christian tradition it has generally
been assumed that Cod is personal in some way, whereas in Hinduism the
nature of the ultimate reality, Brahman, is a matter for debate. In
the following pages we shall trace the historic development of the
conception of the personal in Christianity and will come to see that the
question of interpersonal relationship is central. Man only comes into
his own as a person in terms of his relationship with God and with his
fellow men. In contrast, the Hindu ideal may be described as that of
self-realisation which makes the values of the interpersonal redundant.
One can put the point by saying that in Christianity one comes to the
meaning of life through relationships - with God and with other people :
in Hinduism the significance of life is realised by delving ever deeper
into one's own nature.
In spite of these broad differences of approach, when we come to
examine the picture on each side in a little more detail, we find subtle
differences in the overall view whioh make the opposing pictures rather
more complex and lead them to show more of a resemblance to each other
than might at first appear to be the case. There is a vigorous theistic
strain in Hinduism which though in general subordinated philosophically
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to monism, does draw attention to the importance of bhakti (devotion)
and, therefore, to the relationship between the worshipper and God.
In the case of Christianity, the traditional definition of a person
did not make any reference to the necessity of interpersonal
relationship and indeed defines 'person* in such a way as to make the
possibility of interpersonal relations doubtful and even unnecessary
to the life of a person.
The Personal In The Old And New Testaments^"
It was a common presupposition with writers of both the Old and New
Testaments that God's nature was such that personal relationships
were possible between man and God. In the Old Testament God
confronted His people, spoke to them and demanded unconditional
obedience from them. The Old Testament writers had a profound sense
both of the collective responsibility of the nation before God and of
the responsibility of the individual to God. Eichrodt describes the
history of Israel as having the character of a struggle for a direct
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relationship with God. Speaking of the effect which the preaching of
the prophets had on the life of the nation he says,
' the fundamental datum of Israel's view of life is that the
individual is summoned to responsibility which demands to be taken as
absolute ..... here a view of personality is more and more clearly
established which has nothing to do with an animistic theory of an
indestructible soul substance.'**
1 See C.C.J. Webb, God & Personality, Allen & Unwin, 1919.
John Baillie, Our Knowledge Of God. London, O.U.P., 1939. : And The
Life Everlasting. New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1933. : Invitation
To Pilgrimage. London, O.U.P., 1942.
H.R. Mackintosh, The Christian Apprehension of God. London, S.C.M.
Press, 1929.
L. Eiohrodt, Man in the Old Testament. Translated by K. & R. Gregor
Smith, London, S.C.M. Press, 1951.
2 Eichrodt, Op. Cit., Ch. 1, Sect. 3. 3 IMd. p.23
In the New Testament the Incarnation doctrine brought a fresh and
deeper understanding of the oonviotion that the life of man derived
its meaning and value from obedience to a personal G-od. The
consciousness of being redeemed into fellowship with God through
Jesus Christ had various aspects : on the one hand, the life, death
and resurrection of Jesus were seen as the means by which the
relationship between God and man was restored, and on the other hand,
a consideration of the relationship of Christ to God led to the
belief that the life of the Godhead was social in character. Paul,
for example,speaks of Christians as being sons of God by adoption.1
From the foregoing emerge two points which in the Old and New
Testaments are firmly linked with the conviction of the personal
nature of God. The one concerns the value of the individual within
the framework of the community and the importance of fellowship, and
the other concerns the connection of personal value with morality and
the understanding of the moral life. I shall comment further on each
of these.
The relation of the individual to the community may be seen in a
number of ways. The whole value of the individual may be seen as
intrinsic to himself, and the oommunity as external to him and,
therefore, of little importance when considering the meaning and
significance of the life of the individual. Or the values of the
individual may be seen as strictly subordinate to and dependent on the
life and purpose of the community as a whole. Between these two
extremes lie a great number of possibilities in which the relative
values of individual and community are balanced against each other in
different degrees. There is yet another possibility, however, and that
1 See L. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity. Nisbet & Co., London,
1943* Lecture 2.
is that the values of the individual and the community are strictly
correlative and complementary to each other, and it is this possiblity
which seems to be implied by the Old and New Testament understanding of
the personal nature of God.
In the Old Testament the sense of both individual and collective
responsibility flourished together and while the prophets summoned the
individual to repentance they also emphasised that the repentance and
obedienoe of the individual was closely bound up with God's purpose
for the nation as a whole. In the New Testament the immediate result
of conversion was the creation of a new way of life for the believers
in which •they had all things common'.
Baillie1 emphasises, when discussing the question of the after-life,
that the Bible is not concerned with the immortality of the individual
soul or with the individual merely as an individual : it is rather
concerned with the end and destiny of the community. When discussing
the role of the Church in the Christian life he points out that
Christianity is essentially a community affair for it is only in a
community that a person can be born and develop, and that he can
develop fully only in a community where the individual has a sense of
the universal bearing of his life. He sums it up thus {
'the Christian religion is a relation between the individual soul and
God, but it is a relation which can be real only within that universal
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community whioh is the Church of Christ.'
It might be objected that if the emphasis on the regeneration of the
community is really implicit in Christian faith, then the Church has
been curiously slow to recognise it and has too often accepted social
1 Invitation to Pilgrimage. Ch. XIII
2 Ibid. p.119
and political evils with complacence. Baillie admits the justice of
this claim1 and grants that Christians have frequently acquiesced too
readily in an existing political and sooial order. In mitigation,
however, he points out that Christians have always been ready to extend
sympathy and suocour to the oppressed. The contrast is not really
between accepting a social order and seeking to ohange it, but between
relying on love and charity or relying on legislation to change
society. The Church has traditionally chosen the former means and
sought to reform society by reforming the individual members.
In the Old Testament the personal relationship whioh God sought to
establish with His people was seen to demand loyalty and obedience on
the part of the nation which showed itself in an adherence to strict
standards of conduct. In the New Testament, as we have already noted,
the life of the Christian found its expression in participation in a
community in which new standards of behaviour were spontaneously
adopted. The emphasis on fellowship and the emphasis on morality are
closely linked, for morality was understood in the context of the
Christian's relationship to God.
The Christian Doctrine Of A Personal God
Although the writers of the Old and New Testaments regarded it as a
presupposition of their religious experience that the God with whom
they were dealing was personal in nature, the actual doctrine of the
personal nature of God was a gradual development and its formulation
was influenced to a considerable extent by Greek philosophical
theology. Further, the original interest of Christian theologians
lay with the question of personal relations within the Godhead and the
doctrine of the personal nature of God came later.
1 Ibid.
The word 'person1 as has frequently been pointed out, is derived from
the Latin 'persona1 which referred to the mask donned by the aotor in
a drama. Prom this the term came to be used to designate a being who
had a part to play in some form of social intercourse. Later on,
•persona' came to be used by theologians as equivalent to 'hypostasis'
which referred to something having real concrete existence as opposed
to being a mere appearance with no substantial foundation; and these
terms were used to designate the distinctions of Father, Son and Holy
Spirit within the Trinity. It is from this that the notion of
personality in God developed.
The term 'personality* may be confusing as its meaning has changed
over the years. In modern use it suggests those particular
characteristics which distinguish one person from another, in other
words, a set of characteristics which are peculiar to one individual.
This contrasts with its traditional use which was to refer to the
general characteristics which distinguished certain individuals as
persons from other non-personal beings. Thus traditional theologians
talked about personality in or of God where modern discussion would
prefer the terms 'personal nature' or 'personal characteristics'.
The distinction between 'person' and 'individual' is also important.
A person is an Individual but not all individuals are persons;
personality or personal characteristics, may belong to beings whom we
should not naturally class as individuals.
It was because traditional theologians saw God as an individual, but
not as a person, that they spoke of personality in God rather than the
personality of God. It was possible to affirm personality in God
because of the existence of personal relations between Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. On the other hand, the existence of personal relations
here did not imply that there were three separate persons or individuals,
and originally the assertion that God was a person had a use only to
contradict the view that He was three persons.
In the 6th century AD Boethius gave the classioal definition of a
person as 'an individual subsistence of a rational nature'. Webb points
out that this definition has two aspects, that of individual
subsistence which is representative of the term 'hypostasis' and that
of rational nature which is representative of the term 'persona';
from the time of Boethius on, the meaning of 'person' oscillated between
that of an 'independent and fundamentally unchangeable individual'
(hypostasis) and the 'thought of social relationships and voluntary
activity' (persona)."*"
The distinction between these two aspects of 'person' represents the
distinction between the God of Hebrew theology and the God of Greek
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philosophical theology. The former was personal in the sense of being
a conscious, intelligent being, directly in control of the events of
this world in which He is working out His purposes : the latter was
also personal so far a3 the self-contemplation in which His life
consisted was conscious, intelligent activity. But He was not personal
in the sense of being in touch with the events of space and time
because this would disturb His changelessness. One implication of this
is that ethical predicates are strictly inapplicable to a God such as
that of Aristotle, whose life consists in the contemplation of his own
excellence, and is thereby outwith the possibility of a personal
relationship with his creatures, if such they may be called.
1 See C.C.J. Webb, Op. Cit., Lecture 2.
2 See L. Hodgson, Op. Cit., Lecture 5.
Summing up the foregoing we find that the term 'person* as it occurs
in Christian thought has two aspeots. On the one hand it may "be used
primarily to designate an intelligent, independent, self-conscious
being and on the other, it may be used to indicate that the being so
termed is capable of voluntary, purposeful activity and of entering
into social relationships with other beings of the same nature. An
examination of the development of Christian thought has shown that it
has been the latter aspect of the meaning which has been of prime
significance in Christian experience. Expressing this more technically
we can say that the Christian conception of the personal is of a
subject who is not primarily a knower but an agent : an agent who not
only acts on things which are not themselves agents, but, and this is
of the utmost importance, who interacts in a unique way with beings who
are themselves agents. It is in terms of this interaction which makes
fellowship possible and implies such qualities as love, trust,
obedience, forgiveness, thankfulness, and which gives rise to a
distinctive understanding of the moral life, that the value of the
personal within the Christian tradition mu3t be understood.
Persons And Personal Relationship
It may be asked how a personal relationship can be possible without
the individual participants in the relationship being themselves
persons. Unless God is regarded as a person how can there be a
personal relationship between man and God? This question troubled the
1
Idealists of the 19th century and they raised the question of
personality in relation to the Absolute. The major issue is whether
personality, or as we should prefer to say nowadays, a personal nature,
which in our case is predicated of finite individuals and seems to
1 See J.E. MoTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. Cambridge
University Press, 1918.
imply and to presuppose the existence of other similar finite
individuals, can he predicated of God who is infinite and over and
against which there is no other,
MoTaggart sums up the matter :
•What ••••• is meant hy personality? ••••• The nature of an infinite
and perfect being must be very different from mine. And within what
limits must this difference be confined, if that infinite and perfect
being is to be oalled a person?*1
*The consciousness of the non-Ego is not personality. But is it not
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an essential condition of personality?*
On the one hand there are those who argue that to be a person is to
be finite because a self must have a not-self over and against it.
It follows, therefore, that Sod cannot be a self or person. On the
other hand it is possible that we are wrong in attempting to transfer
our human limitations to Sod and that we are persons in a second-rate
fashion as compared to Him. Lotze, for example, says
♦Perfect personality is in Sod only; to all finite minds there is
allotted but a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is not
a producing condition of the Personality, but a limit and a hindrance
of its development.*"^
One possible reply to the assertion that Sod cannot be a self or person
because He oannot have a not-self over and against him is to argue that
it is not strictly true that Sod does not have a not-self. Mackintosh
and Hodgson'4' point out that while there can be no •other* over and
against an Absolute such as Hegel's, this does not hold true of the
Christian Sod who does not contain everything as a part of Himself.
1 Op. Cit, p.57« 2 Ibid. p.68.
3 Lotze, Microcosmos. Bk.IX; Ch.IV. 4 Opera Cit.
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The created world is not a part of God. In the idealist metaphysics
reality is a systematic whole within which the space-time universe of
our experience has a necessary existence in relation to the whole as
an expression of the Absolute. In contrast, for Christian thought
the space-time universe is not a medium through which God finds
expression in order to be Himselfj it is not internal to the eternal
being of God, but was created by God for a purpose and as such has a
relative independence of God.
Another line of reply is to question the assumption of the sceptics
who regard finiteness and exclusiveness as essential features of the
person. MacMurray takes the view that universality and individuality
are the key features of personality and that these terms are
correlative.
•The more universal a person becomes in his self-transcendence, the
more unique does he become in his individuality. There is, therefore,
no ground for hesitation in ascribing personality to God. Absolute
personality, in terms of our analysis, must involve absolute
universality and absolute individuality at once ..... The
transcendence of God is His unique individuality; His immanence is
his abolute universality; and these are, therefore, not peculiar
characteristics of Deity, but the fundamental characteristics of all
persons carried to their infinite limit. What is human love but the
Immanence of one human personality in another? Yet it does no
violence to the unique individuality, the transcendence, of either
the idea that the supreme reality is an infinite person is not
self-contradictory.^
On this view the salient feature of personality or the characteristic
of the personal is its inclusiveness rather than its exclusiveness
and although contact with others may enable us to come to know our
personality it is not such contact which constitutes it.
1 Adventure, ed. B.H. Streeter, London, Macmillan, 1927, pp.l93-19A-
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MacMurrays*s viewpoint is consonant with the Christian belief that
the believer stands in a personal relationship to Cod. The assertion
that God is personal, meaning that the believer can stand in a
personal relationship with Him, does not imply that God has personal
characteristics in the same degree and kind, as do human persons. An
analysis of personal relationship on the human level reveals that
personal relationships between equals, i.e. between persons exhibiting
personal characteristics in the same degree, are comparatively rare.
More often there is inequality between the partners. Take the case
of mother and baby. It is only through a personal relationship with
his mother that the baby has the possibility of growing up to be a
mature person. In the initial stages the whole of the relationship
must be maintained by the mother and she must contribute everything to
it while the baby apparently is simply on the receiving end. At later
stages of life there are many other examples of personal relationships
where the inequality of the two partners is not so pronounced, but is
nevertheless unmistakeably present. If this line of thought is
pursued we come to the conclusion that just as the fact that the baby
is limited in his responses does not preclude his participating in a
personal relationship with his mother, so the limitations and finitude
of man do not prevent him from entering a relationship with a God who
is unlimited and infinite. The difficulty arises only because we
falsely imagine that the personal characteristics possessed by God
must correspond to those possessed by us.
The Self In Hindu Thought
V/e have seen in the preceding section that within the Christian
religious context 'personal* is the highest evaluative category. God
is apprehended as personal, i.e. as a being who takes an intelligent,
purposeful interest in the events of this space-time world and who
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interacts with men 'not for a time but always, not with some, but
with ideal wisdom, not with a mixture of love, hate and indifference,
but with unsurpassable love for all.'^" It is within this context of
a unique relationship with Ck>4 that man is understood as a person.
One of the consequences of this understanding of 'person* is that
there is little discussion from the religious viewpoint of what it is
to be a person or of the nature of a person as such. In fact,
Christian theologians seem to be characteristically vague about what
may be called the ontological status of the person. This is because
it is the nature of the relationship between God and man which is
fundamental and any special features which may belong to the terms of
the relation are of no special interest in themselves, but only in so
far as they contribute to the nature of the relationship.
Is there any similar situation in Hinduism? The answer is 'no'
because here we find that, central in theological controversy, is
continuous, lively discussion as to the precise nature of the self.
The Upanishads abound with questions about and descriptions of the
selfj for example,
'The Atman (self) is not born, nor dies. This one has not come from
anywhere, has not become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal,
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primeval, this one is not slain when the body is slain.'
•More minute than the minute, greater than the great, is the Self
that is set in the heart of a creature here.*^
1 Hartshorne, Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity. Union
Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XX, No.3, March, 1965, p.267.
2 Katha Upanlshad. 11.18. R.E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal
Upanishads. London, O.U.P., 1931*
3 Ibid. Katha Upanishad. 11.20.
While the question of the nature of the self was of paramount importance
to the Upanishadic thinkers there was no single account of the self
which was accepted by all. The most general term used to refer to the
self was ' ataman*. * Atman' may be used simply as a reflexive pronoun.
Ninian Smart gives in addition to 'self' the translations 'spirit*,
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•eternal self' and 'World-Spirit'. R.C. Zaehner is in agreement with
the translation 'immortal soul* but points out that on oocasion •atman'
may also be translated as 'ego' or as 'animal soul' or 'lower self'.
Another term which may sometimes be regarded as virtually identical
•a
with 'atman' is 'purusha*. This means literally 'man', 'person* or
'human being'. It is also used to designate the world soul. At the
beginning of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad it is used to refer to the
original, primeval man out of whom the world is said to evolve, in much
the same manner as it is imagined in Plato's myth in the Symposium. In
the Samkhya system purusha, oonscious spirit, is one of the first
principles, the other being prakrti, matter. Ramanuja refers to God as
Purushottama, meaning the supreme person. Purusha as the eternal
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element in living beings is translated as 'soul* by Smart while
Edgerton and other translators prefer the term 'spirit', reserving the
terms 'soul* and 'self' for'atman'.
By the time of Shankara and Ramahuja discussion of the self is carried
on against a background of more or less agreed technical description
of the various powers and faculties of man. Subtle distinctions are
drawn which are intended to be verifiable in experience. These
1 Ninian Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, quoted
by E.G. Parrinder, Recent Views of Indian Religion and Philosophy.
Religious Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, October, 1965* p.110.
2 R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism, quoted Ibid.
3 Ibid, p.lll.
technicalities are hinted at in the Upanishads, hut only fully
developed by later writers. For example, in the Katha Upanishad we
g at the famous comparison of the self to a charioteer :
Know thou the atman as riding in a chariot, the body as the chariot.
Know thou the intellect (buddhi) as the chariot-driver, and the mind
as the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses; the objects of
sense, what they range over. The self combined with senses and mind
wise men call "the enjoyer".*
Later on in the same section we get an ascending grad ation of objects
which leads to the Self which is not regarded as an object at all ;
'Higher than the senses are the objects of sense. Higher than the
objects of sense is the mind; and higher than the mind is the
intellect (buddhi). Higher than the intellect is the Great Self
(Atman). Higher than the Great is the Unmanifest (avyakta). Higher
than the Unmanifest is the Person. Higher than the Person there is
nothing at all. That is the goal. That is the highest course.
Though he is hidden in all things, that Self shines not forth.*"1'
Shankara, in a typical passage in the Upadeshasahasri, distinguishes
the Self (atman) from the sense-organs, the organs of action (the
larynx, the hand, etc.), the mind (manas), and the intellect (dhi).
It is the confusion of the self with any of these that obscures the
recognition of its true nature and so prevents moksha or self-
realisation. For present purposes it will be sufficient if we
consider the mind and the intellect in relation to the self.
Shankara refers to these as 'mental modifications' (vrttis). We
shall see that the important distinction philosophically is that
drawn between the self and the 'mental modifications'. Devaraja
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discusses this point.
A vrtti is a modification of the internal organ, the internal organ
comprising the instruments of knowledge such as manas and buddhi, and
1 Katha Up. III. 3-4, 10-12. 2 An Introduction to Shankara's
Theory of Knowledge, pp.97-99.
by the time of Shankara, the distinction of the various components,
as it were, of the internal organ, were less important than the
distinction of the internal organ from the self; and so the internal
organ, as Devaraja notes, was variously known as antahkarana, manas,
buddhi, vijnana, citta and hrdaya. It was regarded as constituting
the •upadhi', or limiting condition of the Absolute. Shankara
regarded all mental prooesses, intellectual as well as emotional, as
modifications or vrttis of the internal organ.
«
•The self which is of the nature of pure awareness is said to have
the modes of the internal organ for its objects which latter it
illumines. The pure awareness is designated by the Vedantists as
Saksi or Saksi jnana. while knowledge in its changing aspect is
called Vrtti.jnana.1
On the next page Devaraja says
'The internal organ with its modes is avabhasya (that which is
illumined), while the light of the self is the avahhasaka or the
illuminer ..... Pure oit or awareness ..... since it illumines the
modes of the buddhi, appears to be active when in reality the latter
is active. There can be no real movement or activity in the light
— 2
that is Atman.'
It is usual in Western philosophical thinking to distinguish simply
between the mind and the body. For example, Descartes distinguishes
between mental or spiritual substance which possessed the qualities
of consciousness, thought and intelligence and which had no extension,
and material substance which possessed the quality of extendedness,
and lacked consciousness and the ability to think. Traditionally, man
has been thought to be a trinity of body, mind and soul, but for
philosophioal purposes the soul is usually either equated with the
mind or ignored. For example, Descartes in treating the question of
1 Op. Cit. p.98 2 Op. Cit. p.99
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the relationship between mind and body asks if the soul is lodged in
the body like a pilot in a ship. On this showing, questions about
the nature of the self or soul become questions about the mind. So
that rationalist thinkers supposed that reflection on the cogito
yielded the knowledge that the self was a simple substance, and an
empiricist like Hume declared that in reviewing the contents of his
consciousness he could find nothing but a constantly changing stream
of perceptions and no continuing perception of the self from which
he could derive the idea of personal identity.
It is important to realise that the Hindu analysis proceeds on
different lines. The distinction is broadly speaking, threefold,
body, mind end self, with body and mind very firmly on one side of the
line and the self on the other. The mind (maims) can in no 3ense be
equated with the self which is pure consciousness. Manas, on the
other hand, it is agreed by almost all schools of Indian philosophy,
is a subtle kind of matter. It is capable of reflecting the nature of
the self which is pure consciousness and, therefore, acts as a kind of
link between gross matter and consciousness.
Manas may be described as the totality of the conscious states and
activities that make up our mental life. It is manas which feels
desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, which has intelligence,
knowledge, which can range over past, present and future, which makes
decisions, which values things, which doubts, which includes, in short
all our mental activities. Manas is also responsible for our sensory
knowledge. The mind co-ordinates the perceptions of the senses and
without the co-operation of the mind we should not have perceptions at
all. For example, the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad concludes that it is
more correct to say that we perceive with the mind rather than perceive
with the senses.
'People say my mind was elsewhere} I did not see. My mind was elsewhere
I did not hear. It is with the mind, truly, that one sees. It is with
the mind that one hears •••••'
Shankara takes this argument to prove that knowledge is entirely
dependent upon the mind's attention to the object which is being
perceived. Unless there is attention, there will be no awareness of the
object. Negatively, then, this argument proves, that as there is some¬
times awareness of objects, mind must exist and it must be the most
important requirement for knowledge. To most Indian writers the
existence of manas is arrived at by inference in this way.
The account of manas as being responsible for the co-ordination of our
sense-perceptions bears a resemblance to Aristotle's conception of the
sensus communis, which was also held to be re sponsible for co-ordinating
the activities of the various senses.
Manas, then, is always regarded as an instrument for obtaining knowledge
(cf. Shankara : 'As the mind is an object of consciousness and an
instrument like a lamp it also is not the Atman. )"*"
and never as the agent who attains the knowledge. It is the self which
uses manas as an instrument for the attainment of knowledge and the self
is able to use manas because manas is able to reflect some of the
intelligence which belongs to the true nature of the self as pure
consciousness.
(e.g. Shankara : 'Just as light assumes the forms of objects revealed by
it, but is really different from, though (apparently) mixed up with,
them, so, the Self is different from the mental modifications whose
forms it assumes while revealing them.*)
1 Shankara, Atmajnanopadeshavidhi, v.10.
2 Upadesasahasri, xvi, 5.
But manas in its own nature is material and unconscious. On this
account of mind, recognition and memory are accounted for because
manas, being material, is able to retain traces of every thought and
action and it is these traces, samskara and vasana, which account for
the continuity of our knowledge and experience. It is also these
mental traces whioh record every person*s dharma and so make possible
the operation of the law of karma and so ultimately the endless cycle
of rebirths.
In some respects, Kant's distinction between consciousness and the
contents of consciousness in his account of the transcendental unity
of apperception, may be useful in throwing light on this account of
the relation betvreen self and the mind. It seems to be this
distinction to which the Vedantins are drawing attention when they say
that the self is pure consciousness and the mind is a subtle material
which is able to reflect some of the nature of consciousness, and that
the self is the knowing subject and manas is simply the instrument of
knowledge. But whereas Kant stressed that the unity of consciousness
is simply the unity of consciousness and that the attempt to make use
of this unity in order to gain further knowledge of the nature of the
self was futile, Hindu thinkers want to go on and say something more
about the self.
The intellect or buddhi is also an instrument rather than an agent, in
the same manner as manas. While manas, I have suggested, is a kind of
sensus communis, it is the buddhi which is responsible for our being
able to make inferences and in general for our having the power of
discursive thought. The buddhi is closely connected with the self
though it must always be distinguished from it.
*Always Illumining the all-pervasive intellect by its light, Its own
nature, the Self is called the Knower ..... The Self illumines the
intellect like a stationary lamp devoid of any effort and
illumining everything within its reach.*1
As we have seen the psychological distinctions drawn within Hindu
epistemology are rather different from those noted in the West. A
failure to distinguish clearly between the mind or intellect and the
self may lead to considerable confusion.
We come now to some terms which are more directly relevant to our
subject.
Jiva is the general term in the VedLanta terminology which is used to
denote the empirical self rather than the real self or atman. In
some other systems such as Jainism the term * jiva* is used instead
of 'atman* to denote the self, but it is the Vedahta usage which
primarily concerns us here. Whereas atman designates the true and
fundamental nature of the self, 'jiva* refers to the phenomenal self
as it is bound to the recurring cycle of transmigratory existence.
In contrast to the atman, the jiva is changing and is subject to the
law of karma which affects it in accordance with the deserts which it
has incurred in this life and in previous existences. The
distinguishing feature of the jiva, which makes it what it is, is that
it fails to realise that its true nature (atman) is different from the
mental modifications and objects with whioh it has mistakenly
identified itself and this is why the jiva cannot escape the law of
karma.
Another important term is oit (consciousness). For Shankara, cit is
identical with atman, the atman iis cit and this seems to be a
mathematical identity, i.e. cit and atman are one and the same.
/
1 Shankara, Upadesasahasri. xvi.4, 6.
Ramanuja, on the other hand, distinguishes clearly between oit and
the subject which possesses oit. Cit is an essential characteristic
of the self and presupposes the self, but is not identical with the
self. This, as we shall see, is an important point of difference
between them. Other terms are also used interchangeably to designate
consciousness. For example, Ramanuja says
•This consciousness (anubhuti) which is also termed jnana, avagati,
3amvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self and
related to an object.'"*"
As Shankara identifies cit and the atinan, he regards cit as eternal :
for Rsanahuja, however, consciousness has a beginning and an end.
Ahamkara is another interesting term. It is sometimes translated
'ego-complex' or 'I-consciousness'. Once again, it is to be
distinguished from the self and can be understood as the wrong notion
of the self which is obtained by mistakenly identifying oneself with
the internal organ or the body. In connotation it seems rather like
the jiva in that both terms are the result of the misidentification
of the true self, but whereas jiva is a general term referring to the
tranEmigratory self in all its aspects, the ahamkara is the specific
notion which an individual has of himself as a result of faulty
introspection. In practice it is included in the notions of manas,
buddhi and the antahkarana.
Sthitaprajna And Saksin
The concepts of sthitaprajna (the man of steady understanding) and of
1 Vedanta Sutra Bhasya. 1.1, Translated by Thibaut, Clarendon Press,
Sacred Books of the East. Vol. 4B.
Unless otherwise stated all future quotations from Ramanuja's
commentary on the Vedahta Sutras will be from this translation.
saksin are of great ethical importance. They emphasise the non-
involvement with the empirical world which strikes the Westerner as a
characteristic feature of Hindu thought. It is certainly a feature
of Shankara's account of the self in its classical interpretation.
One of the questions to be considered in this study is whether
Ramanuja's insistence that the self is a conscious directing agent
rather than sheer consciousness does anything to modify this
fundamental attitude.
The concept of sthitaprajna is first elaborated and clarified in the
Bhagavad-G-ita.
The Bhagavad-G-ita attempts a synthesis of several different strands of
thought and the concept of sthitaprajna is central in the reconciliation
of apparently incompatible ideas. Chief of these is the synthesis of
action and knowledge. On the one hand the life of action involves an
acceptance of manyness and differentiation, and on the other, the
knowledge of Brahman, the supx-eme reality is a knowledge in which there
can be no element of differentiation. In acting a man is inevitably
bound to the wheel of k&naa and further action whereas knowledge of
supreme reality must involve the transcending of action altogether.
*• — N
The G-ita reconciles these opposites in the concept of the sthitaprajna.
The man of steady understanding adopts the transcendental standpoint,
the standpoint of the divine. Consequently, although he must continue
to act, he no longer is motivated by egocentric considerations. He
acts without desire for the fruit of his actions. By so doing he is no
longer bound by his actions and is able to attain Brahmisthiti, the
divine state. In the divine state a person is never deluded and
ultimately obtains moksha, the complete merging with Brahman. The
sthitaprajna thus reconciles in his life the values of ethics and
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mysticism. His life is characterised by a strict ethical discipline
which leads eventually to the attainment of a state where ethical
considerations are no longer relevant.
Che &ita gives the following descriptions of the man who has his
thoughts fixed and steady :
'When a man puts away all the desires of his mind ..... and when his
spirit is content in itself, then is he called stable in intelligence
(sthitaprajna). He whose mind is untroubled in the midst of sorrows
and is free from eager desire amid pleasures, he from whom passion,
fear and rage have passed away - he is called a sage of settled
intelligence. He who is without affection on any side, who does not
rejoice or loathe as he obtains good or evil - his intelligence is
firmly set. He who draws away the senses from the objects of senses
on every side as a tortoise draws in his limbs into the shell - his
intelligence is firmly set.'1
Linked with the concept of sthitaprajna is that of saksin, the
witness-self. Saksin means observer or eye-witness and it is used in
philosophy to designate the knowing subject. Shankara uses the term
sak3in to refer to cit, the underlying consciousness.
Summing up this section, we see that the Hindu and Christian approaches
to the question of the personal are quite different. In Christianity,
the question of the evaluation of personal characteristics, and
derivatively of the person, occurs within the context of a religious
experience of a relationship of man with God which displays certain
unique features. Metaphysically we might say that the context of the
question of the personal is that of action and in particular of
interaction. In Hinduism the nature of religious experience is
different and seems to be centered on reflection rather than action.
1 Bhagavad-G-ita, 11.54-58. Quoted in History of Indian Philosophy.
Vol. 2, p.491, by S.N, Dasgupta, Cambridge University Press, 1932.
The context of evaluation is knowledge rather than action or interaction
and, therefore, we get audi discussion and analysis of the different
aspects of personal experience, whioh is absent from Chritian thought.
Corresponding to this, the notion of the 'Witness-self', the impassive,
wisdom-filled observer, is the highest evaluative category.
The Conception Of Moksha
In the preceding section I said that the context of religious experience
in Hinduism might be more appropriately described a3 knowledge or
enquiry rather than action or interaction. This could be misleading,
Paradoxically perhaps, Hindu religion is philosophical in character in
that it emphasises the importance of knowledgej but Hindu philosophy is
religious in character in that it presupposes a certain view of the end
of life, and to this extent is essentially praotical; enquiry is not
simply for its own sake, but in order to further the achievement of the
ideal prescribed by religion, whioh is moksha or liberation. The
presupposition of moksha as the end and aim of life is perhaps the
governing religious conception in Hinduism and, therefore, an important
key to the Hindu understanding of the personal.
All the schools of Indian philosophy with the exception of the Carvakas
or materialists accepted the ideal of moksha and held that the way to
achieve it was through knowledge, and that the state of moksha which
was the outcome of this knowledge was imperishable. Moksha was a
presupposition which did not require independent justification, but
which itself was used as a criterion for the acceptance or rejection
of philosophical systems.
'Any metaphysical system which cannot interpret the universe in a way
compatible with the possibility of moksha must be discarded. While
refuting the views of the opponents, one of the favourite arguments
which Shankara employs is to show that the theory in question fails
to make room for liberation.'"1"
1 Devaraja, Op. Cit. p.5k
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The importance of moksha as a presupposition of Hindu thought is also
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emphasised by S.S. Roy :
'between the adverse critic of Advaita and Advaitism there is community
of purpose, and identity of motifs. And the motif that unites two such
antagonists takes its colouring from what we have ..... described as the
morphological structure of the entire Indian philosophical
consciousness. "Hie adverse critics of the Advaita, as much as the
Advaitins themselves, are oriented to a value, other than the one,
found in the attitude that accepts the merely given. This value is
freedom ..... Freedom ..... is central to Indian philosophy Only
its conceptual determinations vary. The variations in conceptual
determinations of Freedom, reflect temperamental differences in the
envisagement of this commitment in its metaphysical and logical aspects.'
Given that moksha is of central importance as a presupposition of Hindu
thought, what are we to understand by it? There are variations in the
way that it is interpreted. Devaraja distinguishes a negative and a
positive element in its meaning and says that
'All Indian thinkers are one with regard to the negative conclusion that
the state of release involves a complete freedom from the shackles of
empirical existence. Differences on the positive side are mostly due to
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their differing conceptions of the nature of the Atman.'
Can we compare this conception of the state of moksha with anything
similar in Christianity? Does, for example, the notion of the after-life
hold a similar position to that of moksha? The answer seems to be no.
In Hinduism moksha is a definite state to be aimed at, which, when once
achieved, is final. There is no similar state of being to which the
Christian's life is directed. Again there is a certain vagueness in the
Christian account of the final outcome of things. Bie one thing positive
that the Christian is left with is the assurance that all will be well j
how this will come about or what it will consist in is not made dear
1 The Heritage of Shankara, pp.viii, ix. (Udayana Pubis. Allahabad, 1965.)
2 Op. Cit. p.77.
except in highly metaphorical language. The reason for this, I suggest,
is the same as the reason for the vagueness in the Christian acoount of
the nature of a person : it is that these questions are not central to
the Christian understanding of life. What is central is the
relationship between God and man and it is this relationship which gives
meaning to the Christian's present existenoe and it is the assuranoe of
the continuance of the relationship which gives significance to any
accounts of the after-life.
3?
CHAPTER r»0 - BRAHMAN
Introduction
In the first Chapter a complex picture started to emerge. Broadly
speaking, the Christian emphasis is on relationship and the Hindu is
on self-realisation. This is a reflection of the Christian idea of
God as a loving Being, concerning Himself in the affairs of this world
and of the Hindu view of ultimate reality as Pure Being, One without a
second. Nevertheless, although each tradition differs in its major
emphasis, yet they are not consistently different, and in fact we find
common elements. In Hinduism, alongside strict mohism, there is a
flourishing theism which emphasises God's concern for the world and the
importance of the relationship between Him and His worshipper. In
Christianity, although the main feature whioh has led Christian thinkers
to a view of God as personal is His loving concern for the world, yet
when Christian philosophers came to give expression to the nature of a
person, the definition given, 'a self-subsistent entity of a rational
nature', would equally fit Shankara's Brahman, a being of whom loving
concern could certainly not be predicated.
As the conception of God is of paramount importance in Christian
thought, so the conception of Brahman is vital to Hindu religious
thought. In both, supreme reality and supreme value coincide. God is
the One who was, before the heavens and the earth were created, and in
creating them, He also endowed them with whatever importance and
significance they may possess. Brahman, likewise, is the One, out of
which the universe has evolved and into whioh it will return at the
end of the age, from there to continue with the never-ending cycle of
evolution and dissolution : thus it has always been extremely important
to Hindu thinkers to explain the relationship of this present reality to
the ultimata reality. Van Buitenen, for example, declares that the
fundamental problem of the Vedanta is to explain the relation between
the first cause and the effected world.*
I have argued that the Christian conception of the personal nature of
Cod has arisen directly out of the Hebrew-Christian experience of
encounter with a God who demands personal obedience and who presents
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himself as the awareness of 'absolute demand' end 'final Succour*.
It is reasonable, then, to assume, that since the conception of Brahman
is central to Hindu religious thought, the understanding of this
conception will give a due to the nature and importance of the
conception of the personal in Hindu thought.
While there can be no doubt within the Christian tradition, that
whatever else or more God may be, He is certainly personal in His nature
and in His relationship to the world and to man, Brahman may or may not
be regarded as personal. The term 'Brahman' functions much more in th<»
manner of the expression 'the Absolute* as used by Western Idealist
philosophers. It is equivalent to the ultimate principle of existence
or the ultimate reality. As it was a matter of controversy amongst the
Idealists whether or not the Absolute oould be regarded as personal,
(end thus as equivalent to the Christian God), so there is disagreement
between Shankara and Ramanuja over the fundamental nature of Brahman.
The question of the nature and character of Brahman is synonymous for
Shankara and Ramanuja with the question of the nature and character of
ultimate reality or of the power of principle behind the universe, Ihe
essential difference between these thinkers concerns the personal
character or otherwise of Brahman and the importance of this issue lies
1 Ramanuja's Vedartha Saxagraha, Deocan College Monograph Series,
Poona, 1956*
2 H.H. Parmer, The World and God, Nisbet A Co., 1935* pp.23-25.
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in the implications it has for the way of life and set of values
adopted by the believer. Are 'personal* values better preserved
within an overall framework of theism, or are they adequately
accounted for by non-dualism or monism which is prepared to incorporate
en aspect which is theistic? This is one of the important questions
which this thesis attempts to elucidate.
An objector at this point might question the assumption that metaphysical
beliefs can have ethical implications. Can this simply be taken for
granted without discussion, especially in view of the vast amount of
controversy in contemporary philosophy over the fact/value distinction?
My reply to this is fourfold. In the first place, the assumption that
metaphysical beliefs may have ethical implications can be made without
prejudice to the question of the autonomy of ethios. It can prevent
no-one from holding ethical convictions which are unrelated to a set of
metaphysical beliefs. Secondly, as we have already noted in Chapter One,
although ethical questions may be considered in isolation from questions
concerning the nature of the world as a whole, yet for the religious
believer these issues cannot be kept apart. Since religion affects
man's total life, each aspect of it must in some way colour the other
aspects. Thus for the Christian, the way in which he conducts himself
and the motivation for his actions can only be considered in the light of
experience of and commitment to a personal loving Cod. This leads to the
third point. Since the believer does view these issues as parts of en
inter-related whole it is important, if what he says is to carry any
weight with an outsider, that what he says should at least be consistent
with itself. It is also important to examine the type of arguments used
and the sort of conclusiveness which these arguments are capable of
producing. Just as the Christian views his moral commitment from within
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the framework of his commitment to a personal God, so Hindu non-dualists
and theiats wish to link up their metaphysical and moral beliefs and to
show that the one provides the motivation for the other. It is a common
feature of contemporary Vedantism to argue that the only convincing
motivation for universal love is the conviction of non-dualism. Before
we can comment on the force of this argument we must examine the
premisses from which it is taken to follow. The fourth point we have
already touched on in the previous Chapter. The personal is essentially
an evaluative conception. In a religious context the significance of
the personal is determined by the nature of the religious experience
which is central to the tradition in question. This means that an
analysis of the religious consciousness gives rise to a view of the self
which participates in this religious consciousness and the values that
are taken to pertain to the self are also derived from the religious
consciousness. Non-dualism and theism give rise to different accounts of
the self and, therefore, to different evaluations of the personal.
History Of The Term 'Brahmanf
H. deWitt Griswold distinguishes three interconnected lines of development
of the use of the term 'brahman' in Pre-Upanishadic literature.^ In the
first place it was used to refer to the holy word. Different aspects of
this tended to be emphasised in different collections of literature. In
the Rg-Veda 'brahman' is used interchangeably with other words meaning
•hymn'. In this period, the essentials of Vedic worship were sacrifice
and brahman : both were a means of 'quickening and strengthening the
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gods'. In the Atharva-Veda the emphasis shifted to the potency of
brahman as a magical formula or ohara while in the Brahmanas, its
sacredness, the result of its divine origin and antiquity, came to the
forefront.
1 H. do Witt Griswold, Brahman. A Study in the History of Indian
Philosophy. N.Y., The Macmillan Co., 1900 . 2 Ibid. p.5.
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Secondly, Brahman was used in a more 'subjective' sense to refer to
the truth of the external word or to its inner content; and finally,
we get the god Brahmanaspati (Lord of Brahman) or Brhaspati, who is
the apotheosis of the power of the holy word. Brahmanaspati is
described in such terns as 'the first bom', 'the world order' and
'the self-existent*.
J. Sonde points out in agreement that
'Brahman is more and more regarded as the potency or principle from
which all things are derived, as the ultimate basis of the world, as
erne with the true immortality and eternal reality'
Further, G-onda claims that
'its meanings or shades of meaning represent only facets or
manifestations of an idea which is more general than "sacred word,
stansa, hymn, rite, ritual, potency, etc." which is even more
comprehensive than these objects added together «..•• these objects
are designated by the same name, because they all participate in or
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partake of that important and central concept. *
G-onda sees the oentral meaning of brahman to be a power which manifests
itself in various ways. He argues that in the early literature there
is no sharp distinction drawn between the personal and impersonal,
animate and inanimate aspects of this power. Brahmanaspati, the
personal Lord of prayer, was simply a way of formulating the ' impersonal'
aspect of divine power which was equally well represented by the
neutral 'brahman*.
There has been much controversy over the etymology of 'brahran •. Gonda
emphasises the arguments in favour of the root brh-bnabati - to exceed.
« •
The adjeotive 'brhat' from this root, generally has such meanings as
•firm, great, powerful, extensive'.** In this sense it is easily
1 J. Cronda, Notes on Brahman. Utrecht, J.B. Beyers, 1950, p.10.
2 Ibid., p.13. 3 Ibid., p.38.
seen to be applicable to the meanings which we have already considered
for brahman in the pre-Upaniahadlo literature. In the context of Vedic
literature the holy word, as described by Griswold is something that
grants prosperity, that strengthens and that animates. And from being
the power or potency behind the sacrifice, it cooes to be regarded as
the sustaining principle behind the universe.
'From being the subjective force which helped the seer to compose a
prayer it case to mean the power of sacrifice, and since in the
Brahmanas the whole universe is regarded as produced from sacrifice,
the term cams to signify the creative principle of the world.*1
Gonda'a etymology agrees with that of Shankara end Ramenuja, and the
Madhva school which followed Ramahuja. The latter say that the
etymological meaning of brahman is 'the entity in which there is a
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fullness of qualities.'
By the time of the Upanishads, Brahman was definitely established as
the ultimate reality or the principle behind the universe. One of the
major themes of the Upanishadio writers was the enquiry into the nature
of this ultimate support of the universe, the 'self-existent' or
•imperishable' and the attempt to relate the changing phenomenal world
of everyday experience to the unchanging, imperishable Brahman.
The teachings of the Upanishads was summarised in aphoristic form by
Badarayana in the Vedanta Sutras. These sutras, together with the
Upanishads, provide the foundation for the philosophical systems of
Shankara and Ramahuja.
The Vedanta Sutras themselves are written so concisely as to be
wellnigh incomprehensible without the help of a commentary. Although
1 S. Radh&krishnan, Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1, quoted by Gonda,
Op. Cit. 2 Gonda, Op. Cit., p.20.
*T Zj
there is general agreement amongst Hindus that they contain the essence
of Upanishadic teaching, there is les3 agreement as to what that
teaching actually is, Shankara and Ramanuja differ fundamentally over
several vital points.
It would be agreed by most unbiased readers that it is impossible to
make the teachings of the Upanishads consistent as they stand. Roughly
speaking, older Upanishads auoh as the Brhadaranyaka and Chnndogya,
from which Shankara frequently quotes, tend to favour a monistic
doctrine where Brahman is the indescribable, not this, not this
or, if he is described, it is in impersonal terms such as a mass of
intelligence or the self-existent. Sane of the later Upanishads, on
✓
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the other hand, like the Svetasvatara, can scarcely be construed in
other than monotheistic terms. Brahman is here described as the inner
ruler and controller of the universe.
Shankara's method of interpretation has the great merit that it allows
him to acknowledge and account for these differences in teaching in a
consistent way. This he does by making a distinction between higher and
lower knowledge. Lower knowledge (vyavaharika satyam) is the knowledge
of common-senee and everyday empirical experience. So long as we remain
within this sphere, this knowledge is perfectly genuine. It leads us to
acknowledge amultiplicity of selves and the existence of a supreme ruler
and controller of the universe. Higher knowledge (paramarthika satyam)
is that possessed by the knower of Brahman who has aohieved moksha. In
this state it is realised that there is nothing but Brahman. The
supposition that there are finite selves and a personal ruler of the
universe is seen to be ultimately an illusion (raaya), true only so long
as one has not yet achieved knowledge of Brahman. In this way, Shankara
is able to reconcile the texts which apparently preach theism, with
those that are monistic in content, by saying that in the former
knowledge at the empirical level is being referred to, while in the
latter it is knowledge on the transcendental level. Thibaut concludes
of Shankara's method of interpretation that
•it is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating
heterogeneous systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly
in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than
those of other Vedihta systems.1^
On the other hand, Thibaut argues, the teaching of the Vedanta Sutras
themselves is almost undoubtedly theistic in intent and Ramanuja,
therefore, is the more faithful commentator as far as the sutras are
concerned,2
These conclusions of Thibaut regarding the contents of the Upanishads
and the Vedanta Sutras are in conformity with our earlier findings
concerning pre-Upsnishadic literature. They suggest that from the
earliest times there has been m ambivalence inherent in Hindu thought
regarding the nature of the ultimate reality. The characterisation of
the ultimately real as personal would seem to go back at least as far
as the impersonal account. Perhaps one of the reasons why a personal
theism did not take greater root was that a multiplicity of gods was
always acknowledged and this made it difficult to accept any one god
as supreme.
Although there is evidence that the tradition followed by Raaahuja is
jast as ancient as that followed by Rhankara, yet the most influential
philosophical school has undoubtedly been the Vedahta of Shank&ra,
Many orthodox Hindus insist that this is the only doctrine that is
1 Sacred Books of the Saat. Vol. IH1V, Oxford, Clarenden Press, 1880,
p.C/JClV. Unless otherwise stated all other quotations from
Shankara•s commentary on the Vedanta Sutras will be from this edition.
2 Ibid.
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taught in the scriptures. Vedahta has received additional support from
the fact that Western educated Hindus at the beginning of this century
found in it many points of similarity and comparison with Western forms
of Idealism. Probably largely for this reason, it has frequently bean
Vedahta that has been expounded to the West by those Hindus who wished
to make their religion and philosophy intelligible to the West and to
show that it was in no way inferior to Western religion and philosophy."*"
Cn the other hand, it must be said that the philosophical ideas of
Shankara have never found favour with the mass of the Hindu people, who
in actual practice have tended to adopt some form of theism. The
nature of Hinduism seems to be such that it is capable of assimilating
almost any kind of belief and practice, without undue regard for the
consistency of so doing. Nevertheless, a great revolution is taking
place in Hindu 'Ihought at the moment. This has been largely
precipitated by the advent of Independence and the creation of a secular
democracy. It has become imperative to weld India into a single unit.
This implies legislation on a national scale which will apply to every
community. This has led to the realisation that many of the practices
traditionally associated with Hinduism, such as caste and the joint
family system with all its implications, are not of the essentials of
the faith. This is leading to a reappraisal of Hindu thought. Its
metaphysical and ethical assumptions are being re-examined and
reaffirmed. It is hoped that a study such as the present, of the nature
and importance of the conception of the personal, may help in casting
some light on these questions for both Hindu and Christian thinkers.
1 Vedanta is not the only system which has sent missionaries to the
West. There have also been various attempts to spread Yoga which
relies for its philosophy on the Samkhya system.
Shsnkara's Account Of Brahman
As stated earlier, Shankara•s method of interpretation allows him to
impose consistency on the teaohings of the Upanishads and to
accommodate both personal and impersonal accounts of Brahman. He
does this by distinguishing between a higher and a lower from of
knowledge and a higher and a lower form of Brahman. The higher
knowledge is of Brahman as he really is, nirguna (qualityless) Brahman t
the lower knowledge is of the way Brahman appears to us as mediated
by maya (the world illusion or cosmic ignorance). Brahman remains
eternally the same I he only appears to be other than he is because of
our ignorance. A favourite illustration, of this is that of the rope
that is mistaken for a snake. At no time is there a snake present, but
the onlooker, through false perception, imagines that there is, and this
generates in him false fears, which vanish when he realises his mistake.
In the same way, Brahman, which is an absolute unity, is mistakenly
thought to have multiplicity. Ms is the effect of maya. Bo long as
the soul mistakenly identifies itself with part of this multiplicity
which it peroeives, it is subject to desire and passion. But once the
realisation dawns that all is Brahman, all desires cease and the self
becomes blissful in the knowledge of Brahman. Shankara describes the
purpose of studying the Vedic texts as being that of freeing oneself
•from that wrong notion whioh is the cause of all evil and attaining
thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self.
Maga
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The concept of maya is of great importance. Although the average
Hindu accepts the doctrine of maya as an attitude of baffled mistrust
towards life, whioh sees life as intrinsically meaningless and
1 Vedanta Sutras, l.i.l, Translated by Thibaut, Op. Cit.
2 See Paul Devanandum, Me Concept of Maya. Lutterworth Press, 1950.
J. Gonaa, Four Studies in the Language of the Veda. Mouton 3: Co.'a
Gravenhage, 1959.
sorrowful,* in its original use the term had no such connotation.
In the Rg-Veda it often refers to an incomprehensible power or wisdom
which can only be ascribed to divine beings. Sometimes it may be
used in connection with the marvels of nature and here 'Maya is the
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power, ability or capacity of achieving the marvellous •. In other
places the gods who are described as 'wise', 'knowing' or 'omniscient*
are also said to possess maya and this suggests that there may be a
connection between the concepts of wisdom and maya,
fronds. points out that the word 'dhira*, which may be translated as
'wise' or 'thoughtful', whan it is used in the Rg-Veda, often refers
to the technical skill or practical wisdom of divine beings. In the
Atharva-Veda the term 'maya' is associated with the adjective
'pracetas* (clever) which is applied to the asur&s, a group of god¬
like beings, to whom is attributed creative power, Gonda describes
the conception of maya in this context as 'a power to create and
achieve the marvellous.
It may be seen from this, that in its original sense maya signifies
a creative power rather than an illusoiy power as later came to be
the case. Hie main emphasis which occurs in the early use of the
term 'maya', is on the marvellousness and wonder of creation. Hie
fact that the early writers seem to be indicating by the use of the
term 'maya' is the wonder that there is anything there at all, and
following on from this, awe and admiration at the nature of what _is
there. In other words, maya is the concept which explains the
inexplicable, i.e. the phenomenal world, the fact that there is
anything there at all, that we do in fact exist in the manner that
we do.
1 Devanandum, Op. Git. 2 Gonda, Op. Git., p.1^2. 3 Ibid, p.159.
Maya And The Christian Doctrine Of Creation
A comparison may be drawn here with the Christian doctrine of Sod's
marvellous creation of the world out of nothing. To say that the
world is created by maya, when maya refers to 'the inexplicable
power of a High Being to assume forms, to project itself into
extermality, to assume an outward appearance, to appear in, or as,
the phenomenal world.'1 is both as satisfactory and as puzzling an
explanation of the existence of the world as to say that it was
created by G-od out of nothing. Both explanations are really only
attempts to describe what is tfcs case and what is recognised to be
essentially inexplicable. To say that the world is either the
creation of Cod or the projection of a High Being are simply ways of
conveying the awe and wonder felt before creation. To say that the
High Being projects himself or that Cod creates out of nothing may
add to our mental picture and increase our 3ense of awe and reverence
in the face of nature, but they add nothing at all to our practical
understanding of the existence of the world. In both cases also the
reality of the phenomenal world is taken for granted and it is only
in later liindu literature that the idea of the world being an
•illusion' creeps in.
The fact that the term'mays' began to be used in a greater variety of
senses and gradually to assume the meaning of 'illusion* may have been
due in part to the fact already noted, that there was in Hinduism no
supreme, personal Cod. There were a great number of gods and each in
so far as he was creative, had the power of maya, but since none was
supreme, the meaning of maya did not become associated exclusively
with the unique creation of a beneficient personal being, but was able
to assume a variety of shades of meaning. For example, since maya is
1 Ibid. p.128.
not associated exclusively with one supreme beneficlent Being, it
comes simply to refer to a miraculous power. Since power in itself
is morally neutral we occasionally find it put to bad use, and so
we come to find maya described as kapati (fraud, deceit).1 For
the same reason, i.e. that maya is not associated with any one
supreme Being, we find that 'men of uncommon qualities and
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achievements might also be credited with the faculty called maya.'
It is not difficult to see how when the question of the relation
between the phenomenal world and ultimate reality came to assume
fundamental importance for Hindu thought, the notion of maya as the
creative mysterious power of G-od was developed in two ways : it
helped to revoal Ishvara, the Ruler and Lord of the universe to the
worldj and at the same time, it hid from the human mind the real
nature of the individual's relation to the eternal Brahman.
It thus had two facets : on the positive side it functioned as the
power of God, creating the world of 'name and form' for the human
mind, and in its negative aspect, it acted as a veil or means of
concealment, screening the real nature of Brahi m from the world.
Both aspects appear in Shankara's thought, but it is the negative side
which tends to be emphasised. The world is maya because it is like
the illusion produced by the magician : it is simply a display having
no substantial reality behind it.
In popular i-eligioua thought, maya became personalised into the consort
of god and symbolised the power or energy of god. Maya was then the
creative energy of god manifested in the world and the maya-shakti
(eod's power or creative energy) cult became an integral part of
1 Ibid, p.127. 2 Ibid, p.160.
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popular worship. The sheer exuberance end positive delight in the
manifold variety of life is perhaps best demonstrated in Hindu art and
architecture
■Anirvaoaniya
One of Shankara • s illustrations of maya is the example of a man who
sees the moonlight glinting on a shell on the beach and mistakes it
for a bit of silver. But when he investigates it further he finds it
to be only a shell. Here the object of perception is said to be
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anirvaoaniya, which may be translated 'indefinable*. The meaning is
that it can neither be said to be real, nor to be unreal. (Por
example, 'Maya cannot be defined as that which is or that which
is not.'It cannot be real silver that appears in the perception
for further investigation shows it to be a shell j but neither can the
perception of silver be totally unreal, for the experience of silver is
a fact of perceptual experience and what is unreal cannot be perceived.
The silver is, therefore, said to be anirvacanlya.
We may infer from this example that when it is claimed that from the
standpoint of ultimate reality the whole world is unreal or illusory,
this does not mean that the world does not exist. To come to see that
one's experience is illusory is to come to see that one has been wrongly
describing it. In the light of further knowledge we realise that the
silver is merely an appearance of the shell and could have no
independent existence. Likewise, in the light of ultimate reality
(Brahman), we realise that empirical experience is merely an aspect of
1 See H. Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilisation,
Pantheon Books Inc., New York, 1946, for examples of this.
2 Literally this means 'indescribable'.
3 Vedanta Sutra, l.iv.l.
Brahman which we hare hitherto been falsely thinking of and describing
as being itself ultimate.
Shankara is emphatic that knowledge of Brahman shows empirical
knowledge to be the product of ignorance. For example.
•Perception and other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts hare
for their object that which is dependent on Nescience.*1 and
•the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically
assumed, as long as we have not learned ..... that the Self is one only.
As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal
Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its
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distinctions of bondage, final release and the like.*
Hie one universal Self, the higher (nirguna) Brahman is described as
•eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent,
, 3
and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss.*
♦it transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category of
objects.
•of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all differences to be
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described only by denying of it all other characteristics.'
This last description is typical of Shankara's account of Brahman.
Brahman can in no sense be an object and so cannot have any predicates
ascribed to it as if it were an object. Strictly speaking it is
indefinable, 'beyond speech and mind*, 'not this, not this •
Shankara discusses the question of the sense in which the higher Brahman
can be talked about or described in his commentary on the Taittiriya
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Upanishad. Here Brahman is described as satyam-jnanam-anantam (truth-
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knowledge-infinity). Shankamexplains that the sentence, Brahman
1 V.S.l.i.l 2 V.S.I.ii.6 3 V.S.l.i.4 4 V.S.3.ii.22 5 V.S.3.ii.l8
6 jJight Upanishads with the Commentary of Shaakaraoaiya. Vol. 1, Advaita
Ashrama, Calcutta, 1965t Taittiriya Upanishad, 2.1.1.
7 Later Vedantists often use the phrase sac cid anandam as a standard
formulation to describe Brahman, but this wording does not seem to have
been used by Shankara himself.
is truth, kno ledge, infinity, is intended to distinguish Brahman from
any other thing. If Brahman were simply an object amongst other objects,
then these terms would be applied to Brahman as adjectives, for example,
to describe a lotus as white rules out the possibility of its being blue
or red.
'Ad adjective is meaningful when there are many nouns which belong to
the same class and which are capable of having many adjectives.'L
But in the case of Brahman, there is only a single, unique Brahman.
Any terms used to refer to Brahman, cannot, therefore, be understood
simply as adjectives, but must be understood in a sense which distinguishes
Brahman from everything else.
Shankara's difficulty would seem to be that Brahman is the term which
denotes the totality of existence (as well as the supreme value). It is
impossible to talk about the world as a whole in the same way that we
can talk about objects within the world. For one thing, all talk about
the world implies a standpoint within the world from whioh the
relationship between objects in the world can be apprehended. To talk
about the world as a whole, implies a standpoint that is outside the
world. This is a logical impossibility, for we cannot conceive of
anything apart from the world as whole to which the world as a whole
could be related and so apprehended as a whole. But sinoe Brahman
denotes the supreme value, the realisation of which relates to moksha,
there must be some way, however oblique, of referring to Brahman.
Shankara solves this problem by saying that the terms aatyaa-jnanam-
anantam are primarily a means of distinguishing Brahman from what it
is not. Further, each of these terms must be treated absolutely
separately and not in conjunction with each other. Taken in conjunction,
they would indicate limitations of various sorts on Brahman, which is
not the case if they are treated separately.
1 Ibid.
The terra satyam, true, is equivalent to real and a thing is real when
it does not change its nature, and conversely, unreal when it does
change its nature* So a pot is unreal in relation to the clay out of
which it is made. The term satyam, when applied to Brahman, is
intended to distinguish Brahman, the ultimately real and absolutely
unchanging, from all unreal things.
The term •jnanam' means knowledge. In its usual application, it would
imply a knowing agent, but this cannot be the case in its application
to Brahman. For Shankara, a knowing agent cannot be termed either true
(i.e. absolutely real) or infinite. It cannot be absolutely real,
since the absolutely real must be that whioh does not change, and a
knowing agent must participate in change inasmuch as he passes from a
state of not knowing to a state of knowing. Neither can a knowing agent
be infinite since the infinite is that 'which is not separated from
anything1'1' t but a knowing agent must be separate from what is known and
so must be finite. It follows from this, that the term 'jnanaa', when
applied to Brahman, can only indicate knowledge without the implio&tion
of there being an agent or subject who knows.
As we have already seen, the tern 'anantam* (infinite), when applied to
Brahman, rules out the possibility of Brahman being a knowing agent, as
an agent must necessarily be limited.
The only one of these terms which denotes Brahman directly is the last,
anantam. Brahman is infinite in time and space and hence omniscient :
'since till that exists is inalienable from Brahman in time and space
..... there is nothing else whether subtle or soreened or remote or
past, present or future which can be unknowable to it. Therefore,
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Brahman is omniscient.'
1 Loo. Cit. 2 Ibid.
In contrast, Brahman is indicated, but not denoted, by the terms satyam
and jnanam. They apply to Brahman only when understood in conjunction
with enantaxa. Hie word 'jnanam* is only properly applicable to the
knowledge that compartmentalises and objectifies : but Brahman is free
from all such distinctions. Likewise, satyam which applies to external
reality in general i.e. to something which contains distinctions, can
only indirectly refer to Brahman, but cannot denote it.
Summing up Shankara' s position with regard to the nature of nirguna
Brahman, strictly understood it is absolutely indesoribable, but it
may nevertheless be indicated by the careful use of certain terms.
In contrast, Brahman in its lower form (saguna Brahman) is knowable as
Ishvara, the supreme Lord and Ruler of the universe, the object of
popular religious devotion. Shankara explains the distinction of the
higher and lower Brahman by saying that Brahman is apprehended under
two foims,
'as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the
evolutions of name and form' and
'as being the opposite of this i.e. free from all limiting conditions
whatever.
Brahman possesses a double nature, according as it is the objeot either
of knowledge or of nescience.
'As long as it is the object of nescience, there are applied to it the
2
categories of devotee, object of devotion and the like.'
Mrguna And Saguna Brahman : Antithetical Or Complementary?
It has been suggested by Griswold that
The lower knowledge is concerned with the lower Brahman as the supreme
concept of religion; while the higher knowledge is concerned with the
1 V.S. l.i.ll. 2 Ibid.
higher Brahman a3 the supreme concept of philosophy.'1
By drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and religion, and
implying the autonomy of each, Griswold tries to preserve intact the
personal values embodied in Xshvara, the lower Brahmen. This view
receives some justification from Shankara. For example,
•we therefore must definitely conclude that Brahman is devoid of form.
Those other passages ..... which refer to a Brahman qualified by form
do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but rather at
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enjoining the worship of Brahman.'
It would certainly be a mistake to under-rate the importance which
Shankara attaches to saguna Brahman.
Nevertheless, although the personal Deity may appear absolutely real
to the worshipper, he depends for his being as Lord
'Upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of nescience
It is due to the effeot of Nescience that in the phenomenal world the
supreme Brahman appears in the form of the Lord who is the ruler of the
individual selves or jivas.
'For him who has reached the state of truth and reality the whole
apparent world does not exist.
Brahman cannot undergo change and so cannot be the ruler of changing
selves. The same transcendence of Ishvara or saguna Brahman appears
in Shankara*s treatment of the ultimate end of life. The lower Brahman
as the Lord and ruler of the individual souls, metes out reward and
punishment. This is allotted according to the actions of the souls.




'The fruits come from the Lord acting with a view to the deeds done by
the souls.
The individual souls are created in forms corresponding to their past
deeds. Souls who have lived well go on 'the path of the gods' to a
kind of paradise, while those who have lived badly return to earth in
another form. "Hie path of the gods', however, has nothing to do with
knowledge of Brahman, aooording to Shank&ra, and is quite irrelevant to
those who have attained such knowledge.
'We do not see that going cm the path of the gods has anything to do
with perfect knowledge. For those who, risen to the intuition of the
Self's unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the potentiality
of all suffering is already destroyed here below, have nothing further
to look for but the dissolution of the bode of activity end enjoyment
of former deeds in the body; in their case, therefore, to proceed on
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the road of the gods would be purposeless.*
Brahman. Sat, Cit, Moksha
Before closing this account of Brahman in Shankara*s thought, there are
several identifications which Shankara makes, which deserve comment.
The description of Brahman as sat, i.e. being or that which is we have
already met. This identification is understandable since Brahman is
the supremely real and that which is absolutely unchanging. In Hindu
thought, sat, the real and unchanging is opposed to asat, not in the
sense of the non-existent, but in the sense of the changing or even the
chaotic."*
1 V.S. 3.11.41 2 V.S. 3.iii.30.
3 o.f. Rg-Veda where being is said to have come from non-being. This
seems to be the creation of order out of chaos in the maimer of the
Timaeus rather than Genesis.
Brahman is also identified with cit, i.e. consciousness. Cit is, in
fact, the defining characteristic of Brahman and has links with the
equation Atman(the self) is Brahman; for the essential character of
the Self is consciousness. The cognitive nature of Brahman is frequently
likened to the luminosity of the sun.
'Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition - as the sun's nature is
eternal luminosity.'*
Shank&ra makes further use of the metaphor of light to explain the
nature of consciousness. Just as we do not become aware of light except
as it illuminates different objects, so the faot that we may not always
be aware of being conscious does not mean that consciousness has ceased,
but only that there are no objects of which to be conscious.
'The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of objects,
not to the absence of intelligence; just as the light pervading space
Is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to
the absence of its own nature ..... eternal intelligence is the essential
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nature of the soul.'
Shankara's explanation of the self-revealing nature of consciousness and
his equation of the self of the individual with the supreme Brahman, the
Self of the universe, will be discussed further in the next Chapter on
the nature of the Atman, as will the translation of pit.
Finally, raoksha (release) is equated with being or knowing Brahman and
the characteristics of moksha are described as the characteristics of
Brahman. Moksha is said to be
'eternal without undergoing any changes, omnipresent as ether, free from
all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of
self-luminous nature ..... It (moksha) is, therefore, the same as
Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged.
1 V.S. l.i.5. 2 V.S. 2.iii.l8. 3 V.S. l.i.4
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And later on : 'Release is nothing but being Brahman.'
These are the salient points in Shankara's conception of Brahman. We
turn now to Ramahuja's account of Purushottama, or the Highest Lord.
Raxaanuja's Account Of God
Ramanuja, like Shankara, holds a doctrine of Advaitiam (non-dualism),
i.e. the belief that the totality of experience is a unity; but in his
case it is modified in that he allows for a diversity within the unity.
Hence the name Vishishtidvoita (modified non-dualism) has been applied
to his philosophy.
Western readers who study Ramanuja become aware of a man who is deeply
religions in a sense with which they are familiar, i.e. he worships a
God who is supreme and personal in nature in that he elicits the
loving devotion of His worshipper. He is also a God who by His grace
enables his worshipper to achieve the final goal, raoksha. Many
elements in the Christian view of God and of life in God are present
in Ramanuja'c writings. What is pezhaps most striking in Ramahuja'a
thought in its philosophical aspect, is his devotion to •common-sense',
by which I mean his determination to take the deliverenoes of common
experience and common religious faith at their face value and not to
relegate them to second place in the general scheme of things in order
to satisfy the demands of theoretical explanation, however pressing
these demands may be. Ramanuja sees Shankara's monism as Just such a
threat to the ordinary meaning and significance of life. His
criticisms of Shankara, which are both detailed and penetrating,
concentrate cm two main angles : he argues in the first place that
experience is not as described by Shankara; for example, we never have
any experience of 'pure consciousness', of Undifferentiated unity', and
that, therefore, Shankara's claims can have no experiential basis;
secondly, he argues that were experience as described by Shankara,
then men's life would have no inoentive and significance; for example,
if *1' am not there to experience moksha. as Shankara claims is the
case, than this goal of moksha can have no significance or interest
for me. From this basis we see that That may loosely be termed
'personal values' seem likely to stand a better chance of survival
with Rsunahuja than with Shankara.
We shall try to see in what follows, just how far the personal nature
of Ramanuja's God is comparable to the Christian God. We have noted
that the predominant note in Hinduism is one of self-realisation,
expressed in the traditional goal of raoksha, liberation, freedom from
the shackles of empirical existence, which results in the complete
isolation and detachment of the 'witness-self'. It is difficult to
see how this goal can be reconciled with the Christian standpoint
which starts from the importance of the interpersonal and envisages a
type of personal relationship based on love as the ultimate to be
arrived at. The question which inevitably arise*. — consider
Ramanuja's account of God is just how far he subscribes to each
viewpoint. Does his view of God as personal result in an account of
the significance of life which is based on personal relationships, or
is the worshipper's relationship with his God to be viewed ultimately
simply as a more effective means of obtaining self-realisation?
We have already noted some of the difficulties which arise in trying
to describe a God with personal characteristics. Does personality not
require an 'other' and does this not imply an intolerable limitation
on God's nature? Can Raaanuja present God's relationship with the
world in such a way as to preserve both His personal characteristics
and His transcendence and infinity?
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Shankara asserts that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is 'one without a
second', a bare self-identical unity : in contrast Ramanuja presents us
with a diversified unity, in which the parts, though they derive their
ultimate reality and significance from their relationship to the world,
may yet be regarded as having a certain independent existence of their
own. The picture with which Ramahuja presents us is of the world as
an ensouled organism of which God is the soul. In other words, the
analogy which Ramanuja uses to describe the relationship of God to the
world is that of the soul acting on the body. This is a good analogy
in several aspects. One of the big problems which arises once we
describe God as separate from the world is that of accounting for ills
relationship to the world and His action on the world. How can God,
who transcends physical reality, react cm physical reality? The only
direct case of such action to which we have access is our own
direction of our bodies and relation to them. In the soul-body
relation we experience mind acting upon matter and to extend this
£, slogy to the case of God's relationship to the world is far more
co» heasible and significant than, for example, to refer to God as
the Cause, the Unmoved Hover, or to say that the world is simply
a mist iew of God. The latter notions are abstract and theoretical,
while in , 'e of the soul-body relation, though we may not
understand h^ appens, we do observe that it happens and, therefore,
we start from ac\ j. experience.
/mother aspect in which the soul-body analogy is to be commended is that
it presents a practical illustration of how something can be both
dependent and independent. The body is absolutely dependent on the soul
in that without the soul it is dead, unable to function at all. But
granted that it requires the soul in order to function at all, the way
& J
in which it moves and acts is not always under the complete control of
the soul. Many parts of the body operate without any conscious effort
on our part. Others generally require conscious effort, but do not
always respond to it. Thus we may find ourselves unable to move our
foot because of cramp.
The universe, according to Ramanuja's conception of it as an ensouled
body, consists of God, spiritual elements and non-spiritual elements
(cit and acit).
'The Highest Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited
knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and non-sentient
beings.
Van Euitenen in his edition of Ramanuja's Vedartha Saragraha suggests
that the better rendering of oit and aoit is spiritual end non-spiritual
rather than sentient and non-sentient. His reason is that sentiency is
strictly speaking predicated of matter rather than of spirit and the
term 'cit * is used to refer to the 'spiritual order of the universe,
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the sum-total of individual steams.* In contrast, the term 'aoit'
refers to 'the non-spiritual order, the material or physical
ccanposition of the universe'^ which is the corporeal counterpart of
cit and subservient to it.
Ramahuja's distinction between body and soul is in some respects
similar to Aristotle's distinction of form and matter. Aristotle
describes the soul as the form of the body, that which gives the body
its distinctive character, lire body, as the matter which is informed
by the soul, can have no existence indpendent of the soul which is its
1 V.S. l.iv.27
2 Van Buitenen, Ramanuja's Vedartha Samgi-aaa. p.l83> fh.
3 Ibid.
form, and likewise the soul as form can only be understood as it is
exhibited in the matter of the body. The two are strictly
correlative and complementary, different aspects of one and the same
concrete reality. J\ll this applies equally to Ramahuja. In
Aristotle's case, the subject - attribute, form - matter distinction,
is worked out in much greater detail. We get a range of phenomena,
each of which can be understood as a complex of form and matter and
the components of which can themselves be understood in this way.
For example, the stone is the matter of the statue, but in relation to
the particles of which the stone is composed, the stone is form. Thus
there is no absolute distinction between what is form and what is
matter. This would appear to be implicit in Ramanuja's thought, in as
much as the soul in relation to God is to be regarded as instrument
and body. Where the two differ is that Aristotle allows for pure for®
at the top end of the scale viz. God, and pure matter at the lower end,
though this latter may be purely logical requirement. In Ramanuja's
case, God is not pure Soul, existing independently of the world; He
is the inner ruler and oontroller of the world which is his body, i.e.
the me ns by which he functions and expresses himself.
Just as the body has no proper existence apart from the soul, so the
spiritual and non-spiritual elements of the universe have no proper
existence apart from God, their inner Ruler. Ibe supreme Brahman rules
the individual soul as the individual soul rules the body.1 Ramahuja's
definition of body emphasises its utility. He says that
'Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of controlling and
supporting for its own purposes, which stands to the soul in an
entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul ..... In this
sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute
1 Vedartha Samgrsha, 2.26.
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the body of the supreme Ruler, for they are completely controlled and
supported by Him for His own ends, and are absolutely subservient to
Him.'1
It is important not to confuse iamanuja's conception of the body with
his conception of matter. The essence of body is not in its
materiality, but in its being the instrument of the soul. Apart from
serving the soul, the body has no proper existence.
Having emphasised the complete integration and interdependence of God
and the world as exhibited in the soul-body analogy and, in particular,
the body's dependence on the soul as its inner ruler, it is important
to consider also the other side of the coin. As the body is the
instrument of the soul and requires the soul's direction, so the soul
needs the body in order to function and express itself. Any complete
account of this metaphor must consider also the dependence of the sail
on the body - what could be said about the soul apart from the body?
How could it express itself apart from the body? As God is the Ruler
of the world so the world must be regarded as the self-expression of
God, as the means whereby He makes His character known and if the
world needs God in order to exist, so God must need the world. This
implication is contained in Ramanuja's thought and yet it is not
developed to the extent which one might expect. In many ways this is
not surprising as it raises enormous difficulties. If the world is
to be regarded as an integral part of God, then so must all the
imperfections and sufferings which are present in the world. IIow
than can God be perfect? Ramihuja is very concerned to rebut the
charge that God can be affected by the imperfections of the world.
Not only suffering is regarded a3 an imperfection, but also change of
any kind. We have already had occasion to note this presupposition
1 Vedanta Sutras, 2.i.9.
of both the Hindus and the Greeks that anything which is perfect cannot
be thought of as changing in any way. In order to maintain the
essential self-sufficiency and unchangingaess of God, Ramanuja invokes
the doctrine of lila : the world is simply the sport of God. This
conception is very similar to that of ELato in the Timaeus. Just as
the world results from a kind of overflow of God's creativity,
according to Flato, so for Ramanuja
•sll beings are mere playthings of Brahman the creation and
absorption of the world are only his sport.
God does change in as much as he passes from being in an unevolved
state to being in an evolved state but in his essential nature he
rem?.ins blissful in his unlimited knowledge. His evolution is not due
to any necessity, but occurs simply because he is
'desirous of providing himself with an infinity of playthings of all
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kinds from gods down to plants and stones.*
Any imperfection, suffering or change which occurs in the world in no
way affects its inner Ruler ;
'all imperfections and suffering are limited to the sentient beings
constituting part of its body, and all change is restricted to
non-sentient things which constitute another part. The highest Self
effected in that sense only that it is the ruling principle .....
of maker and souls in their ..... evolved state; but just on account
of being thus, vis. their inner Ruler and Self, it is in no way
touched by their imperfections and changes. Consisting of unlimited
knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his unified nature, engaged
in the sport of making this world go round.
«hen Ram&nuja denies that God can be in any way touched by the
imperfections and changes of the world he seems to take back with one
hand what he has given with the other. In proposing the soul-body
1 V.S. l.iv.27. 2 Ibid. 3 V.S. l.iv.27.
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relationship as the model of the relationship of God and the world he
offers an analogy which allows us to make sense of the relationship in
terms of familiar experience. Although we may not understand the 'how*
of the experience we cannot deny 'that' it occurs. The experience in
question involves a two-way traffic. On the one hand, we are aware of
ourselves as making decisions, controlling our movements, and so on :
on the other hand, we are also affected by what happens to our bodies.
We feel pain when we walk into a lamp-post, we are disappointed when
prevented from achieving our goals end in general, are aware of the
way in which our bodies both present us with possibilities of
experience and also set limits to our experience. If the soul-body
analogy is to be taken seriously and to be regarded as helpful, it is
not pressing it too far to ask that it take into account such features
of our experience. Certainly the reciprocity which this demands raises
great difficulties when applied to the case of God and the world, yet
unless this reciprocity be granted and the demands which it makes
faced up to it hardly seems worthwhile to employ the soul-body analogy
at all.
In employing the soul-body analogy, yet denying that God can be offeoted
by the changes in the world, Eamanuja is once again failing to hold
consistently to his original insight and reverting to the view of the
soul-body relationship held by Shankara. For Shank&ra a man is mistaken
in identifying himself with his body or even with his mind or his
thoughts. His true self is not to be found in the changing, outward
manifestations of the personality, but in the isolated, blissful
witness-self who remains imperturbable end calm in the midst of every
change. So the enlightened man strives to gain greater and greater
control over the functions of his body and mind and eventually even his
environment, because he realises that they are all separate from, end
subservient to, his real self. A nan in an unenlightened oandition may
identic himself with his environment, desires and ambitions, but when
he cooes to see the true nature of things he realises that these form
no part of his true self.
Whatever the merits of Shankara's account of the soul-body relation,
which will be discussed in the next Chapter, it is olear that it departs
from what can reasonably be regarded as the common-sonse understanding of
experience.
The question of the reciprocal interdependence of the world and God has
an important bearing on the question of the relationship between the
worshipper and God. In Chapter One I argued that a personal relationship
did not necessarily presuppose equality as persons between the
participants and that in many cases it was up to one partner to supply
all or nearly all of the *personal• element in the relationship.
Further I argued that some of the characteristics ascribed to God which
we consider to contribute to his 'personal* character, are not qualities
to be found in any human person. One essential feature of a personal
relationship, however, is that there shall be a 'response* of some kind
by one party to the other's approaches. Itoless the doctor elicits a
response from his patient, the patient cannot be cured and elioitation of
this response does not leave the doctor cold and indifferent, but rather
confirms him in his attitude of personal concern, for the patient.
Likewise the baby*3 response has an effect on the mother which again is
reflected back on the baby. If the relationship between man and God is
to be described in personal terms then it must be supposed that the
response of man to God itself produces some effeot on God. For example,
if God is described as a Ruler, then just as a ruler is pleased when
his subjects obey him, so God must be supposed to be gratified when man
obeys Him. In Christianity while the predominant trend in religious
practice presumes a degree of reciprocal interaction between Cod and
man, yet philosophers have been slow to realise this and have
persisted in describing God in abstract, Aristotelian terms suoh as
the First Cause and Unmoved Mover, neither of which terms could refer
to a possible object of worship or reverence.
Although prima facie Ramanuja's use of the soul-body analogy gives the
possibility of a degree of reciprocal interaction between God and the
world which allows for the development of a personal relationship
between man and God, and, therefore, permits the adoption of a set of
values centered on the experience of relationship, yet on closer
inspection we find that Ramanuja's recognition of the importance of
relationship in the religious consciousness is not given an adequate
critical foundation. The dependence of the body on the soul is
developed in a wholly one-sided manner and we have to recognise that
although the world is God's body, yet it is in the last analysis
simply 'on instrument of sport'.1
The importance for Ramanuja of allowing for God's response to the
worshipper is brought out in the question of the compassion of God.
Ramanuja's school is particularly noted for its emphasis on the grace
of God which enables the worshipper to attain salvation. This is an
aspeot of Ramahuja's theism which is of great interest from the
Christian point of view. The followers of Ramahuja were later to
divide into the 'cat' and the 'monkey' school, differing in their
accounts of the operation of the grace of God. As the cat carries
its kittens in its mouth and so requires no co-operation from them at
all, whereas the monkey must hold on to its mother, so the 'monkey'
school differed from the 'oat' school in holding that some co-operation
1 V.S. l.iv.27.
with the grace of God was necessary from the believer in order that
grace could be efficacious. To assert the reality of the compassionate
grace of God, however, is meaningless unless God is understood as
being moved by the suffering of the world and acting in response to
the world's need. It is difficult to see how God can consistently be
regarded as compassionate yet 'in no way touched by imperfections
and changes.
The difficulty here is twofold. All change is regarded as imperfection
and to admit that God is affected by change in the world, even though
the world may be regarded as his body, is apparently to admit
imperfection in God.
The first reply to this is to contradict the assertion that change is
synonymous with imperfection. Change in itself is neutral ; it is
part and parcel of experience. Ramanuja was bold enough to assert that
there can be no perception of anything completely undifferentiated. He
might also have added that there is no perception of anything
changeless. Some things in our experience change less then others, but
it is a matter of degree depending on the kind of thing In question.
Further, some changes may be for the better and there are some forms of
perfection which would be unattainable apart from change. A piece of
music is a pattern of changes end there are some pieces of music which
give us an experience of perfection which it may seem to some is
unlikely to be surpassed.
Having said this, however, it must be admitted that change in relation
to God is a special case. God cannot be supposed to be other than
unchangeably great and good, to mention only two of his attributes.
But to say that God is unchangeably good is not to preclude the
possibility of his unchanging goodness being manifested in a number of
1 Ibid
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changing ways. Indeed, it ia difficult to know how God could be
supposed to be good in any meaningful sense if there were no
possibility of seeing the evidence of his goodness exhibited in a
variety of changing situations.
The second difficulty is not so easily answered. Any form of theism
which identifies the creator of the world and the source of moral
goodness must inevitably be faced with the problem of accounting for
imperfection and evil in the world. It is doubtful whether any answer
is possible here. On the positive side one may say that a situation
which allows for a certain degree of imperfection may ultimately
produce something of greater value that a situation in which the
possibility of imperfection is ruled out from the start. In Ramanuja's
case, his assertion that God in his essential nature remains blissful
in his unlimited knowledge does not remove the problem. The
imperfections remain as aspects of God's body and there is no
explanation of this. Indeed the situation is somewhat worse for
Ramanuja than it is for Shankara., for whereas Shankara can explain
imperfection as ultimately an illusion (though who or what is
responsible for the illusion?), Ramanuja1s common-sense standpoint means
that he must acknowledge its reality. In the light of these
considerations it is clear that Ramanuja would have little to lose and a
great deal to gain by interpreting the soul-body analogy in such a way
as to allow for reciprocal interaction between God and the individual
soul.
The Unity Of Experience
We shall now consider whether Raiaanuja's explanation of the world as
a whole can be considered any more satisfactory than that of Shankara.
Ramanu,3a, like G.S. Moore, is the apostle of common-sense. Constantly
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in rebutting Shankara' s arguments he refers us to experience and to the
everyday meaning of words and phrases. In his refutation of Shankara's
claim that reality is pure, undifferentiated consciousness he refers us
to our ordinary means of knowing anything. He examines the different
accepted means of knowledge and asserts categorically that
•all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with
difference. •"*"
For example, none of the senses apprehend pure being, the eye apprehends
colour and coloured objects. Further, the Advaitins argued that
plurality must be unreal, and hence difference, on the grounds that none
of the differences presented in cognition persist j in other words, the
familiar premiss that only the unchanging can be ultimately real, and
since everything we experience changes in some way, nothing can be
ultimately real. Ramanuja answers this by distinguishing between
•persistence and non-persistence' and the relation between 'what
sublates and what is sublated*. When one cognition is sublated by
another, then the former is shown to be false or illusory, as when the
cognition of silver on the beach is sublated by the cognition of the
shell. In this case we have a cognition which does not persist and
which is sublated. In contrast, Ramanuja gives the example of different
perceptions of things like jars which are separated in space and time
from each other. These perceptions, although they do not persist, are
not contradictory of each other and, therefore, do not sublate each
other end indicate their unreality. In other words, there are two
different kinds of change or non-persistence end only one of these is
a reason for supposing the changed perceptions to be unreal.
It must be admitted in Ramanuja's favour that the world of empirical
experience does not yield pure, undifferentiated unities and that the
1 V.S. l.i.l.
the argument that change and non-persistence imply unreality is
fallacious. The unities which we do find are unities in multiplicity,
amongst them organic unities. .An organic unity, such as a plant or
animal, contains parts, but these parts, although they have a real
existence in that they can be distinguished from each other, have no
independent existence. The flower needs the roots before it can
flourish and when out from the root it eventually withers, though the
flower is undoubtedly something different from the roots. The higher
the type of life we study, the more complex does its organic unity
become, and the most complex type of organic unity in the biological
field is undoubtedly exhibited in man in the soul-body relation. If
we take biological life as the most significant type of existence in
the universe then Ramanuja's account is prima facie more in accord
with the world as we actually find it than is Shankara's. Organic
unities in the biological sense, however, are not the only kinds of
unity to be found in the universe. A work of art, for example, may
also be regarded as a complex kind of organic unity. It has been
suggested that the criteria for the beauty and, therefore, the value
of a work of art may be found in its degree of complexity taken
together with the extent to which that complexity is unified into an
organic whole."'' If we start from this point, then it may be just as
plausible to regard the universe as a whole as a gigantic work of art
which exhibits the highest possible degree of organic unity, each
element being necessary for the completion of the whole. This type
of picture is, in faot, fairly familiar. The Leibnisisn concept of
the best of all possible worlds suggests an organic whole of an
aesthetic nature. This type of total aocount has the advantage (or
1 Harold Osboume, keory of Beauty.
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disadvantage, according to one's convictions) of accounting for the
presence of evil in the world by making it the counterpart of good.
Apart from organic unities in the biological and aesthetic senses,
there are other unities : for example, natural phenomena like mountain
ranges, oceans and ice-caps are unities, but not organic unities; what
of different kinds of social groupings and societies? these again may
be unities, but not of an organic nature; the artefacts which man
creates are by and large not organic unities; the course of a man's
life may be regarded as a unity, but seldom as an organic unity, These
are merely intended as suggestions to exhibit the change of unified
diversity which we find in experience. We could also mention the
disunity and strife which is also part and parcel of experience and
this would complicate the picture still further,
The general point to be mate is that however tempting and comprehensible
it may be to try to explain the world as a whole on the analogy of what
we find in our experience, are we entitled to generalise in this way?
The world as we find it is not self-explanatozy and there is no reason
to suppose that an explanation of the world as a whole will accord with
what at first sight may seem fairly obvious in our experience. I have
argued that RamSnuja's analogy of the soul-body relation to explain the
world as a whole has much to commend it. On the other hand, on closer
inspection we see that biologioal organic unities are not the only type
of unities in the universe as we know it, and there may be a case for
considering the merits of some other kind of unity. Another feature of
an account such as Ramanuja's, which bases the explanation of the world
as a whole on the analogy of what is taken to be the most significant
feature within the world, is that it speaks to us in terms that we
understand. The explanation is comprehensible : we can grasp the gist
of what is being said. We have seen that Raaanuja is the great
exponent of common-sense and his arguments have the solid ring which
comes from their being based on incontrovertible experience. But,
and this is a major reservation, the very fact that we are talking
about the world as a whole means that we cannot refer to it in the
way that we can refer to individual objects within the world. It is
doubtful even if it makes sense to talk about knowing the ultimately
real in the way that we know the empirically real. Hence Raminuja
may be naive in implying that Brahman can be known end Shankara may
hold the philosophically tenable position in claiming that Brehman
is ultimately 'beyond speech and mind. *
We shall see in the next Chapter that there are great difficulties
involved in Shankara's claim that we 'know* Brahman in some sense,
as on examination, it turns out that this sense of the verb 'to know'
can have no counterpart in our ordinary use of the word. Hence what
meaning can be given to Shankara's assertions? It must be admitted,
however, that in our ordinary use of the term what W8 can 'know' is
subject to definite limitations and conditions. There is no reason
to suppose that the world as a whole should be subject to the
conditions imposed on the objects contained within it, and indeed the
reverse position would seem more probable, i.e. that the world as a
whole is not subjeot to the limitations of its parts and, therefore,
cannot be known in the same way as can the parts. If this be the
ease then it is an oversimplification to use the verb 'know' in its
ordinary sense when discussing the world as a whole. We appear, in
fact, to be in a oleft stick : to talk about knowledge in the
ordinary sense is to go beyond what we are entitled to, and to talk
about knowledge in a new esotarda sense is to risk talking nonsense
and saying nothing.
One of Shankara*s reasons for holding that Brahman alone is real is
that he takes it to he the only rational possibility, (he only way
that it is possible for us to think the world as a whole is as & unity
(this is, indeed, a tautology) and for Shankara, the only rationally
acceptable kind of unity was permanent, unchanging, undifferentiated.
Because of this requirement of thought, it logically followed that
the empirical world of difference must be unreal. We hare already
noted that the Hindus like the Greeks, had a predilection for the
necessary and unchanging. But is this any more than a
metaphysical preference? Is there any sound reason for preferring a
non-differentiated unity to a differentiated unity?
iVhile it seems to be a presupposition of thought that there should be
an ultimate unity, there is nothing in thought Itself to indicate whether
this unity is differentiated or undifferentiated. On the showing of the
evidence available, however, it seems more probable that there should be
a very complex kind of unity.
If it were the case that the world as a whole were a very complex kind
of unity then there is no reason to suppose that it would be 'knowable*
in its totality in the same way that the complex unities of ordinary
experience are known. '.These latter unities are known from within the
framework of experience, but the world In its totality could only be
grasped from a viewpoint •outside* experience, if it were to be known
in the ordinary sense and this is, of course, impossible. Nevertheless,
the fact that we would be dealing with a unity which oontained
complexity and hence differentiation would enable something significant
to be said about it in the ordinary sense of the terms. Uris,
obviously, has great advantages as it would enable competing accounts
to present rational arguments to eaoh other up to a certain point.
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Assuming that the world as a whole were a very complex unity, is there
anything to indicate what sort of unity this might be, allowing tor
the assumption that we could never grasp it in its totality? The
highest and most complex kinds of unity with which we are acquainted
are personal unities* An individual person is a unity of feeling,
thought and action* It does not follow from this, of course, that any
unity which is very complex is likely, or probably, some kind of
personal unity* Tet it does provide us with a starting point which
makes it worthwhile asking whether our experiential personal unity can
be applied to the world as a whole i this brings us back to Ramanuja.
There is nothing illogical in supposing that the unity of the universe
as a whole can be at least nothing less complex than some kind of
personal unity.
Following on from this, we might also consider the nature of the unity
which is present in a community of persons. As the only kind of life
with which we are acquainted is dependent on the joint co-operation of
persons, and as each person has his own personal unity which forms
part of the communal unity, this subsvases personal unity under
communal unity. Communal unity in turn subsumes most, if not all,
other unities and aspects of life under it t for example, the creation
of works of art requires a community of persons for whom they have
significance} and the life of the community requires that both
natural phenomena and human artefacts be brought within its orbit and
subordinated to its needs and aspirations to become part of its unity.
The Lower And The Higher Brahman
Rsmanuja^ position is nearer the Christian position than is that of
Shankara, in that both Ramanuja and Christian thinkers insist that
ultimately God or Brahman is personal in character. It might he argued,
however, that this is only superficially the case, .Any account of God
which confines itself to discussing Him in purely personal terms is
bound to ignore an important feature without which God would not be
God viz. his transcendence or complete otherness from the world. It
will not do to discuss God purely in terms of his relationship to and
activity in the world for this is necessarily to limit Him. In so far
as we consider God as the object of our worship we must consider him
as a personal being, but when we come to give a philosophical account
of his absolute transcendence, then we realise that all terms are
misleading, God is simply 'One without a second'. If this be the case,
then Shankara's distinction between the lower and the higher Brahman
may offer more hope of satisfying both theologians and philosophers.
Further, Shankara's distinction between the lower and higher Brahman is
not without its parallel in the thought of Christian theologians.
Rudolph Otto finds many similarities between the mysticism of Shankara
and that of Eckhart, the mediaeval Christian mystic and theologian.^
Eckhart distinguishes between God and the Godhead. God is the personal
God of the Church, but the Godhead, Sckhart describes in terms which
might well be those of Shankara discussing the higher Brahmanj for
example,
'He is the purely One without the admission even in thought of anything
quantitative or differentiated, above everything which suffers even in
thought or name the faintest shadow of difference, in whom all
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delimitation and qualification is lost.* And again
5'God is neither this or that like these manifold things. God is one.*
1 Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East /nd West. New York, Maoraillan, 1932
2 Op. Cit. p.ll.
3 Ibid,
The argument is that we can distinguish between the personal God of
the worshipper and the theologian and the aooount or analysis of this
given by the philosopher. The faot that the philosopher may be unable
to justify the worshipper* s account as it stands is no reason for
abandoaming the worshipper's account, which is perfectly valid in the
context of worship and devotional life. A similar argument might be
advanced by someone who wished to agree with G-.E. Moore that his two
hands were prime examples of material objects, yet disagreed that a
satisfactory philosophical acoount of the concept of a material object
could be given.
(hie decisive objection to this Interpretation of Shankara and Sokhart
is that it is not the way that these thinkers viewed the distinction.
The hitter Brahman and the Godhead are no mere philosophical
abstractions, but the apprehensions of a living religious consciousness
in each case. They are not simply matters of thought, but of
experience. The apprehension of the Godhead or the higher Brahman is
not a matter of philosophical thinking, but of spiritual intuition.
For example, 3ckhart says
'The seer has to pass beyond "God" into the silent void of the Godhead
itself. That is the highest vision, and whoever still has "a God"
has not yet reached the highest and the last. He stands only on the
verge of eternity, but not yet within it.'*
Shankara points out that once the intuition of the supreme Brahman is
achieved, all empirical knowledge, though genuine on the lower level,
is seen to be maya, and the means of knowledge, such as perception or
inference are no longer valid. The realisation of the meaning of such
key texts as 'Tat twam asi*, That thou art, is dependent on insight
1 Rudolph Otto, Op. Cit., Quoted pp.7-8.
and not on reasoning or analysis. This spiritual insight is
reflected in the life of the person concerned. Realising that the
empirical world is maya he is no longer swayed either by external
events or by his own desires and passions.
For both Shsnkara and Sckhart, the god of religion and the god of
philosophy completely coincided. What their religious consciousness
apprehended in experience was found to be capable of satisfactory
analysis in philosophical terms by their reason. For Shankara, at
any rate, it seems clear that there can he no room for the workings
of God in the life of a man who has realised his identity with the
supreme Brahman. Such a man will be prepared to accept that worship
is a perfectly genuine activity for other people so long as they
remain on the empirical level of understanding, but will claim that
it is senseless for one who has achieved the highest knowledge.
Apart from its being alien to Shankara's thought, the distinction
between a god of religion and a god of philosophy is difficult to
sustain. It is true that religion and philosophy have different
interests in the sense that they are concerned with different kinds of
questions. For example, Gilson contrasts 'a religious explanation of
the world by means of certain persons* with *a philosophical
explanation of the world by means of one or several natural things'
and says that they represent 'two distinct types of problems,
demonstrations and solutions.'* So long as we have a situation of
polytheism or her o the ism as did the early Greeks and Indians then it
is possible to keep the two apart. Gilson argues that in religion until
the time of Aristotle, the god of philosophy and the god of religion
were never identified with eaoh other in Greek thought, although
1 E. Gilsan, God ;md Philosophy.
admittedly this would have been a logical conclusion for any thinker to
have drawn. A similar situation seems to have obtained in India.
Explanations of the world in terms of living beings existed side by
side with explanations of the world in terms of natural principles,
but the two are distinct until the time of the Upanishads. For example,
in one of the verses of the Rg-Veda the poet says that perhaps God
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knows how the world was created and perhaps he does not. In the
Upsnishads we get attempts to present a unified account of the
relation of the different appearances in the world to the ultimate
reality and these take the form of rival theistic and monistic aocounts.
It beoaae one of the tasks of the commentators to show that either the
theistic account was capable of incorporating the monistic or vioe
versa. In contrast, the Jews started with the advantage of having
only one God and consequently, as Gilson remarks, a follower of the Jewish
God would know at once that
♦whatever the nature of reality itself may be said to be, its religious
principle must of necessity coincide with its philosophical principle.
Each of them being one, they are bound to be the same and to provide
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men with one and the same explanation of the world. '
A philosophical explanation of the world and the religious explanation
of the world cannot in the end be kept apart. Sooner or later the
question of the relationship between the two must arise and if there be
an ultimate point of reference in each explanation, then either they
must be allowed to be one and the same, or one must be shown to be
subordinate to the other.
If we agree that the higher Brahman is just as much an object of
religion as of philosophy, the question still remains regarding the
1 Rg-Veda, 10. 129. 7. 2 Gilson, Op. Cit. p.38.
similarity between Shankara* s thought and an account such as that of
Eckhart. This is a complicated question.
The Christian position is that God has revealed His nature to us in
the creation of the world and in His activity in histozy. Whatever
more He may be, what He has revealed of Himself in these ways cannot
be negated. In other words, if we can draw a distinction between the
Godhead and God, between the transcendent other and the activity of a
supreme Being in this world, then there must be a continuity between
the two such that the former does not negate the latter. Otto's
comparison between Shankara and Eckhart would suggest that there is
such a continuity in Eokhart's thought, which is laoking in Shankara's
aocount of Brahman. This continuity centres around two main points*
In the first plaoe
•Both masters seek and behold unity and the Eternal One in contrast to
multiplicity, but with this difference : the relationship of the One
to the many is for Shankara one of strict exclusion, but for Eckhart
one of the most live polarity.
Sckhart's God is a living God and the metaphors used to describe him
imply movement and activity : the 'wheel rolling out of itself' or
•a stream flowing into itself'. This means that God is not sufficient
unto himself, but it is in his nature to create the world. In contrast,
Otto claims, Shankara's Brahman or Sat is an abstraction or state of
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static repose. The creation of the world is not necessary to his
nature, but due to the mistake of Avidya.
1 Otto, Op. Cit., pp.123-2,..
2 It must be noted that this would not be acoepted by other writers,
for example, Betty Heimann makes quite the opposite contrast : it
is the Christian God which is a static Absolute while the fundamental
concepts of the East presuppose a dynamic Eternal. Facets of Indian
Thought. Allen & Unwin, London, 1964. Shankara is not referred to
specifically here.
Secondly, Eckhart'a mysticism leads to a positive attitude towards the
world and to the moral life and to a positive evaluation of life in the
world; whereas that of Shankara is life denying and morality - denying#
As the devotional life oeases to he meaningful to the man who knows
Brahman, so does the moral life.
Otto's own view is not entirely clear. Although he draws these oontrasts
in content and thus appears to deny that there is a continuity between
the lower and the higher Brahman, yet earlier in the book"1' he is at
pains to refute this suggestion and says that for Shankara
•none of the dignity of the world - creating and world - governing God
must be lost to the eternal Brahman. The latter is to be very greatly
exalted, but in such a way, that all value that pertains to the lower
2
shall be taken up into the higher. *
This remark is very difficult to reconcile with his later comments.
If Otto is right in thinking that the higher Brahman is inclusive of
the lower, then Shankara 'a position may well turn out to be the more
satisfactory compared with that of Ramanuja, both theologically and
philosophically. But if there is a negation of personal values, then
we seem to be losing, not simply an account of what is involved in
religion, but the whole religious life itself, as well as the rest of
our empirical existence.
The Relation Between Kirguna and Saguna Brahman
How is Shankara to be interpreted in his account of the relation between
nirguna and saguna Brahman? There are elements in Shankara's thought
which point in both directions. He declares that the comprehension of
Brahman brings to an end all empirical activities yet he also asserts
that the Self 'reveals itself in a graduated series of beings, and so
1 Ibid. Transition, Sect. 10-16. 2 Ibid. p.157-6.
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appears in forms of various dignity and power.The latter text
suggests a continuity between the lower and higher Brahman which is
denied by the former yet it was in the light of the former text that
Shankara was interpreted by his immediate successors. It is this
interpretation which has given rise to the traditional picture of the
world-denying, life-negating ascetic which features so largely in
Hindu thought. On the other hand the idea of the self-revelation of
Brahman in en increasingly fuller and more self-consclou3 manner has
been developed in recent Hindu thought by the philosopher end raystio
Aurobindo and others.
One of the key factors in the relation of the lower to the higher Brahmen
lies in the interpretation of the concept 'maya *. Via have already noted
the duality of meaning present in it by the time of Shankara ; it
signified both the self-expression and creativity of Brahman in the
world yet also it served to conceal the true nature of Brahman. While
urobindo recognises the element of concealment present in maya he
emphasises primarily its creative power :
•out of the supreme being in which all is all without barrier of
separative consciousness emerges the phenomenal being in which all is
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in each and each is in all
It may be worthwhile to elaborate Aurobindo's position in a little more
detail at this point as it serves as a good example of the way in which
the non-dualism of Shankara may be developed without its traditional
1 V.S. l.i.ll.
2 Arya, pp.108-9, quoted in a Source Book in Indian Philosophy. ed.
S. Radhekrishnan end C.A. Moore, Princeton University Press,
1957, P.596.
corollary of the world being an illusion, and in a way which brings
non-dualism close to things which have been and are being said by
Western philosophers and theologians, A total evaluation of Aurobindo
thought (and that, also, of other contemporary Hindus), would have to
Involve a consideration of his indebtedness to Western thought and
particularly to Idealist philosophy, as well as the influence of
traditional Hindu thought. This is without the scope of the present
work so that the following comments can only be regarded cs an fxample
of a possible interpretation of maya, which emphasises its creative
aapeot.
Aurobindo'a Interpretation Of Maya
Aurobindo insists on accepting both Unity and Multiplicity. Keither
excludes the other. Apparent opposites are reconciled in the light of
Ultimate Reality. The details of this belief are worked out in a
doctrine of the involution of Spirit into Matter and the subsequent
Evolution of Spirit through various grades of matter, mind, super-mind
which is reminiscent of Hegel's doctrine of the progressive self-
manifestation of the Absolute. Aurobindo emphatically rejects all
rigid dichotomies and consequently rejects the illusionism of Shank&ra
'Shankar&'s wordless, inactive Self and his Maya of many names and
forms are equally disparate and irreconcilable entities; their rigid
antagonism can terminate only by the dissolution of the multitudinous
illusion into the sole Truth of an eternal Silence.'*
In contrast, the truth of Mlya is that it is
•God's play of the infinities of existence, the splendours of
knowledge, the glories of force mastered and the ecstasies of love
illimitable .....'2
1 Aurobindo, The Life Divine. Calcutta, 1939, p.10.
2 Ibid, p.175.
Since all opposites are reconcilable, the experience of the One and
the Many are complementary to each other. They represent different
aspects of Brahman, the inactive and the active, positive and negative
and •each is necessary to the other.1'*
We have noted the difficulties involved in relating Shankara*8
nirguna and saguna Brahman. Whereas for Shankara nirguna brahman
supercedes saguna brahman, for Aurobindo the two are complementary.
But, attractive as it is, does Aurobindo•s alternative convinoe any
more than that of Shankara? In spite of the fine rhetoric of the
language, there is little positive argument to convince us that there
is a reconciliation of opposites and that this reconciliation occurs
in the manner supposed by Aurobindo. The doubt is increased when he
ends his chapter on Reality Omnipresent with the admission that the
perception of the resolution of the dualities in the universe must
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•constantly support itself on an act of faith ....•'
JMa criticism notwithstanding, there is much of interest in Aurobindo' s
position, particularly as compared with the •process theology' of
contemporary Christian thought. In the writings of Charles Hartshorne
for example, the implications of God's relativity are developed very
fully. One of the ways in which Hartshorne has done this is by
examining the concept of the unsurpassibility of God.^ Hartshome
points out that the unsurpassibility of God by any other does not
preclude the possibility that He should be constantly surpassing
Himself. Once this is admitted we are faced with the idea that God has
a past and a future. The notion of a relative aspeot to Deity which
manifests itself temporally is common to both Aurobindo and Hartshorne.
1 Ibid. p.40. 2 Ibid. p.50.
3 SeeA.G. The Divine Relativity. Yale University Press, 1943.
.Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity, Union Seminary Quarterly
Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, Maroh 1965.
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Both are also in agreement that this in no way impairs the absoluteness
of God or the Self. For Hartshome the absoluteness of God must inolude
absolute relativity : God is unsurpassable in His relativity and so
can relate Himself as perfectly as is possible to each of his creatures.
Conclusions
What emerges from this discussion is the possibility that there may not
be such a wide gulf between Shankara's account of Brahman and the
Christian account of God as at first appeared. One of the reasons for
a distinction between the lower and higher Brahman is the need to
recognise divine transcendence as well as divine activity in the world.
Christian thought also faces these questions. If maya is interpreted,
as it is by Aurobindo, as the self-manifestation and self-expression of
God rather than the veil which hides reality from us, then it allows
for the possibility of a positive basis on which to develop personal
values which is comparable to the picture presented by Christian thought.
Nevertheless, although divine transcendenoe is maintained in Shankara's
account of nirguna (qualityless) Brahman, it is maintained at the cost
of making the personal element in the Divine dubious. Maya may be
interpreted as the self-expression of God, but in order to maintain the
continuity of the higher and lower Brahman it is necessary to give an
account of the higher (nirguna) Brahman which in no way contradicts
the values implicit in the concept of saguna Brahman. In the following
pages I shall argue that while Shankara's nirguna Brahman may well be
described as an 'individual subsistence of a rational nature', the
definition of 'person* given by the Western philosopher Boethius, yet
this in no way guarantees the personal nature of nirguna Brahman and
in fact glosses over important distinctions between Shankar&'s aooount
of nirguna Brahman and Ramanuja's account of God. The reason for this
stems from a deficiency in the definition of a person as a 'self-
subsistent being of a rational nature* and it is to this that we now
turn.
Difficulties in Defining 'Person* as 'Self-Subsistent, Rational Entity*
Boethius definition of a person as 'an individual subsistence of a
rational nature* is unsatisfactory in several respects when extrapolated
as a description of God.
It is insufficiently precise in its application. As we shall see, it is
a reasonable description of Shankara's nirguna Brahman. If we conclude
from this, however, that both Shankara's nirguna Brahman and Raaanuja's
Puruahottama are personal in nature, important distinctions are
blurred : between a god who has feelings of love towards his worshippers
and who aids them with his divine grace, and an absolute of whoa such
talk makes no sense. In other words, the distinction between personal
and impersonal is blurred rather than clarified.
One reason for this is an ambiguity in the meaning of the term 'rational*.
In one sense, 'rational' implies a being who is rational in the sense
that he acts rationally, i.e. he acts and thinks in ways which are
appropriate to the situation in which he finds himself. This accords
with our ordinary understanding of the terms 'personal* and 'rational'.
In this sense we can agree that a defining character of being a person
is that of having a rational nature. In the history of philosophy, on
the other hand, 'rational' has not generally had this connotation : it
has been associated with the distinction between truths of reason and
truths of fact, and in this sense has suggested something which is
logioally necessary. In this meaning of rational, mathematics and logic
are prime exhibitors of rationality. Following this line of thought,
a first principle may well be rational without being a person. It
could be something which could not be thought not to be and from which
the world folio?/s as a necessary oonsequence, but whioh could in no
sense be described as acting or willing to produce the world. It may
be that Christians have frequently had this sen® of rational in mind
when discussing rationality in connection with God. This seems to be
implicit in A.O. Love joy's account when he traces the history of the
Creek principles of self-sufficiency and plenitude in Christian
thought.1 Nevertheless, it is not this concept which is central in
the Hebrew-Christian revelation. The existence of the world does not
follow as a necessary consequence from the nature of Cod, but Cod
creates the world as an aot of will. In allowing the meaning of
rational as 'logically necessary' to predominate in their thought,
Christian theologians have let the Cod of Creek philosophy usurp the
place of the Cod of Christianity. There is a third somewhat different
3ense of rational in whioh it refers to what pertains to the mind. In
this sense, the rational, as mind, is opposed to the material, as for
example, when Descartes distinguished between intelligent mind and
inert matter and Berkeley argued that matter could never be the cause
of an idea.
The implications of this sense of rational are interesting, in that
it is a kind of half-way house between a personal and impersonal
meaning of the term, v/hich apparently does not imply any dubious
assertions about the supposed owner of the mind. Inert, blind matter
is contrasted ?/ith active conscious mind. Matter is blind because it
cannot be said to be aware of its movements and cannot, therefore, be
said to initiate any of them deliberately or with forethought. Mind
is conscious and active because it is aware of what it is doing and
can, therefore, be said to do things with a purpose. But the only
kinds of beings which we know to be aware of what they are doing and
1 A.O. Love joy, The Creat Chain of Being. Harvard Univ. Press, 1936.
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to act with a purpose are personal agents. One rai^it imagine that to
describe something as the work of mind would imply that it was the
outcome of personal agency. This conclusion is not drawn, however#
Part of the reason for this may be that those who have argued in this
way have wished to say that the world as a whole has a structure and
design which is explicable in terms of nothing less than mind, and yet
they have, for various reasons, hesitated to draw the explicit
conclusion that there was a personal agenoy behind the world. Thus we
get the odd conception of purposiveness and agency without an agent
or a purpose, which only fails to strike us as odd because it has
become so familiar.
But why should we be afraid of agency as a metaphysical notion? Why
should it seem less respectable to account for the world in terms of
an agent than in terms of a principle? It is understandable that the
Greeks should have fought shy of talking about agency in connection
with their first principle. In Greek thought"*" philosophy and religion
followed different paths and were concerned with different questions.
Religion was concerned with questions of agency regarding the meaning
and purpose of life. "Hiese were referred to the gods, in the plural.
Philosophy was concerned with an explanation of things in terms of
general principles, without regard to the question of why there was
anything at all. It would be natural to connect up these questions
and to account for what there is by the same principle as one accounts
for why it is there, but this was difficult for the Greeks because
they had a plurality of gods. It is plausible to suppose that because
they Were unable to produce a single unified answer to the question of
'why*, they had, of necessity, to subordinate this question to that of
1 See S. Gilson, God And Philosophy.
•what', and thus subordinated agency to principle.
It is unnecessary, however, for Christian philosophy to follow them in
this. For the Christian believer, the god of philosophy and the god
of religion are one and the same, This means that both questions of
philosophy and religion can be referred ultimately to the same source
and we are free to consider on its own merits the question of whether
agency should be subordinated to principle, action to being.
Christian revelation shows God to be a god of action, one who creates
the world out of nothing and who has placed man in it with a definite
purpose in view. From this, it follows that until insuperable diff¬
iculties have been clearly shown to arise, the correct metaphysical
starting point for Christian philosophy is agenoy.
The question of a starting point for metaphysics will be discussed
further in the next Chapter in relation to the self. I shall argue,
along the lines of John MacMurray, that only by regarding the self
from the standpoint of en agent rather than as a knowing subject can
an adequate aocount of experience be given.
Shaoksra's Nirguna Brahman As A Self-Subsistent. Rational. Individual
It will be seen from these remarks that I do not think that *an
individual subsistence of a rational nature* is an adequate
definition of 'person*. The main reason for my doubts is that it
seems to leave completely open the question of whether such a
subsistence acts or is In any way an agent. It is impossible to make
sense of the concept of person without bringing in the notion of agency.
Having said this, let us see how Shankara'a account of brahman agrees
with Boethius* definition.
Brahman is undoubtedly a subsistence. One of Shankara*s most important
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ways of referring to Brahman is as 'sat' (being), 'The Self (another
synonym for Brahman) is nothing but that which is (the Sat).'1
Brahman is not simply a subsistence amongst other subsistences, but
is subsistence or being itself.
Is Brahman an individual? To say that something is an individual is
to imply that it can be distinguished from other individuals, and
that, therefore, it possesses a unique description. Shankara would
certainly say that there could not be another Brahman and that Brahman
is different from everything else to which one can refer, but this is
not quite the same as giving a description which applies uniquely to
Brahman and excludes all other individuals. However, we have
discussed previously the sense in which Shankara thinks it possible to
refer to Brahman. Brahman may be regarded as an individual, but not
in precisely the same sense as any particular object in the world is
an individual.
In what sense can Brahman be said to have a rational nature? Here we
are faced with a problem similar to that to which I have referred in
connection with Greek philosophy and religion. The Hindus, too,
recognised a plurality of gods. In the course of time, different gods
came to assume the supremaoy, but even to this day, different gods
are worshipped as supreme by different sects, and Hindus find no
difficulty in accepting what would be, for the Christian, an
intolerably anomolous situation : that different objects of worship
are all the same god under different names and guises.
Again we have the situation of philosophy giving expression to the
questions asked by religion. Certain questions demand an answer in
terms of agency and others in terns of first principles; but
1 Vedanta Sutra, l.i.8.
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philosophy and religion must ultimately have a single reference. Since
religion has never auoceeded in unifying Itself in the sense of
acknowledging one supreme god who brooks no rivals, agency must be
subordinated to prlnoiple : philosophy must win the day. Qie starting
point of Jhankara's philosophy is being. But here we are led to the
same oddity that we have noticed in the Western conception of mind. A
truly explanatory first principle must explain why the world is, end not
simply what it is, and so we get the notion of consciousness playing
the same part as mind. It is self-aware and purposive, but cannot be
termed an agent.
Shankara' a nirguna Brahman may, therefore, be described as rational in
the sense that it is self-aware and purposive. Shankara devotes a
considerable portion of the Vedanta Sutras to arguing against the rival
Samkhya school, very powerful in his day, who claimed that the first
principle of the world was inert, unconscious matter (prakrti). One of
his arguments is that the animate cannot be produced from the inanimate,
whereas we find from experience that the reverse does happen. He
describes Brahman's nature as being 'eternal cognition' He is both
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material and operative cause of the world. But on the other hand, he
is definitely not an agent.
Although the definition 'individual subsistence of a rational nature'
is applicable to Brchman, yet it does not enable Brahman to be
described as personal in a sense which is relevant to the religious
consciousness of God, which views Him as acting in love towards the world.
One of the most striking thing? to emerge from this study is that
although there is a fundamental difference of emphasis in the Hindu and
Christian traditions - while the personal is paramount in Christianity,
1 V.S. 1.1*5. 2 V.S. l.iv.23.
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it is a matter of debate in Hinduism - yet on closer inspection, there
are some very important similarities in the thought patterns of eaoh
tradition. This encourages one to hope that eaoh may have something
to contribute to and to leaxn from the other. The similarity which I
shall discuss now is a paradox which has been exhibited and discussed
in detail as it occurs in the Christian tradition by A.O. Love joy.
I will try and show that the same paradox is also present in Hindu
thought as it is presented in its monistio form and that a similar
development has taken place in Hindu thought as has occurred in
Christianity.
One difficulty which we have encountered repeatedly is that of relating
the human to the divine, the empirical to the ultimate reality. The
philosophical account of this problem which was to be elaborated by
Christian theologians was first enunciated by Plato in the
Lovejoy shows that in effect Plato put forward two conflicting ideas
of God which resulted in two conflicting ideas of life and systems of
value. These conflicting ideas were never openly admitted as such,
but continued to haunt Christian theology in different expressions
right through its development. They were an ideal of otherworldliness
and an ideal of this-worldlines3. I shall trace Lovejoy's account of
these conflicting ideas in Christian thought and show how a similar
conflict is also present in Hindu thought.
In Plato we find the origin of the strain of other-worldliness in
Western religious thought. It is expressed in the belief that
'both the genuinely "ideal" and the truly good are radically
antithetic in their essential characteristics to anything to be found
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in man's natural life.'
1 The Great Chain of Being 2 Lovejoy, Op. Cit., p.25.
The essence of the good
'lay in self-containment, freedom from all dependence upon that which
is external to the individual.
and the result of this conviction when applied to God was that God
could have no need of the world, and that from the divine point of view
creatures could have no value* Taken to extremes, this view of the
world sees the craving for a separate, personal immortality as
constituting the root cause of the misery and vanity of existence.
This is the expression of the belief that perfection implies self-
sufficiency and immutability and is stated explicitly by Aristotle in
the Eudaemonian Sthios. God oan have no need of anything since
'One who is self-sufficient can have no need of the services of others,
nor of their affection, nor of social life, since he is capable of
living alone* This is espeoially evident in the case of God. Clearly,
since he is in need of nothing God cannot have need of friends, nor
2
will he have any.'
This line of thought clearly parallels the description of Brahman as
'self-existent' and 'imperishable'* The assertion that Brahman is
Sad cid ananda - being, consciousness, bliss -i.e.that Brahman is
blissful, intelligent, being, has affinities with the .Aristotelian
conception of God as eternally engaged in self-contemplation and
following from this, the conception of the ideal life as that of
contemplation. The Hindu tradition of renunciation of the world and
the achievement of a self-sufficiency which is indifferent to worldly
concerns is also of a part with this way of tfainking;and Shankaru's
distinction between the lower knowledge of the empirical world ?nd
the higher knowledge which completely negates empirical life
1 Ibid., p.42.
2 Aristotle, Budaemonian Ethics* 12446-12456, quoted by Lovejoy,
Op. Cit. p.47.
emphasises once more the *otherworldliness' present in the Hindu
tradition. As the belief that perfection must involve self-sufficiency
and immutability was axiomatic to the Greeks, so it was also held by
the Hindus. This is further demonstrated by the repeated attempts by
different writers to show that the empirical world, though integrally
related to the ultimate reality, could not impair that reality by its
own transitoriness and dependence. So we find both in Greek-Christian
and in Hindu thought a fundamental strain of 'otherworldliness', and
this 'otherworldliness• represents an undeniable facet of the religious
consciousness.
An immutable self-sufficient God, however, cannot explain the existence
of a variegated, transitory, world and so some attempt must be made to
explain the relation between the two. Plato says of the form of the
Good in the Republic that it is
'to all things known the cause ..... of their existence and their
reality.
Likewise Brahman must be regarded as the cause of the existence and
reality of the empirical world. ELato explains how this can be in the
Timaeus. God could begrudge existence to nothing that could conceivably
possess it and 'desired that all things should be as like himself as they
could be.' Consequently, out of the overflowing divine superabundance
of being the empirical world was created. The idea of God's not
grudging existence to anything is an attempt to reconcile the absolute
self-sufficiency of the divine being with the obvious existence of the
empirical world. Lovejoy points out that the implications of Plato's
account of the origins of the empirical world are that the intelligible
world is deficient without the sensible, i.e. that
^ Republic. 509B.
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'The entire realm of essence ..... lacked what was indispensable to its
meaning and worth so long as it lacked embodiment.'1
and that the fecundity of the Good is not the consequence of a free and
arbitrary act of ohoice of a personal creator, but rather a dialectical
necessity.
A similar difficulty in accounting for the existence of the empirical
world on the assumption that the divine being is perfectly self-
sufficient and immutable is answered in Hindu thought, by invoking
the concept of lila, play. The world is God's play. To the Western
mind this assertion immediately suggests a trivialisation of empirical
experience if not, as in the case of King Lear, the notion of the play
of the gods as a kind of divine sadism. But in the Hindu context this
is not so, and shorn of its emotive content the assertion that the
world is the 'play' of Brahman evokes the same suggestion as in Plato
of the world being the consequence of the overflowing of the divine
superabundance of creative energy. Both explanations insist that the
creation of the world was motiveless in the sense that it did not
arise from any need present in the divine being, as such a being could
have no need of anything. Shankara declares that the activity of the
Lord may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature,
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without reference to any purpose. S, Radhakrishnsn, in his
translation of the Brahma Sutras quoted another Hindu writer, Baladeva,
as saying that lila is the overflow of joy within. Nevertheless, in
spite of all efforts to the contrary, both Shankara and Plato are
forced to acknowledge, even if only indirectly, a certain necessity in
the existenoe of the empirical world. Superficially the assertion
that the world is mayaT, appearance, suggests no necessity for its
1 Lovejoy, Op. CiU, p.53. 2 V.S. 2.i.33.
existence, but when we enquire into the origin of maya then we are
faced with a beginningless mystery. Although miya has not the status
of an independent principle it cannot yet be identified with Brahman
and its presence necessarily constitutes the empirical world. With
Ramahuja the necessity of the existence of the empirical world is
more explicitly expressed since the world is described ae the body of
God, both His instrument and His means of self-expression.
So we get the same paradox present in both Hindi and Christian thought :
a God who is at once self-sufficient and from whom the world follows
as a neoessaiy consequence; and we shall see that this paradox leads
to the same discrepancy of practical ideals in each case; and that a
similar modification occurs in each tradition in an attempt to mitigate
the paradox and its results.
Love joy shows that what he calls the two gods of Plato, the self-
sufficient being, and the god of creative fecundity, lead to an inner
conflict in Medieval thought because they Implied two irreconcileable
conceptions of the Good. He says
'The final good for men ..... consisted of setae mode of assimilation
or approximation to the divine nature ••••• Hie doctrine of divine
attributes was thus also ..... a theory of the nature of ultimate
value, and the conception of God was at the same time the definition
of the objective of human life; But the God in whom man was thus
to find his own fulfilment was ..... not one God but two ..... Hie one
was an apotheosus of unity, self-sufficiency and quietude, the other
of diversity, self-transcendence and fecundity.
These two conceptions of God implied two incompatible notions of value.
'Hie one programme demanded a withdrawal from all "attachment to
creatures"- culminated in the ecstatic contemplation of the individual
Divine Essence; the other, if it had been formulated, would have
1 Lovejoy, Op. Cit., p.82.
summoned men to participate, in some finite measure, in the creative
passion of God. ..... it would have plaoed the active life above the
]_
contemplative.'
This conflict of ideals can be seen in the writings of Thomas Aquinas
who believed on the one hand that the creature approaches God's
likeness more nearly when it act3 for the good of other things, and on
the other hand, that the final end of life was absorption in the
contemplation of a God to whom one can communicate no good.
Similar conflicting conceptions of the good occur in Hindu thought.
We have the ascetic view which sees moksha, the end and aim of life,
as freedom from the shackles of empirical existence in the sense of
achieving a complete transcendence of empirical experience and values.
In contrast, the concept of dharma emphasises the development of the
nature of each thing in accordance with its own laws and in accordance
with its place in the divine order of things. The concept of dharraa
is applied to society as varnasrama dharma, the oaste system and the
four stages of life, which apart from its excrescences, simply states
that each person has his appointed statical and his duties in society,
x.
which he must fulfil if he is to obtain his highest good. Once again
we have a conflict between the active and the contemplative life.
On the metaphysical side the consequences of Plato's two gods are
equally interesting. Since Plato's God would not begrudge existence
to any possible being it followed that every possible being must exist
and that, therefore, we must suppose a 'Chain of Being*, which by
minute gradations ascended from the lowest form of life to the highest
viz. God. This conception was developed in the thought of Leibniz
into the assertion that God had created the best of all possible worlds.
1 Ibid, p.&j..
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Such a view must ontail that evil also has Its own place in the
general scheme and that apparent evil in the world is necessary in
order for it to be the best world possible. The same view that evil
is a necessary complement to the good in the world is implied by
many of the representations of Hindu deities who to the Testom eye
appear to be completely amoral.
Finally, the notion of a chain of being in which each link has its
own irreplaceable part to fulfil came to be seen as a rigid and static
conception which gave no room for hope either to the individual or
society, and it, therefore, became temporalised both in its 7,estern
and Hindu form. The difficulty was that if every link in the chain
was necessary for the divine self-manifestation, then there was no
possibility of man's being able to ascend the scale of being as had
onoe bean supposed and approach nearer to God, for this would be
rebellion against the divine will. This led not only to an
acquiescence in the condition of things as they were, but also to an
attempt to invoke a divine justification for them. 'Hie sane situation
arose in India in relation to society and in particular the caste
system. Hie solution in each case was to turn the chain of being into
a temporal chain. In place of a fixed order of beings who approximated
more nearly to the Divine came the idea that human beings and society
were gradually evolving and improving in such a way as to approach
more nearly to the divine excellence. Aurobindo's evolutionary
philosophy may be seen as the exemplification of this development in
Hindu terms.
Conclusion
In this Chapter we have been concerned to illuminate the conception of
the personal as it is found in Shankar&'s and Kamanuja's accounts of
Brahman or the ultimate reality. It might have been thought more
fot
logical to have begun with a study of the individual self and then
proceeded from this to consider how far what has been predicated of
the self could be predicated also of the ultimate reality. This
would be unsatisfactory, however. What is apprehended by the religious
consciousness must be taken as fundamental since this determines the
view taken of the self and the development of practical ideals of life.
(This is not to say that criticism of the apprehensions of religious
consciousness is out of the question. It is obvious for example, that
in dividing religions into major religions and the rest, we are
applying some criteria to discriminate certain religions from others.)
Consequently, the next Chapter will be devoted to the study of the
Atman, the Self, and the following Chapter to moksha and dharma, the
ideals which shape practical values and aims.
We have shown that the Hindu conception of Brahman is not wholly
consistent, but contains two main strands, theistio and monistic,
personal and impersonal, neither of which can claim precedence in time
over the other. In general, however, there is a tendency to
incorporate the theistic strand within the monistic as is done in the
case of Shankara. This may take the form of arguing that while theism
is true for the religious consciousness, monism in the only
satisfactory philosophical account. We have rejected this solution
and recognise the monistic account as the expression of an alternative
type of religious consciousness, or, alternatively, as a different
interpretation of the religious consciousness. The object of philosophy
and religion must be one and the same. The religious consciousness of
whioh Shankara'a monism is the expression implies the adoption of the
attitude of an impartial spectator, and in contrast, Ramanuja's theism
starts from the point of view of an intentional agent. We shall have
more to say about this contrast in the following Chapter. The
metaphysical implications of this, however, are that in the one case
thought is taken as the starting point and in the other, action.
Y.hen thought is taken as the starting point as in Shankara'a system,
a problem arises in accounting for the empirical world. Although the
Absolute as pure thought must be completely self-sufficient, yet it
must also be the cause of the empirioal world and the latter must be
necessarily related to the Absolute. This gives rise to paradoxical
consequences which are reflected in Hindu life and culture. This
question will be disoussed again in Chapter Four.
If we compare these findings with what is present in the Christian
tradition there are some remarkable similarities. Here too we do not
find a single unified tradition, but an amalgam of Creek and Hebrew
thought. We have seen that the Creek tradition in Christian thought
has much in common with Shank&r&'a account of nirguna Brahman, and
that the starting point for metaphysics here is also thought. Arising
out of this comes a similar difficulty in accounting for the existence
of the empirical world. In spite of the predominance of what might
be termed a thought-oriented, impersonal metaphysics in Christian
thinking, however, the overall emphasis is on action inasmuch as Cod
is oonoeived as one with whom we stand in personal relationship, who
has a loving concern for the world.
It will be seen from the foregoing that a fundamental problem which
arises in each tradition in very similar terms is that of explaining
the existence of the empirical world and showing how it derives its
meaning and significance. A thought-oriented metaphysics has in each
case singularly failed to throw light on this important question and an
'action-oriented' metaphysics has yet to be adequately developed.
CHAPTER THREE - ATMAN
The Self : One Or Many?
Western philosophy takes it for granted that there are many, individual
selves. The idea that each individual self is only a part of, or
identical with one universal self is strange. It has to be proved. In
Shankara's thought however, we start from the oneness of the Self and
it is the apparent existence of a plurality of selves which calls for
comment.
The reason for this springs from the nature of the religious experience
which Shankara takes to be of ultimate value. This is summed up for
him in the text, tat twam asi. that thou art. The individual self and
the highest Brahman are ultimately one :
•the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only.'*"
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'In reality there is only one universal Self.'
This means that discussion of and evaluation of the self takes place in
the context of the discussion of the nature of Brahman. Discussion of
the individual self refers to the empirical self which is not ultimately
real.
Another possible reason for Shankara's Atman/Brahman identification lies
in his polemic against the dualist Samkhya system. Samkhya holds that
there are two basic, opposing principles : the intelligent purusha and
the unintelligent prakrti. The presence of purusha causes prakrti to
evolve by stages into the material world as we know it. For Shankara it
was nonsense to suppose that an unintelligent principle like prakrti
could have been responsible for the evolution and existence of the world.
Much of Shankara's commentary on the Brahma Sutras is devoted to
demonstrating the falsity and essential incoherence of dualism. He holds
1 Brahma Sutra, l.iv.22. 2 Ibid, l.iii.6.
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that It is not only contrary to Scripture, but also unreasonable to
assume a multiplicity of independent principles to explain the world.
In his zeal to demonstrate the unity of experience Shankara can find
no half-way house and this leads him to assert the mathematical
identity of Atman and Brahman. Only by assuming absolute identity of
self and deity can sense be made of religious experience and a
reasonable explanation be given for the existence of the world. (This
is not, of course, to say that Shankara is making the assertion 'I am
Grod' in the sense in which this would be understood in a Christian
context.) The consequence of this is that anything which implies an
essential plurality must be regarded as maya, not ultimately real.
This means that empirical experience and personal relationships are
relegated to the sphere of the not ultimately real and significant.
Characteristics which can be attributed only to individual selves, i.e.
the empirical multiplicity of selves, must inevitably be rated as of
secondary importance. This means that it may be rash to accuse
Shankara of neglecting •personal' values. He can reply that he has
had an experience which transcends personal values and makes them
irrelevant. It is not that they are misconceived : on the empirical
level they are perfectly valid. Life could not be carried on without
a respect for individuals and a sense of individual responsibility.
But when identity with Brahman is realised then the empirical world
is seen to be maya. It is not completely real though neither is it
completely unreal. It is anirvacaniya, indefinable.
The individual person is then of secondary importance from the start.
Shankara begins from the religious experience of the ultimate reality
in which Brahman, the universal self, is everything. It is in the
light of this experience that the nature of the individual self is
examined.
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Shankara's Metaphysical Starting Point
A further determinant of Shankara's position is the metaphysical
presupposition that only the unchanging is real. Consequently, his
arguments are intended to show that there is something absolutely
unchanging which has permanent value in our awareness of ourselves.
It is this unchanging element which determines the nature of man and
the values which he adopts.
Shankara assumes that only the unchanging can be real in an absolute
sense. The expression 'real in an absolute sense' is not altogether
clear. Those like Shankara who make a distinction between different
degrees of reality usually think that the unchanging is more real than
the changing. But what does this amount to saying? If the unchanging
is more real simply because it persists this is to say that real is
synonymous with unchanging. But this means that to say that only the
unchanging is absolutely real is just to say that only the unchanging
is unchanging and this is not to say a great deal. Why should the
quality of unchangeableness be accepted as the criterion of reality?
Are there not other qualities with an equal claim to be regarded as
criteria? For example, pleasureableness, intensity, effectiveness.
If only the unchanging is real then the body cannot be real. Neither
can the thoughts and impressions which succeed one another in the mind.
We must find an unchanging awareness behind the changing thoughts and
actions. Shankara identifies this as cit, consciousness or intelligence,
(in translating cit as intelligence it must be carefully distinguished
from buddhi, the intellect which is the organ responsible for
discursive thought.)
Cit
Some remarks on the translation and interpretation of cit are necessary as
/Ofe
there is no Western equivalent which precisely fits its sense. An
older commentator like Thibaut translates cit by cognition and although
this is not a technical term which is in current use it may turn out to
be the nearest equivalent. The translations, 'conscousness•,
•intelligence', or 'awareness' have all been used in different contexts,
as has the term 'thought'. Thought is a fairly accurate translation :
it implies consciousness and intelligence. On the other hand, it is
misleading to the Western reader who does not draw the Hindu's
distinction between the activity of cit and of manas, but terms both
•thought'. In Chapter One we saw that the Hindu analysis distinguishes
the self not only from the body, but also from the mind which is
regarded as being a subtle material. Where the Western writer
distinguishes between the mind and the body, the Hindu distinguishes
the self, the mind and the body. The activities of perception,
judgement and discursive thought, all of which might come under the
general label of 'thought' in the Western tradition are regarded as the
functions of manas by the Hindu, and as quite distinct from cit, which is
the illuminator of these functions. The nearest Western equivalent of
cit is probably Kant's 'transcendental unity of apperoeption'. Kant
makes a sharp distinction between the contents of thought and that
which is aware of and unifies these contents and calls the latter the
'transcendental unity of apperception'. This is simply a bare unity,
but a unity without which we could not imagine the possibility of
mental activity and of our experience of ourselves as persons.
Carrying the comparison further, it would probably not be unreasonable
to talk about the transcendental unity of apperception as illuminating
the contents of thought in the same way that cit is said to illuminate
manas. It would be a good metaphor inasmuch as our mental experience
or indeed any experience could not occur in the form which it does
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without this •transcendental unity*. If we can imagine a series of
thoughts without this 'transcendental unity' they would be simply a
sequence of activity which was inherently meaningless because not
apprehended by anyone and, therefore, not combined into a unity by
anyone. But when they are illuminated by someone's thinking them
then they immediately stand out and reveal their character as thought
and in the course of doing this, also make us aware of the
transoendental unity which brings them into being. The phrase,
•transcendental unity of apperception' is, however, cumbersome and in
what follows I propose to translate cit simply as'consciousness*.
I have mentioned 'cognition* above as a possible translation of cit
and will say a few words about this. One reason why 'cognition' is
not in current philosophical use is that it is rather a broad term
which covers the whole spectrum of mental activity from bare awareness
of something to an apprehension of that thing which could be
classified as knowledge. Current philosophical interest lies in
classifying different kinds of mental activity rather than
differentiating mental activity as a whole from other tilings. Cognition
in this context is too broad and, therefore, too vague a term to be of
practical use. However, there seems to be a certain vagueness in the
term 'cit* which is successfully captured in the translation 'cognition'.
Those Hindu writers who discuss cit in relation to the Atman or to
Brahman appear to have no fixed translation of the term and to subsume
what to the T/estern mind are totally different concepts under the same
term 'oit'. Thus in the same breath, Brahman may be referred to as a
mass of consciousness, or of intelligence or even knowledge and there
is no indication that the writer considers himself to be saying
different things. This is remarkable when we consider how scrupulously
careful classical Hindu commentators are in choosing the right word
to convey their precise meaning. We would expect their modem
counterparts to exercise equal discretion. The fact that they do use
a great variety of words with different connotations to translate the
single term *cit' is an indication not of looseness of thought, but
of the 'open-endedness* of the concept itself. As well as
indicating the transcendental unity of apperception, cit also indicates
the essence of mental activity, though perhaps the term *activity' is
ill-chosen as cit cannot be said to act.
I would suggest that one of the main reasons for ambiguity in terns
such as cit and its derivative, caitanya, is that they are taken by
Hindu writers as the differentiae of the personal. For example, Bamanuja
says,
'Analogously to the lamp, the self is essentially intelligent (cid-
rupa), and has intelligence (caitanya) for its essential nature. And
to be essentially intelligent means to be self-luminous.
In other words, the defining mark of our experience as human beings is
the presence of cit or some other related term. It is no wonder then
that the meaning of these terms should appear both to be patently clear
and also surprisingly confused when it is considered that each writer has
his own ideas as to how exactly the differentiae of the personal should
be analysed and described. Cit is to the Hindu what rationality was to
the Greeks and still is to the West. It is significant that Aristotle
also uses the analogy of light to describe reason and 'reason* might
also be considered as a translation of cit since it is both sufficiently
exact to indicate the range of experience which cit covers and
sufficiently vague to leave the precise delineation of cit as a matter
for discus3ion.
1 Brahma Sutra, l.i.l.
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The Relation Of Consciousness To The Empirical Self
Cit, the true self, is in no sense an agent. It is not to be regarded
as the originator of thoughts and actions. The self cannot be an
agent because
•an act cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides.'"^
If the self were an agent it would be subject to modification and,
therefore, changing. What is it then that acts? It is the principle
of egoity, the ahamkara. This is the notion of oneself which one has
through faulty introspection and the misidentifying of oneself with
the body or the mind or some other object. Shankara says
'it is only this principle of egoity, the object of the notion of
the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions
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and enjoys their result.'
The true self does not act : it is the underlying awareness behind the
empirical acting ego.
Another reason Shankara gives why the self cannot be regarded as an
agent in its real nature is that if this were so then final release
would be impossible. This is because, according to Shankara, final
release is an unchanging state while being an agent is to be always in
a changing state. Further Shankara points out, that 'activity is
3
essentially painful* and final release is a state of absolute bliss.
Criticism Of Shankara
What are we to make of Shankara's account of the self? Does it permit
of any answer to questions regarding personal identity? The Western
philosophical tradition has concerned itself with the interplay of
bodily and mental criteria such as memory as the criteria of personal
identity. Here in contrast is an account of the self which refuses to
associate it at all with bodily or mental experience. It may be
1 Brahma Sutra, l.i.4. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 2.iii.4£).
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objected that such an account is essentially meaningless since it can
have no content. It seems to leave us with a totally disembodied being
- a ghost, but without even a machine. As Stuart Hampshire has put it,
•I do not know how I would identify myself as a disembodied being, and
I do not know what this hypothesis means.
It is important to realise that the presuppositions of Shankara and of
Hampshire are totally different so that the type of account given by
Hampshire misses the point so far as Shankara is concerned. Hampshire,
presupposes the ultimacy of a plurality of individual selves, whereas
Shankara who started from the premiss that the Self or Brahman are one
is not concerned with the question of identifying an individual,
disembodied being. As far as Shankara is concerned, Hampshire would be
referring to the empirical self and naturally the activities of the
individual empirical self must be understood in terms of empirical
experience which includes bodily and mental experience. Shankara would
have no quarrel over this. The ground is cut from beneath the feet of
those who would criticise along these lines. For Shankara the fact that
his account of the self has no 'content* is a point in its favour for
if it did have a content then it could only be an account of the
empirical self. Pursuing the logic of the argument, by applying
Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiseernpbles then if cit or
the transcendental unity of apperception for me cannot be distinguished
from the consciousness which you experience, then there is every reason
for concluding that they are one and the same. From there it is but a
short step to identifying the inner principle of unity with the outer
principle of unity in experience and we arrive at the equation of Atman
2
and Brahman.
1 Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action. Chatto and Windus,
2 See also Note 1 on Chapter Three.
1959, p.48.
Once the assumption is made that the plurality of individual selves
are unreal, then Shankara's account of the Atman as cit, consciousness,
becomes plausible. It does, however, leave us with some problems. One
of these concerns the sense in which cit, consciousness, may be
predicated of the individual self and Brahman. Inasmuch as the Atman
and Brahman are taken to be identical, cit must have the same meaning
when applied to Brahman as it has in its application to Atman. If cit
is interpretated as equivalent to the transcendental unity of
apperception it cannot be identified with any kind of bodily or mental
activity. The fact remains however, that our apprehension of cit is
very much bound up with our experience of bodily and mental activity :
consciousness in our experience is always consciousness of something
even although we may be able to differentiate between the something
and our consciousness of it. It is difficult to make sense of the
notion of pure consciousness with no object at all. Shankara admits in
one passage, that the transmigrating soul needs a body in order that it
may acquire knowledge. He contrasts the case of Brahman who has no
need of a body with that of the individual self;
'Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition - as the sun's nature is
eternal luminousness - can impossibly stand in need of any instruments
of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (samsarin) ..... which i3 under
the sway of nescience, etc., may require a body in order that knowledge
may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments
of knowledge.'-
The Experiential Basis Of Consciousness
The relation of the body and the mind to the real self 3s desoribed by
Shankara as superimposition. He defines superimposition as
'the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to
2
consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing.'
1 Brahma Sutras l.i.5. 2 Brahma Sutras l.i.
In other words the attributes of the body and mind are mistakenly
considered as attributes of the real self. But attributes are only
predicated of objects and the self is not an object. This difficulty is
got round by saying that the real self (pratyagatman) is not
'non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion
of the ego and the interior self is well-known to exist in account of
its immediate (intuitive) presentation.
In the same way blueness is superimposed on the sky which is not in
itself an immediate object of perception. The sky is like the real
self. It would not be perceived were it not for the blueness which in
actual fact is no part of the sky. But in turn the blueness could not
appear if there were no sky. Likewise it is meaningless to talk about
mental and bodily activity apart from its illumination by the real self.
The superimposition in the case of the real self and the internal organ
is a two-way matter.
'Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ)
ia superimposed on the interior self, which, in reality, is the witness
of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa, the
interior self ..... is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses
and so on.*^
The difficulty here is that there appears to be such mutual inter¬
dependence between the 'internal self* and the 'internal organ* as to make
it impossible to conceive of the one without the other. Shankara himself
admits that without consciousness mental activity would be incomprehensible.
But why on the other hand should consciousness by itself be supposed a
viable proposition? We can point to the case of deep sleep where self-
awareness may be supposed to span the interval during which we are asleep
1 Ibid. 2 Ibid.
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and not involved in any activity. Yet this is not pure consciousness;
the body continues to function. If the body is dead then we can assume
no such continuity of self-awareness. The notion of self-awareness or
consciousness can not be made sense of except in conjunction with a
physical body, even although that body is not engaged in overt action.
'The case is similar to that found in David Hume's familiar account of our
discrimination of shape and colour with regard to the cubes and the sphere.
As colour and shape are discriminable, but inseparable, so are
consciousness and consoious activity. The mind and body are often
described by Shankara as 'limiting adjuncts' which hinder our realisation
of the true nature of the self as pure consciousness. The metaphor is
used of the air which is the same substance whether or not it is enclosed
in pots and pans. The difficulty, however, is to make any sense of the
notion of consciousness apart from our experience of it in association
with its limiting adjuncts. Shankara's belief that the body is a
hindrance to us in obtaining knowledge of Brahman is similar to the
platonic view that our bodies hinder us in acquiring knowledge. Plato
draws an analogy with the bird which is hindered from reaching the
uppermost heaven by the air. To this it might well be replied that if it
were not for the air the bird would not be able to fly at all. In a
similar way Shankara argues that the material elements such as the body
and the senses prevent us from obtaining the true knowledge of Brahman;
to which we can equally reply that were it not for the bo^y and the
senses we should have no knowledge at all.
Consciousness As Predicated Of Brahman
If the concepts of consciousness and the contents of consciousness are
interdependent, discriminable but not separable, what are we to make of
consciousness as applied to Brahman? Cit or pure consciousness is one
of Shankara's favourite ways of describing Brahman. Pursuing the line of
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our preceding argument, we must either find a sense of cit, consciousness,
in which it is totally independent of any "bodily functioning,or conclude
that Shankara is using the term in a different sense when he applies it
to Brahman. Neither alternative is acceptable. Shankara's position
depends on the possibility of predicating consciousness both of what is
experienced by the individual self and what is experienced by the
universal Brahman. Continually he appeals to the experiential nature
of cit, consciousness. Yet we have been unable in give any coherent sense
to the notion of a consciousness which functions quite independently
of the bodily activity which is its regular concomitant in our
experience.
Returning to our experience of consciousness, it is clear that our
awareness of our consciousness is a fleeting and imperfect thing. Most
of the time we are aware of the objects of which we are conscious and it
requires a fair degree of sophistication to distinguish the objects of
consciousness from the awareness of consciousness itself. Brahman,
however, must be supposed to be eternally conscious. If cit is one and
the same when predicated of the individual and of Brahman then how can
there be an eternal consciousness which is some of the time not conscious?
Shankara appears to be involved here in a difficulty which Ramanuja
escapes. Ramanuja distinguishes between consciousness and the subject
who is conscious. Like Shankara, he holds that the term means the same
when applied to the individual and to Brahman, but his explanation of
the experiential difference between the two cases is based on the
supposed expansion and contraction of consciousness in the states of
release and samsara. Thus the individual's experience of consciousness
is different from that of Brahman because they are two different subjects
and although they are both conscious in the same sense, it is not
unreasonable to suppose them consoious in different degrees.
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The Reality Of An Unchanging Consciousness
We have seen that there is some difficulty in finding an experiential
basis for the concept of a consciousness which functions independently
of bodily activity and is one and the same when applied to the
individual and to Brahman. Apart from these practical difficulties,
the metaphysical presupposition of an unchanging reality may also be
questioned."1" Is such a concept coherent or does it contain
contradictory notions?
Like Plato in the Timaeus. Shankara asserts that the existence of the
One is eternal, necessary, unchanging. W.C. Kneale has shown the
incoherence of the Timaeus doctrine of timeless life which was later to
be adopted by Christian theologians and applied to God. Similar
considerations may be applied to Shankara • s doctrine of the unchanging
Brahman.
The difficulty lies in making sense of a reality which is both conscious
and unchanging. We have already argued that it is impossible to give a
meaning to the notion of a consciousness which functions independently
of bodily activity. While we can separate the awareness of
consciousness from the awareness of the contents of consciousness we
have no independent experience of consciousness itself. Since
consciousness and the activity of consciousness are inseparable, change
must be regarded as an inseparable feature of consciousness. All
consciousness involves awareness of happenings in time. It might be
argued that although our experience of consciousness is inseparable from
the activity of consciousness, yet the actual awareness of consciousness
is an awareness of an unchanging something which is not involved in time.
It is true that the •transcendental unity of consciousness* is a bare,
1 See W.C. Kheale, Eternity. P.A.S. Vol. 61 (1960-61), pp. 87-108.
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self-identical unity. It is unchanging at whatever point of time we are
aware of it. While the nature of the contents of consciousness may be
affected by the passing of time the nature of the awareness of the
contents of consciousness remains unchanged and hence appears to stand
outside time. Further while the contents of consciousness are affected
by sundry factors, there could be no contents of consciousness and so no
experience at all as we understand it without the awareness of
consciousness. Hence the plausibility of describing consciousness as
necessary, as well as unchanging and eternal.
But here we come to the difficulty. It may be correct up to a point to
describe consciousness as atemporal, necessary and unchanging. But
what sort of reality has this thing that we are describing? If our
foregoing arguments are correct, consciousness cannot be regarded as
having any independent reality whatever. It is something which as far
as we know only exists in conjunction with changing experience. It is
an aspect of that experience but no more than an aspect. It is a feature
of life but not the whole of it, and life as a whole is inseparable from
temporality and change. Arguments from the nature of consciousness
considered in itself to the nature of reality are on the same footing as
arguments from the nature of mathematical truths. The necessity of
mathematical truths gives us no grounds for concluding that the
existence which manifests mathematical properties is necessary.
Mathematical properties are an aspect of reality and not the whole of it.
Likewise consciousness is an aspect of reality and there are no grounds
for supposing that what is true of consciousness is true of reality as a
whole.
One of the metaphors whioh Shankara applies to both Brahman and the
individual self in order to explain what he means by characterising them
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as cognition or consciousness is that of light. Shankara says
•Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition as the sun's nature is
eternal luminousness. and 'eternal intelligence is the
2
essential nature of the soul.' Further that 'The absence of
actual intelligising is due to the absence of objects, not to the
absence of intelligence; just as the light pervading space is not
apparent due to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the
3absence of its own nature.'
The nature of the self is like light. It is luminous and as light
pervades space so the self is pervasive. If objects stand in the path
of the light then they obstruct the light and cast as shadows.
The true nature of the light is only adequately manifested when there
are no objects to obstruct it. Conversely, Shankara notes the light
itself may not be noticed when there are no objects to be illuminated.
This situation occurs in deep sleep. Then, according to Shankara,
consciousness shines with its own light, but we are not aware of it as
there are no objects for it to illumine. But what sense can be made of
saying that consciousness shines with its own light if we are not aware
of its shining and there is no evidence of its shining? Ramahuja. as
we shall see, found this an intolerable supposition.
Consciousness As Self-Luminous
On the face of it, Shankara is making contradictory assertions. He asks
us to accept that the true nature of light is only manifested when there
are no objects to obstruct it, and also that in a situation in which
there are no objects for the light to shine on the light itself may not
be noticed. If the first statement is true then it is difficult to see
how we could fail to be aware of the light when there were no longer any
obstructions to its shining.
1 Brahma Sutra, l.i.5. 2 Ibid. 2.iii.l8. 3 Ibid.
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When the metaphor is applied to consciousness, however, we get the
statement that the true nature of consciousness is manifested when there
are no objects of which to be conscious coupled with the assertion that
there are some situations, such as that in which we are in a deep sleep,
when we are conscious of no objects and yet are unaware of consciousness
itself. To the Western mind these are puzzling statements which may be
made no less puzzling when coupled with the Upanishadic quartet of
ascending states j waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and the realisation
of the atman. This ascending series of states of consciousness allows
for the possibility of two conditions, dreamless sleep, in which we are
unaware of objects yet also unaware of the true nature of the self or
consciousness, and a more exalted condition in which we are unaware of
objects but aware of the true nature of the self. The suggestion that
we are nearer to our true selves when we are asleep rather than when we
are awake is an odd one. When we are asleep we are doing nothing, there
is a momentary hiatus in the history of our lives, a temporary suspension
of the experiences which individualise us from the rest of humanity. How
can we be more ourselves in such a condition?
To make sense of these ideas we must remember that the touchstone of
reality for Shankara is not our experience of ourselves as individuals,
related to and relating ourselves to the kaleidoscopic transformations of
life, but rather the mystical experience of ecstatic bliss in which the
oneness of the self and the ultimate reality, Brahman, is realised. This
has as its corollary the assumption that there is only one real, self and
that, therefore, the empirical awareness whioh individuals have of
themselves is not ultimate. In the light of the blis3 of Brahman in which
there is no longer any awareness of the empirical world, we can see the
resemblance to this of the state of deep sleep from which empirical
experience is also absent.
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In spite of this resemblance, however, there is an important difference
between the state of ecstatic bliss in which identity with Brahman is
realised and the state of deep sleep that may seem more relevant than
the similarity they have in both being devoid of experience of empirical
objects. In the former state there is an awareness which is absent from
the latter. We have said that cit, consciousness, is equivalent to the
transcendental unity of apperception, the principle of self-awareness
which makes us aware from one moment to the next of the coherence and
meaning of our experiences by connecting them together as our experiences.
This self-awareness is not always with us. We are not aware of ourselves
when we are asleep or unconscious. Yet something bridges these periods
for we realise afterwards that we are the same person as we were
previously. If it is necessary to assume that there is something present
during these periods of unconsciousness then that something can only be a
species of the self-awareness which constitutes our personal unity when
we are awake. This is the significance of Shankara's statement that
consciousness continues to shine with its own light even when we are not
aware of it.
This explanation, however, serves once again to pinpoint the difficulties
in Shankara's position. What is the nature of this self-awareness of
which we are not always aware? Is such a concept coherent at all? How
is the ecstatic bliss of Brahman related to our self-awareness? Without
wishing to doubt the validity of the mystical experience which provides
the experiential core of Shankara's philosophy, one wonders whether, in
linking the analysis of the state of mystical bliss with an analysis of
self-awareness, Shankara manages to provide an adequate account of either.
Is there not here a conflation of distinct ideas?
Proof Of The Self
The picture of the self which emerges from Shankara's writings is
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determined by the presupposition that the real must be unchanging, by the
nature of religious experience and by the need to refute current dualistic
philosophy. These factors lead Shankara to describe the self as the
constant awareness behind the changing thoughts and actions which make up
the empirical self. The time self takes no part in changing empirical
experience : it is only the witness of these things. It is variously
described as awareness, intelligence, thought, prefixed by the epithet
•pure'. This term •pure' indicates that the terms are to be taken as
applied to an unchanging reality.
It seems at first sight that there can be no relation between the real
self and the empirical self and that we can never be aware of the real
self in the way that we are aware of our continuous empirical existence.
Yet the real self is the ground of the empirical self and Shankara holds
that its existence is self-evident. Shankara*s argument in proof of this
is very similar to the argument of Descartes' cogito. Descartes, although
he could doubt the evidence of his senses could not doubt that he was
actually thinking and he, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the
incontrovertible awareness of his thinking was the evidence of his real
existence. Shankara argues that the existence of the self is self-
evident from the fact that everyone thinks and is aware of his thinking :
'Everyone admits the existence of the self and not (i.e. and does not say)
that he does not exist.'"''
Shankara then proceeds to identify the self in question with Brahman.
Here the similarity to Descartes ends. For Descartes the cogito proved
the existence of the individual self : for Shankara it is Brahman, the
universal self that is indicated. The fact that two thinkers should
reach such different conclusions from similar premisses leads one to
1 Brahma Sutra, l.i.l., translation by Dr. J.L. Brockington.
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suspect the argument. Yet reasons for this divergence can be indicated..
Descartes is writing in the context of the Christian tradition where an
assertion of the identity of the individual self and the universal self
would be heresy. As we have already noted, however, from a logical
point of view there is much to commend the identity. If we can point
to no factor differentiating my awareness of myself from your awareness
of yourself inasmuch as they are both sheer awareness, it is economical
to conclude that they are one and the same. And from this it is but a
short step to the assertion that the individual awareness is simply a
part of the universal awareness and so identical with it.
The Self-Evidence Of The Self
Shankara affirms the self-evidencs of the self.
'Just because it is the self, it is impossible for us to entertain the
idea of its being capable of refutation.'"*"
The knowledge of the self is described as 'self-established' in contrast
to the 'adventitious' knowledge which is obtained through the pramanas
or means of knowledge. Shankara says
•as the nature of the Self is eternal presence we cannot even
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conceive that it should ever become something different from what it is.'
v?hat is meant by describing the self as an unchanging awareness, 'eternal
presence' which is 'self-established'? Is there any such self-evident
awareness in our experience?
The fact that something is self-evident does not imply that we are always
aware of it or that when it is drawn to our attention we are unfailingly
accurate in our awareness of it. If two plus two equals four be an
example of a self-evident truth then it is obvious that we are not always
aware of it and that it is possible to apprehend it falsely as a child
1 Brahma Sutra, 2.iii.7. 2 Ibid.
/•
may in learning addition. Similarly, to describe the self as self-evident
need not necessarily imply that we are always aware of it or preclude the
possibility of our being mistaken as to its nature.
We have already seen that consciousness interpreted as the transcendental
unity of apperception may be described as necessary, unchanging and
eternal. We oannot argue from this, however, that consciousness has an
independent existence j on the contrary it only exists as part of a whole
which is constituted by the activity of a conscious agent. Consequently,
to say that consciousness is necessary and eternal is to say no more
about it than can be said about mathematical truths. The fact that
mathematical truths are eternally necessary does not confer a superior
degree of reality on them. Similarly, to say that consciousness is
necessary and unchanging is not to assert the existence of something
which is more real than the changing experience of which consciousness is
a part : it is simply to state that we do have experience. To suppose
that we are saying more than this is to suppose that the 'transcendental
unity of apperception' is a definite something, an impression or
intuition, and not simply a bare unity which affords the possibility of
#
experience.
An Impression Of The Self?
I have suggested that the intuition of the self which Shankara claims
as the touchstone of his philosophy may be comparable to the impression
of the self which David Hume sought and failed to find. Hume could find
no constant impression which would confer personal identity and hence
concluded that the self-identity of the self was no more than a
convenient fiction of our practical lives which could not be adequately
accounted for by reason. It was simply the result of a tendency of the
mind to run so quickly over a succession of slightly different perceptions
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that it mistakenly ascribes the series to a single identical source and
thus imagines a mysterious unity underlying the apparent and visible
diversity. Shankara, in contrast, claims to have found the single
identical source of the unity of experience in an intuition of the self,
though this self is not to be identified with the individual self with
which Hume was concerned.
Both Hume and Shankara assume that once an intuition of the self is
found then this does account for the unity of experience and give a basis
for personal identity. Is this a correct assumption? Supposing that Hume
had found his impression of the self would it have been able to do the job
required of it? What sort of unity would it have given to experience and
how would it have integrated the different activities of the self?
It is not immediately obvious that such a constant impression would make
a difference to our experience. So long as its only difference from
other impressions is that it is continuous whereas the others are momentary
it is simply another impression. It is on the same level as every other
and one is tempted to say to one who claims to have such an impression,
'So what?' Whatever the nature of such an impression, it could not by
itself provide an explanation of anything until related in some way to the
totality of the experience which it accompanies. A constant impression,
just as much as a momentary impression, still requires the assumption of
an underlying personal unity which is more than an impression in order to
account for experience.
This has an application to Shankara's thought. If what I have said is
correct it is not enough for Shankara to claim an intuition of the self.
Such an intuition, however pressing its claim may appear at the moment of
insight, can have no value until related to the rest of experience. The
act of relating an intuition to experience is an act of the self. This
means that the essence or unity of the self cannot reside solely in the
impression or intuition.
Although it may appear that experience occurs to us already labelled with
its significance, this is not the case. We have to make sense of a
•blooming, buzzing confusion'. The significance which we attach to our
various experiences is the result of an extensive period of learning to
weave what we experience into a single meaningful whole.
What, however, of experiences such as that of the mystic, in which the
•whole' of everyday life is to all intents and purposes transcended?
Does mystical experience contradict the claim tnat no impression in itself
can be significant and valuable?
No mystical experience occurs completely in a void. Mystics live within
different traditions and are influenced by different modes of thought.
While in the mystical state, ordinary experience may appear to be entirely
superceded, yet when it comes to making assertions about that state this
must be done in everyday language. The mystical state must be shown to
have some relevance to everyday life or it could never be regarded as a
goal. There are many experiences in which ordinary life becomes
irrelevant but they do not thereby qualify as mystical experiences or as
revelations of the true nature of the self. To one in a state of
exhaustion, sleep appears sheer bliss. Sleep, however, is not generally
regarded as having any transcendental significance. (An exception to this
occurs in Hindu thought where, as we have seen, dreamless sleep is
regarded as being next door to the state of transcendental bliss in the
ascending series of waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and the realisation
of the atman.) The reason for this is that when normality returns, this
state is seen to be insignificant in relation to life as a whole. It does
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not transform our understanding of life in any way. One important test
of the authenticity of the mystic's experience, however, is that it does
transform his life. This experience becomes of supreme importance to
him and his ordinary life becomes viewed in terns of it. The reality
of the mystical state is understood in contrast to the reality of the
other experiences which it illuminates. This means that whatever
impressions of the self may be revealed in experience any account of the
self which fails to include an account of the activity of the self in
relating these impressions to the rest of experience, must be deficient.
Shankara's account of the self is deficient in this way since he treats
the self as being revealed in an intuition which transcends experience.
Nothing is left of ordinary experience in the full realisation of the
Brahman/Atman identification. We cannot refer to this state, however,
without implying a reference to ordinary experience and to the relation
between the two. It is essential to the nature of the mystical state
that it should be able to be referred to or it could not become a goal
for human life. Unless this is possible the state of transcendence
becomes meaningless apart from the time one is involved in it. During
this time it is impossible to distinguish the special nature of this
experience from that of other experiences of ordinary life which at the
time of experiencing them seem particularly significant, but later on
turn out not to be so. What this means is that the self cannot be
identified with any impression or intuition since this leaves us with
the problem of relating the intuition to the rest of experience, which
must be the work of the self yet cannot be done by an intuition.
Knowing Subject Or Agent?
In Chapter One we distinguished two aspects of the term 'person* within
the Christian tradition; 'that which indicates a self-conscious,
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intelligent, independent being and that which indicates a centre of
volunatry, purposeful social activity'. We argued that it is the
latter aspect which is more distinctively Christian although the former
element may have been more philosophically prominent as a result of the
influence of Greek thought on the Christian tradition. The first
aspect emphasises knowledge as the essence the person;the second
emphasises action. Is the self or person primarily a knower or an agent?
The evaluation of the self as a knower or an agent has repercussions
in the social and moral spheres. A tradition which takes knowing as its
standpoint must account for action and show the relevance of action to a
life which is seen from the position of the knowing subject. Where
action is central, agency must be shown to include the capacity for
knowledge. As it is the actions of persons which together constitute
social life and raise moral issues, it follows that the importance which
one attaches to action will be reflected in the standpoint from which one
views the individual and vice versa. For example, if the individual is
viewed primarily as a knowing subject then error becomes a problem of
misperception and the existence of others becomes problematic as they
only exist as part of the experience of the knowing subject. Social and
moral issues logically play a secondary role. On the other hand, if the
individual is primarily an agent error becomes not misperception, but
misdoing. This gives priority to ethical and social considerations.
John MacMurray* s Analysis Of The Self"*"
John MacMurray compares these two opposing points of view : that which
treats the self as primarily a thinker and that which starts from the
point of view of the self as agent. His analyses have an interesting
application to Shankara and Ramanuja's accounts of the self.
1 The Self As Agent, Faber & Faber, 1957.
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ne argues that Western philosophy sinoe the time of Descartes has been
vitiated by the adoption of the egocentric standpoint of the knowing
subject for whom the world is an object. Once the indubitability of
the cogito is accepted as fundamental, certain conclusions inevitably
follow. My existence becomes viewed in terms of my awareness of my
thinking. In other words, my relation to my experience becomes that of
knowing subject to object of thought. This has the effect of making
the self reflective in character and of withdrawing it from the field
of action. Everything, and this includes action, is viewed as
primarily an object of my thought. As an object of my thought,
experience becomes something which I contemplate but in which I take no
active part. 'The self in reflection is self-isolated from the world
which it knows.*1 Not only this, but the existence of others becomes
problematic. Although I oannot doubt the fact that I am thinking I can
very well doubt the nature of what I am thinking. I could well be
mistaken or some malignant demon could be deceiving me. This means that
I can have no guarantee of the real existence of the other people who
occur as objects of my thought. Solipsism is unavoidable.
Since experience has become an object of my thought, it must be seen as
something determinate. It is an object of contemplation rather than
something which allows the possibility of change through action. Looked
at from the opposite angle, action as it is commonly understood
presupposes both that we are free to initiate change and that the world
is still indeterminate to a degree which will allow for the possibility
of its determination through action. As knowing subjects, however, we
can only contemplate our experience, not change it, for to assert that
we can change our experience is immediately to grant it a reality on a par
with the reality which we attribute to ourselves. This would be to deny
1 Op. Cit. p.11.
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the premiss of the cogito; hence we are faced with the conclusion that
action is illusory.
Hie analysis which MacMurray gives of the self as knowing subject bears
similarities to aspects of Shankara's thought. Solipsism occurs in
both. Whereas this is a perennial problem for Western philosophers, it
is as we have seen, no problem for Shankara. The tradition within which
he writes has no uncompromising monotheism to contend with so that he is
able to follow through the logic of the argument to the conclusion that
there is and can be only one real subject. A further similarity occurs
in MacMurray's account of the world as an object of contemplation and
Shankara's account of the relation of the 'witness-self to the world.
The 'witness-self' is the impassive observer, the onlooker who simply
contemplates the world, taking no active part for he realises that the
world with all its change and diversity is not ultimately real.
In place of the self as knowing subject MacMurray wishes to put the
self as agent. This, he argues, is a more comprehensive conception since
knowledge is included in the agency of the self. The 'I do' includes 'I
know that I do'. I may be aware of the world without doing anything in
it but what I do in the world I must be aware of doing. Further, all
our knowledge must have, directly or indirectly, a praotical reference.
Knowledge is for the sake of action :
'theoretical activities have their origins in practical
requirements and they also find their meaning and significance in
the practical field '.1
MacMurray goes on to apply his conclusions to the field of religion. If
we accept that all our knowledge has a practical reference, then he
argues, we can give an account of our experience which tends to a
1 Ibid. p.21.
theistic conclusion and gives religion its proper place. If, on the
other hand, we adopt the standpoint of the knowing subject for whom the
world is an object of knowledge, atheism becomes inevitable.
These are far-reaching conclusions, but according to MacMurray
•The conflict between religion and atheism turns, in large part at least
on the issue whether the process of the world is intentional or not.'"*"
This means that when we adopt the standpoint of an agent we acknowledge
the importance of intention in understanding the world and
'To think the world in practical terms is ultimately to think the unity
of the world as one action, and therefore as informed by a unifying
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intention.•
This prima facie implies a supreme Agent whose act the world is. On the
other hand, if the reflective subject is taken as fundamental then there
is no place for intention in thinking the unity of the world and,
therefore, no place for personal agency. This for MacMurray is
equivalent to atheism for he assumes that
'it is characteristic of religion that it behaves towards its object in
ways that are suitable to personal intercourse; and the conception of
a deity is the conception of a personal ground of all that we experience
We can suppose that MacMurray would regard Shankara's monism as a type
of atheism inasmuch as Shankara's ultimate reality, nirguna Brahman, is
in no sense an agent. If we accept this then MacMurray's account of the
point at issue between religion and atheism agrees with what we find to
be the case in the development of Shankara and Ramanuja's thought. In
Shankara's case the treatment of the self as primarily a reflective
subject who in no sense really interacts with the empirical world goes
along with his account of ultimate reality as in no way informed by
1 Ibid. p.222 2 Ibid. p.221. 3 Ibid. p.17.
intention and to be conceived of, therefore, in completely impersonal
terms. On the other hand, Ramanuja's insistency on the agency of the
self of whom reflective consciousness is only an attribute and not the
essence is correlated with his theism.
MacMurray's claim that the ground of religion is our experience of
personal relationship, leading to the conclusion when applied to
Shankara that his Advaitism is a kind of atheism, is sweeping but by
no means new. Raminuja's theism was intended as a reinstatement and
defence of religion against Shankara's claims which denied them and we
have already noted that monism has never been popular with the rank
and file of Hindus.
But can it be accepted that the ground of genuine religion is our
experience of personal relationship? MacMurray appears to accept this
as an article of faith rather than offer any reasoned defence of the
position. In relation to the Christian religion it is probably correct
but it does not cover the mystical experience which is central to
Advaitic religion. We have already in Chapter One noted the tendency
of religious thinkers on either side of the fence to assume too readily
that their own particular brand of religious experience is the
fundamental one and that the differences in others' experience may be
ironed out so that they conform to one norm. Shankara's non-dualism
must be accepted as an account of a genuine type of religious awareness
which is not grounded in personal relationship but in the concept of
sthitaprajna, the man of steady understanding. Compared with the theist'
position, Shankara's nirguna Brahman may seem like no god at all, and
therefore to be atheism, but this is an unwarranted conclusion. We must
accept the non-dualist religious awareness in its own terms and seek to
understand it from within rather than impose upon it an interpretation
drawn from an alien type of religious awareness.
In what follows I shall make use of MacMurray' s analysis of the
implications of treating the self as a knowing subject and as an
intentional agent in my discussion of Shankara and Ramanuja's accounts
of the self. I hope that I have made it clear that I do not accept
MacMurray's conclusion that the adoption of the standpoint of the self
as knowing subject leads to atheism. Atheism it may appear from the
Christian's standpoint but not necessarily from any other.
Shankara's 'Theoretical* Standpoint
It may seem strange to characterise a major branch of Hindu philosophy
as 'theoretical' and to compare it with a similar 'theoretical'
development in Western philosophy when one of the striking differences
between Western and Eastern philosophy is the latter's practical
outlook. The motive of the latter is to promote the attainment of moksha.
P.T. Raju expresses this opposite point of view :
I
Western philosophical tradition in general understands the philosopher
as a spectator of eternity and all existence. But the standpoint of
Indian philosophy, because of its predominantly religious interest, is
man's life in its processes, and not merely that of the spectator of
these processes. The chief aim of philosophy is not merely a logical
understanding of the universe; such an understanding is subservient to
the realisation of something higher, which is beyond logic.'"'"
The motivation of Indian philosophy has undoubtedly been religion and
the quest for moksha, freedom. It is therefore fair to say, as I have
pointed out in Chapter One, that Indian philosophy is practical in its
aim whereas Western philosophy is theoretical. Hindu philosophers are
motivated by the desire to show that the world is such that moksha is
possible. Nevertheless, the answer to this practical question, as far
as Shankara is concerned, is that moksha is possible just because man
1 P.T. Raju, Idealist Thought of India. Allen & Uhwin, London, 1953, p.149
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is a spectator of the world and not a real participant. He is interested
in 'man's life in its processes', not primarily for its own sake, but
with the aim of showing that it is compatible with moksha.
Ramahuja
The majority of Hindus are theists of some sort. Karl Potter says that
'With its emphasis on bhakti and prapatti, this development of Ramanuja's
tradition can be said to represent one of the main arteries through which
philosophy reached down to the masses, and it may be said that
Visistadvaita is today the most powerful philosophy in India in terms of
numbers of adherents, whether they know themselves by that label or not.'"*1
By the time of Ramanuja, non-dualism was firmly established on a
philosophic basis and it was possible to rescrutinise it and to modify it
without abandonning it. Raraanuja too is a non-dualist, but he is able
to allow for diversity within an essential unity. He reckoned with the
non-intelligent by classifying it as part of the body of the supreme
spirit and likewise he was able to admit a plurality of independent selves
by calling them a part of the one Brahman.
Ramahuja's Account Of The Self
Superficially there are wide differences between Shankara and Ramanuja's
accounts of the nature of the self. Taking into account the common
ground which they share, however, it is questionable whether these
differences are as great as they first appear.
Ramanuja holds that there is a multiplicity of individual selves all of
which are real, in contrast to Shankara's opinion that there is only one
Universal Self whose nature is pure consciousness. Ramahuja reaches his
conclusions by taking his stand on experience. He argues that Shankara's
account of the self as pure consciousness can find no basis in experience.
1 Karl Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophers. Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1963, p.252.
Likewise, Shankara'S relegation of a personal God to being the effect of
maya, he thinks is a falsification of the nature of religious experience
which demands communion with a personal being whose nature is to be free
from all evil and filled with auspicious qualities of the highest
excellence. Ramanuja takes the 'given' very seriously. He is not
prepared to dispose of apparent contradictions in the 'given' by
adopting the kind of arbitrary principle held by Shankara, however
successful such a method of interpretation may be. Instead, he sets
himself to find an alternative means of harmonising our experience which
will not lead as to deny the reality of the empirical world and our
lives in it. Where Shankara has proclaimed the ultimate unreality of
difference, Ramanuja emphasises that 'reality is affected with difference.
The highest reality is certainly a unity, but it is not a unity that
excludes differences from within it. In fact, any attempt to prove that
there is such an undifferenced unity must lead to contradiction for any
such proof must have terms and these terms must be different from each
other or nothing is proved. This conclusion is supported by an appeal
to perception. All perception is of something affected by differences.
None of the senses apprehend mere Being, but only Being of a specific
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kind : 'mere Being does not alone constitute Reality.• Ramanuja also
appeals to scripture and thus shows that none of the accepted means of
knowledge, perception, inference or soripture gives us knowledge of
non-differenced substance.
Ramanuja argues for the multiplicity of selves or 'I's' along two
different lines. He argues that release would have no appeal if it
consisted in the annihilation of the 'I' as there would then be no-one
there to enjoy release. In other words, there can be no incentive to
1 Brahma Sutra, l.i.l., p.if6. 2 Ibid. 1.1.1., p.47.
aim at release if it bears no relationship at all to my present experience.
We can have no conception of what would be meant by Shankara's views as he
assumes the annihilation of our whole structure of though; which presupposes
an 'I'. Something which we cannot even talk of experiencing in some
extended sense of the word 'experience' can have no interest for us. The
multiplicity of selves with which we are presented in experience must be
considered as fundamental.
'What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself
hence to say that the knowing subject, which is established by the state
of consciousness, "I know", is the not-I, is no better than to maintain
that one's own mother is a barren woman
Ramahuja's second argument concerns the difficulty of the notion of a
consciousness which belongs to no subject, but is simply 'pure'
consciousness. We argued that such a conception makes no sense. This is
because we cannot have consciousness without a subject who is conscious.
Consciousness can be compared to the light, as Shankara suggested. And
just as the light is not aware of its own illumination, but illuminates
objects for a subject, so consciousness requires the direction of a
conscious subject. Ramanuja has many arguments against the Advaitic
account of consciousness in his commentary in the Brahma Sutras and we
shall consider them now.
Being And Consciousness
One reason why Shankara thought that Being and Consciousness were identical
was his presupposition that only the unchanging (or only that which is not
sublated) can be real. Consciousness, he thought, was the only unchanging
entity and since the objects of consciousness were forever changing, they
must be ultimately unreal. Ramanuja points out that this argument is
1 Ibid, l.i.l., p.58.
fallacious. It neglects to distinguish between persistence and non-
persistence on the one hand, and sublation and non-sublation on the
other.
The concept of sublation is illustrated by the example of mistaking a
shell for a piece of silver. When the error is discovered the
perception of the silver is sublated by that of the shell and no longer
persists.
The fact that something does not persist, however, does not necessarily-
mean that it is sublated by something else and therefore unreal.
Sublation only occurs when two perceptions are mutually contradictory
as are the perceptions of the silver and the shell. But there is nothing
contradictory in the fact of jars and pots, etcetera, existing in
different places at different times. There is, therefore, no reason for
us to suppose that jars and pots and other such empirical objects are
unreal. Consciousness, therefore, is not the only thing which is
'unsublated'.
Another essential characteristic of consciousness according to Shankara
is its self-manifestation or self-evidence. Consciousness does not
require any proof of its existence. It cannot require any proof as it is
the presupposition of our knowledge of anything. Our own consciousness,
in the moment of knowledge, can never be an object of contemplation. We
need consciousness to be aware of objects, but we do not need a second
•consciousness' to be aware of consciousness. Consciousness is
svayamprakasha (self-manifesting). Shankara's school took this to mean
that consciousness was at no time an object and that it was this
characteristic which distinguished it from all other things which were
all the time objects. Ramanuja points out that this is to take the
argument too far. The statement that consciousness is not an object is
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true for the knowing self at the time when consciousness is illumining
other things, but it is not true at all times. The consciousness of one
person may become the object of an act of cognition of another person
and likewise past states of consciousness may become the object of
present cognition. Ramanuja says
•The essential nature of consciousness consists therein that it
shines forth, or manifests itself, thro' its own being to its own
substrate at the present moment; or (to give another definition) it is
instrumental in proving its own object by its own being.'"1'
Ramahuja's arguments are designed to show that consciousness cannot
occupy the supreme place assigned to it by Shankara. It cannot be
identified with the ultimate reality. He has shown in the first argument
that the reasoning which purports to show that only consciousness is real
can equally well prove that pots and pans are also real. In the second
argument he claims that consciousness, though quite different from pots
and pans, can equally well be an object of cognition as can pots and
pans. He now goes on to show that the other attributes claimed by
Shankara for consciousness are equally invalid and this culminates in
the claim that consciousness is an attribute of a permanent conscious
self, and in an investigation into the nature of this self. Consciousness
is not eternal. Shankara had maintained that as consciousness is
self-established it can have no antecedent non-existence and, therefore,
no origin. Again Ramanuja appeals to experience to answer Shankara.
The antecedent non-existence of consciousness is apprehended by
consciousness itself. We are made aware that our consciousness has a
beginning and is not eternal because the objects of consciousness are
not eternal. If our consciousness were apprehended as being unlimited
in time then any object of consciousness such as a jar would be
1 Ibid, l.i.l. p.48.
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apprehended as eternal and this is not the case. This implies that
consciousness can only be understood in terms of objects of
consciousness and this Ramahuja now goes on to argue. There can be no
consciousness without an object and one reason for holding this is
simply that we never have an experience of this kind. The essential
nature of consciousness consists in its illumining objects and the only
way that we can prove the self luminosity of consciousness is in regard
to this essential attribute. Unless we were aware of consciousness
illumining objects we should never be aware of consciousness itself.
Shankara, however, did claim that pure consciousness manifests itself
at certain times and in particular in deep 3leep. This Ramanuja
proceeds to challenge. The fact that we do not remember being
conscious in deep sleep is sufficient proof that we are not. What we
do remember, as witnessed by our thoughts on awaking, is that 'I was
not conscious of anything for a long time'. These last two arguments
together imply that consciousness is capable of change. This completes
Ramanuja's analysis of consciousness. Summing up he points out that
Shankara's assertion that consciousness is without attributes is
incompatible with his denial that it is non-intelligent and so on. It
is meaningless to deny consciousness the attribute of non-intelligence
unless it is admitted that it has the attribute of intelligence. And if
consciousness can be established, as Shankara claims it can, then it
must have attributes :
•consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is proved
it follows that it possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something
absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower.
Ramanuja in these arguments has insisted on the experiental basis of
consciousness. He discusses next the difference between consciousness
and the conscious subject.
1 Ibid, l.i.l. p.55.
Samanuja opens his discussion of the conscious self by taking one of
Shankara's slogans : 'consciousness is proof'. This slogan immediately
raises the questions, proof of what and to whom? Unless these questions
can be answered we cannot say that consciousness is proof since proof is
a relative notion depending on the circumstances. Shankara, however,
cannot give a satisfactory answer. Consciousness cannot be proof to
the Self if consciousness is the Self, and equally it cannot be proof of
anything if consciousness is held to be the sole reality. Difference
must be allowed to be essential to reality if we are to make any sense
of our experience. This leads Ranfanuja to his own definition of
consciousness :
'the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its
very existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to its
own substrate, of thought and speech. This consciousness (anubhuti)
which is also termed jnana, avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute
belonging to a conscious self and related to an object : as such it is
known to everyone on the testimony of his own self as appears from
ordinary judgements such as "I know the jar".'
In other words, experience demands that we distinguish between the self
which knows, that which is known and the means of knowledge and Ramahuja
takes these distinctions to be ultimate. Consciousness is no more and no
less than the means by which the self becomes aware of the world. It is
the principle attribute of the self.
Having established the difference between consciousness and the conscious
subject, Ramanuja goes on to argue that it is the conscious subject which
is permanent rather than consciousness as held by Shankara. The
permanence of the subject is proved by the fact of recognition.
•For recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier
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to the later moment, and not merely consciousness:
1 Ibid, l.i.l. p.56. 2 Ibid, l.i.l. p.57.
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Unless there is a difference between consciousness and the conscious
subject it would be impossible to recognise what is seen today as the
same as what was seen yesterday. Ramanuja's appeal to our experience
of recognition as proof of the permanence of the conscious subject is
reminiscent of Kant's arguments in the Transcendental Deduction for
the transcendental unity of apperception. The fact that we are able
to recognise that what we think now is the same as what we have thought
a moment before is one of the factors which leads Kant to posit the
transcendental unity of apperception. But whereas Kant describes this
transcendental unity as a 'pure, original unchangeable consciousness'"'"
for Ramanuja it is the knowing subject which has consciousness as its
essential attribute. The argument points to there being an underlying
synthesizing unity in the changing face of experience, but does it prove
a subject of consciousness rather than consciousness and does it prove a
permanent subject?
Taking the last question first it is clear that the argument cannot
establish the permanence of a subject in the sense of a subject which
has no beginning or end. It can only establish the permanence of a
subject so long as consciousness is an attribute of the subject. If
there is no consciousness there can be no recognition and consequently
no awareness of the subject who recognises. It is not clear, however,
whether Ramanuja intended to prove the permanency of the conscious
subject in this sense by means of this argument, although he certainly
held it as a tenet of belief on other grounds : the self, as a part of
God, has all the attributes of God, including eternity. Ramanuja's
main concern in this argument appears to be to distinguish between
consciousness and the subject who is conscious, arguing that while the
1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Kemp omith translation, p.136.
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former is changing, the latter must, in contrast, be assumed to be
permanent, otherwise there could be no unity of experience.
This leads us to the second question, Does the argument in fact prove
the existence of a conscious subject rather than consciousness?
Kant, as we have noted, takes the fact of recognition to prove the
existence of an unchanging consciousness, Ramanuja takes it to prove a
conscious subject. It is arguable that Kant was not ooncerned with this
specific distinction so that his use of the term •consciousness' is not
decisive. Kant was writing within philosophic tradition which took for
granted the multiplicity of knowing subjects and his task was simply to
show what the nature of a knowing subject was in order that knowledge
should be possible. At this stage he was concerned not to prejudice
his final account of the self and in this context, therefore, the term
'consciousness' is not definitive, the more important terms being
'synthetic' and 'unity'. Taking into account Ramanuja's previous
arguments which purport to show that consciousness is not continuous in
experience, it must be admitted that experience has to have a unity and
if the unity is not provided by a continuous awareness (is this the
constant impression which Hume failed to find which Shankara thinks is
provided by consciousness?) it is not unreasonable to suppose that it is
achieved by the person whose awareness it is.
Ramanuja also attacks Shankara's view that a mutual superimposition takes
place between the interior self (pratyagatman) and the internal organ.
The result of this superimposition, as we have seen, is held to be that
the atman presents itself in our ordinary experience as the ahamkara,
i.e. we falsely imagine that we are knowing subjects when in fact the
only reality is pure consciousness without a subject. To this Ramanuja
iy-1
Replies that if this were the ease then
'the conscious "I" would b© cognised as co-ordinate with the state of
consciousness, "I am consciousness", just as the shining thing
presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver.*^
This is not the case however. The shining thing is seen to be silver
but the state of oonsolousness, 'I am consciousness' is not seen to be
the 'I* but only an attribute of the 'I'. There is far more to the 'I*
than the judgement 'I am consciousness' J what the judgement reveals is
an 'I' which is distinguished by consciousness.
The Consoious Subject in Deep Sleep and in the State of Release
Again Ramanuja appeals to our experience and to the natural expression
of that experience. On waking we may think *1 slept well* but never *1
was pure consciousness*. During sleep oonsciousness does not persist
but the knowing subject does, from our own judgment we can toll that
during sleep it was peroeptive of pleasure; for the term 'well* refers
to the past sleep and not to the present awakening. Next Ramanuja
considers th© meaning of 'For suoh and such a time I was conscious of
nothing* and the expression *1 was not conscious of myself*. The first
egression is not intended to be a negation of all experience but only
of our experience of the objeots of knowledge. The words *1 was
oonscious' show that the knowing *1* persisted otherwise we should be
unable to make a judgement at all. In the expression 'I was not
eonaeious of myself*.- The 'myself* is not the same as the 'I'. Ramanuja
says
1 ibid. i.i.i. p. 61
"+Z.
•The object of the (one) myself is the wIn distinguished by olass
characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object
of the word "I" (in the judgement) is that "Iw which consists of a
uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in deep sleep also,
but is there not quite distinct•' 1
In his consideration of final release Raaanuja reaffirms the ultimacy
of the 'I'• To maintain that consciousness of the ,I* does not persist
in the state of final release amounts to the doctrine that release is
the annihilation of the self. He states :
•The "I" is not a mere attribute of the Self so that even after its
destruction the essential nature of the Self might persist ••••• but it
constitutes the veiy nature of the Self
Again he refers to the nature of judgements such as 'I know* in
confirmation of his views. These judgements show that we are conscious
of knowledge as a mere attribute of the self.
I Ibid l.i.l p.69 2 Ibid 1.i.l. p. 70
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The Relation Of The Self To The Body And The World
It is time now to look more olosely at Ramanuja's account of the relation
of the self to the body and to the world. This is best done by
considering first the relation of God and the self, for the self's
relation to the world is a model of God's relation to the self.
For Ramanuja the soul is a part of God. As a part of God the soul is
fundamentally equal to God in that it has the same qualities as has
God s
'the released individual soul when reaching the highest light, i.e.
Brahman, which is free from all sin and so on, attains its true nature
which is characterised by similar freedom from sin and so on '
He also asserts that the individual soul possesses the same twofold
attributes as Brahman, viz. freedom from evil and possession of blessed
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qualities, with the exception of God's 'world-ruling energies'.
The souls together with all non-sentient beings make up God's body.
They may exist in an unevolved subtle state or in an evolved causal
state. The relationship is described thus :
'The highest Self has for its body all sentient and non-sentient
beings - instruments of sport for him as it were - in so subtle a form
that they may be called non-existing : and as they are his body he may
be said to consist of them (tan-maya). Then desirous of providing
himself with an infinity of play things of all kinds he, by a series of
steps so modifies himself ..... and thus appears in the form of
our world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all
intelligent and non-intelligent things, f»*om gods down to plants and
stones.'^"
(The motive of play as we have already noted is a reference to the self-
sufficiency of God. Since God has everything he is perfectly self-
1 Ibid, l.iii.19. p.323 2 Ibid, 3.ii.l2. p.608. 3 Ibid. 4.iv.l.
p.769. 4 Ibid.l.iv.27. p.405.
sufficient and can have no need of the world. His only motive, therefore
m&tiYO far
in creating it can be play or sport. This is comparable to theAcreation as
described in the Timaeus.) As G-od is the conscious directing agent of
the world which is his body so the soul is the conscious directing agent
of its body. This means that the body and the world are ultimately real
for Ramanuja as they are not for Shankara. Consequently, the empirical.
world must be taken seriously since the self is an agent in it. Ramanuja
devotes some space to showing that the individual self is an agent and
not the internal organ as held by Shankara. He argues that scripture
can only be meaningful if the self is assumed to be an agent since one
of the main purposes of scriptu e is the injunction of various actions
which lead to release.^ Shankara had argued that activity did not
originate with the self but with the non-intelligent pradhana or prakrti
•
in the form of the internal organ. Ramahuja replies that if Shankara's
hypotheses we re correct then the effect of any action of an individual
self would be experienced by each of the other selves. This is because
all souls are equally involved with prakrti and furthermore, because in
Shankara's views the self is omnipresent and therefore is in equal
proximity to each part of prakrti. This is clearly not the case so that
it is more reasonable to assume that it is the individual self which
carries out and enjoys its own actions using as its instrument the
internal organ. Similarly if each soul is omnipresent we cannot explain
the different distinctions of the effects of actions on the different
souls for no soul can be exclusively connected with any particular
internal organ. Ramanuja's arguments here remind one of Leibniz's
suggestion that the essence of personality is responsibility. Once the
individual's responsibility for the execution and consequences of his
actions is broken down then the notion of a person has lost its
1 Ibid. 2.iii.33. p. 553 ff.
definitive content. Ramanuja is pointing out that the concept of action
is only meaningful in terms of a multiplicity of independent selves.
Further Ramanuja points out that if the internal organ was the agent
then the power of enjoyment would also belong to the internal organ and
be denied of the self. But this is contrary to one of Shankara's proofs
of the self which is said to be pure bliss. Bliss can only be
attributed to a knowing agent. Finally Ramanuja points out that
although the self is an agent it does not act all the time. It requires
to have particular reasons for acting since its chief attribute is
intelligence and an intelligent being does not act blindly. The self
is like a carpenter with his tools."'' When he is not using them he is no
less a carpenter. Likewise the self acts or not as he pleases. This is
one more proof that action springs from the intelligent self. If the
internal organ were essentially active it would be constantly acting,
since as it is a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by
particular reasons for acting.
Comparing Shankara and Ramanuja*s accounts of the self we can see that
for both the essential differentia of the personal is cit, which we
have compared with rationality in the Western tradition. In other words,
the clue to our understanding of the form of human experience is cit.
Their interpretation of the meaning of cit, however, varies widely.
For Shankara consciousness is ultimately identical with being or
reality. It transcends the quality of subject and object and ultimately
comes to refer to something 'behind' the phenomena. This leads to the
view that the true self is the 'witness' self, the same for everyone
unconcerned with the particularities of the individual. This self
cannot be an agent for this would imply his participation in the
changing, unreal world of maya. He can only know this world as an
1 Ibid. 2.iii.38. p.556.
object of contemplation. Consequently he can have no direct interest
in changing it or in getting to know his fellow men since as individual
selves they are ultimately unreal ;and as far as they are real they are
identical with himself in any case. (This does not preclude an indirect
interest in the world and others as a means of furthering one's
salvation.) We have compared this view with John MacMurray's
characterisation of the self as thinker and found great similarity.
MacMurray argues that to start from the standpoint of the thinking self
i3 ultimately to end up with solipsism and we have seen that Shankara's
position in this respect is more logical than that of the general run of
Western philosophy in that the multiplicity of individual selves is
abolished.
In Ramanuja's case the self is not identical with cit but cit is its
distinguishing attribute. The knowing 'I* is ultimate and the
individual selves real. The knowing subject is in no sense an impression
accompanying our experience : it is rather a necessary presupposition of
experience. But although it itself is not a part of the empirical world
it is anchored firmly to the empirical world in a way that Shankara's
pure consciousness is not. This is because it has as its chief attribute
consciousness, but not an empty consciousness. Ramanuja's consciousness
is a consciousness of the world which both reveals the self and is given
meaning by the self.
The Unity Of Consciousness
The term 'consciousness' refers to the awareness which a person has of
his thoughts and actions and of his perceptions in general. This is
what is meant by the illuminative nature of consciousness. But although
we are aware that we are conscious we are not aware of this in the same
way that we are aware of the objects of which we are conscious. This is
indicated by saying that consciousness is self-illuminating. Kant in
the passage referred to earlier uses the term 'apprehension1
interchangeably with 'consciousness' and this reminds us that having
3aid that it is by means of our consciousness that we are aware of
things, we have still not explained consciousness. Is it active or
passive? The term 'apprehension' suggests activity whereas 'consciousness'
suggests the passive reception of impressions. Ramanuja, in distinguishing
the conscious subject from consciousness is distinguishing an active and
a passive element in our apprehension of experience. The traditional
metaphor used to describe consciousness is that of light : it illumines
objects. But if that is the agreed function of consciousness it is not
enough to explain experience. It is of little use for objects to be
illuminated unless there be a subject for whom they are illuminated and
who is able to recognise them for what they are. So Ramanuja brings
back the conscious subject as the active synthesizing unity of experience.
Consciousness is the chief attribute of the subject, yes, for without
consciousness experience would have no raw material, but it is
significant that for Ramanuja, the subject is also an agent. This
implies that he is able to grasp and manipulate experience.
Experience must have a unity : this is axiomatic. Any account of the self
or person must give some explanation of this unity. It must try to explain
what sort of unity it is and how it is achieved. Shankara's answer is
that the unity is provided by consciousness. To use Humean language,
consciousness is a constant impression which accompanies all our
experiences and gives them a unity. If we are not always aware of this
constant impression this is because we are blinded by ignorance, deluded
by maya. We have confused something else, for example our body or our
mind, with our real self, consciousness. Ramanuja's reply is that we
can find no such constant impression. Consciousness fluctuates and is
sometimes absent and cannot, therefore, provide the unity that is
required. The unity of experience is not 'given' by consciousness,
but is created by a permanent conscious subject who has the ability to
synthesize successive experiences and make sense of them.
This has important consequences. If pure consciousness is the essence
of the personal then it must be assumed to be the same impression in
each individual self. Prom this it follows that the empirical selves
are not ultimately real and that the true self of each person is the
universal self, consciousness. But if the unity of experience for each
person is created by a permanent, conscious subject who synthesizes
the experience then the different experiences synthesized are vital to
the unity of the person. In other words, the unity cannot be under¬
stood apart from the experiences. This safeguards the uniqueness of
the individual and makes necessary the suppositions of a multiplicity
of unique selves, each of which has his uniqueness guaranteed by the
different combinations of experiences synthesized within his personal
life. What then, in Ramanuja's interpretation, is referred to by the
term 'I'f The *1' does not refer to my body or to my mind, or to any
particular experience of myself or group of such experiences; it does
not refer to an attributeless consciousness which accompanies all my
experiences though I may not always be aware of it, as I sometimes
may forget that I have toothache though the tooth continues to pain
me; the 'I* refers to the unique combination and synthesis of the
total experiences which make up my life. 'I* as the permanent,
conscious subject cannot be apprehended apart from the experiences
which indicate my existence : these experiences make no sense apart
from my apprehension of them. So Ramanuja can say that if release
consisted in the annihilation of the *1' it would hold no attractions.
If we were to forget all our experiences up to the present, if they
were to cease to make sense to us, then the •I' would he annihilated.
.Any goal which is proposed for human life if it is to make sense must
include this 'I' which is the total fabric of my personal life. This
does not imply that any particular part of my life is necessary in
order that I should be myself. For example, 'I* includes my body at
the present time but it does not necessarily include any particular
part of my body. I can lose my hand or my foot and still be •me*.
The deprivation of a limb is still a part of the whole of any experience
and my experience continues without the limb.
Conclusions
In this Chapter the emphasis has been on a detailed study of Shankara
and Rsuaahuja's accounts of the self and in particular their accounts of
consciousness, the principle attribute of the self, or in Shankara's
case, the essence of the self. Consciousness may be regarded as the
differentia of the personal for Shankara and Ramanuja in the same way
as the rational may be regarded as the differentia of the personal for
Western thinkers. There are important similarities in the two
conceptions. In both cases we can have no doubt as to the area of
experience to which they referj at the same time, there is a certain
'open-endedness• about them both - they cover a wide range of experience,
and they may be interpreted in a variety of different ways by writers
of different persuasions. It is interesting that two such different
traditions should have hit on the same type of concept - thought,
intelligence, self-awareness - to mark what they consider the distinctive
element in man.
As the account given of the self depends in large parts on the nature
of the religious apprehension in which the self participates we
considered in the previous Chapter the conception of Brahman. This
revealed two main strands in Hindu religious thought, the monistic and
the theistic and we find now in the present Chapter that the monistic
account of Brahman as the undifferentiated One, above speech and mind,
is reflected in an account of the atman as pure consciousness, a self
who witnesses the world but takes no active part in it. On the other
hand, the theistic account of Brahman goes along with the assertion
that the self is an agent of whom consciousness aadr intelligence is the
principle attribute. One thing that stands out in comparing these
different views of the self and Brahman is that the theistic account
is able to account for both thought and action whereas the monistio
account, in insisting on the supremacy and ultimacy of thought is not
able to give any satisfactory account of action but must instead look
on the world of action as an object of contemplation. In spite of this
apparent advantage of the theistio account, the general tendency in
Hindu thought has been to subsume theism within the general framework
of monism. This as we saw in the previous Chapter could be accounted
for in terms of both logic and practice. Monism has the great
theoretical advantage in maintaining the unity of experience and in the
religious situation in India with its multiplcity of gods and goddesses
the notion of a supreme personal Being is much harder to entertain on
the philosophical level.
One point to be noted in both Shankara and Hamanuja's accounts is the
rigorous logic with which they follow their arguments to their conclusion.
It is important when criticizing these arguments to be aware of the
assumptions which each writer takes as axiomatic otherwise we are in
danger of missing the point. These assumptions are rooted in the nature
of the religious experience which each takes as real. In Shankara's case
it is the experience of identity with the one without a second and,
therefore, he has no reason, in the light of this, to maintain the
ultimate reality of the individual selves. Consequently in adopting a
similar standpoint to that of Descartes as a starting point he cannot
be criticized on the grounds of solipsism. His position is a type of
solipsism. In Ramanuja's case, his experience of a personal God does
require him to maintain the individuality of the separate selves. The
only way to do this is to make them primarily agents for as far as they
are or possess consciousness, they must all be regarded as identical.
The thing that differentiates one self from another is their different
interactions with the world.
The main point at issue between them, apart from their differing
religious apprehensions, is a difference in the significance which they
attach to action. For Ramanuja action is to be taken seriously as it
is of the essential nature of the self whereas for Shankara action is
only real on the empirical plane. In coming to any decision on the
merits of each point of view, then, it is necessary to take into account
the total attitude to life and experience involved as well as the nature
of the religious experiences from which these attitudes originate. As
we saw in the previous Chapter, a metaphysics such as Shankara's which
takes pure thought as its starting point has a basic problem in
accounting for the existence of the empirical world.and it completely
fails to do this as the premisses from which it starts, that of a
completely self-sufficient being, exclude the possibility of an empirical
world. In this Chapter, we have seen that a similar premiss regarding
the nature of the self, i.e. that it is pure consciousness, the 'I
think'.also precludes the possibility of dealing with the empirical
world as any more than a possibly illusory object of thought. Apart
from questions regarding the significance of action the other basic
question which must be raised with Shankara's account is whether it is
really possible to make sense of the notion of 'pure consciousness'
out of relation to any possible content of consciousness, and that of the
'witness-self which again cannot rely on the body for spatial location
and, therefore, faces the question of what it can witness and from
where. It may be that in the moral sphere the notion of an unmoved
witness-self has great value, but the difficulty in expressing it in a
coherent analysis remains.
Turning to ftamanuja, we suggested in the previous Chapter that his
metaphysics was more able to give a satisfactory account of the
existence of the empirical world than was that of Shankara. By treating
the world as the body and instrument of G-od, Ramanuja thereby maintained
its value and significance and at the same time gave it a relative
independence. This same line of thought is continued in his account of
the self as a conscious agent. In maintaining that the self is an
acting subject whose chief attribute is consciousness he thereby insists
on the reality of individual selves. He implies that our apprehension
of ourselves is as bodily agents who act and interact with the world
around us with self-awareness. This in turn implies that we possess a
certain freedom and that we are responsible for our actions in a sense
that could not be possible on the basis of Shankara's metaphysics, viz.
that the empirical world is an illusory object of our thought. 'IMs
leads us into the theme of the next Chapter which is concerned with the
ethical implications of these differing accounts of Brahman and the
self. It must be remembered that Shankara and Ramanuja were not
primarily concerned with drawing these ethical implications which were
only made explicit by their later followers : they, themselves, were only
concerned to give a correct account of our experience as they saw it
which would show that the nature of the world is such that moksha is
possible. Nevertheless the ethical implications are obviously of great
importance. A conception of the personal implies the adoption of a
certain way of life, and the consequences and therefore possibility of
a given way of life have an important bearing on the conception of the
personal whioh they reflect.
Note One On Chapter Siree
Atman And Brahman
Ninian Smart discusses the Atman/Brahman identification in his book
•Reasons and Faiths1.1 He identifies various 'strands' in religious
thought, i.e. directions in which it may develop, amongst which are
the Numinous and the Mystical. He argues that in the Atman/Brahman
identification these two strands beoome woven together.
•The identification of Brahman with the Atman serves ..... as a
prominent example of the kind of weaving together of different strands
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of discourse in a doctrinal scheme.*
Because of similarities in the characteristics attributed to the Atman
and to Brahman the two have become identified in spite of initial
divergence. Brahman is what is ultimately apprehended in the Numinous
approach which seeks the reality behind external phenomena, whereas
the Atman is apprehended in the Mystical approach which looks for the
inner reality of the self. Smart illustrates his point by comparing
the characteristics of nirvana, the ultimate goal of mystical
3
experience with those of Brahman. He finds three main similarities :
in the formal characteristics of mystical experience, in the type of
doctrine associated with mysticism, and in certain of the consequences
of mystical attainment. Firstly, nirvana is timeless, imperceptible
and transcendent and these terns also apply to Brahman. Secondly, in
both doctrines we have a picture of the real lying outside phenomena.
In the Brahman doctrine, Brahman is the real which is behind the
changing empirical scene whereas in the Atman doctrine the Atman is
the real which is behind the empirical self. Thirdly, Smart links the
moral consequences of the pursuit of the mystical ideal and the
worship of Brahman. The mystic's experience of the divine results in
1 Ninian Smart, Reasons And Faiths, London, R. & K. Paul, 1958, Ch.3.
2 Op. Cit. p.107. 3 Ibid. p.82.
a purity of character which is parallelled with the conception of G-od
as freeing from sin.
This last comparison may he questioned. The aim of the non-theistic
mystic is freedom from ignorance rather than from sin. Certainly, as
Smart asserts the mystic's path involves abnegation and this has
affinities with the self-abasement of the worshipper. But there is an
essential difference between the worshipper and the mystic in that in
a non-theistic type of mysticism such as is found in the Vedanta, the
self-abnegation of the mystic is more akin to that of the scholar before
knowledge than to the worshipper in the presence of a superior moral
being.
Note Two On Chapter Three
The Implications For Morality Of MacMurray's Analyses
In 'Persons in Relation'?" the sequel to 'The Self as Agent', MacMurray
discusses the place of morality in the life of the agent. The
application of his analysis to Shankara's thought is illuminating. If
we start by regarding the self as primarily a thinking subject then
the world as we have seen becomes an object of contemplation for this
subject. Included in the world are the person's actions and these,
too, become less real than the life of thought. MacMurray illustrates
the genesis of this attitude in the case of the relationship between
mother and child. He argues that there inevitably comes a time when
the bond between mother and child is disrupted because the mother
wishes the child to do for himself something which she has up till that
time done for him. The child then has three alternatives. He can
accept the mother's decision and advance to a more mature relationship
with her, or he can reject it. If he rejects it he still has to
1 John MacMurray, Persons in Relation. Faber & Paber, 1961.
achieve some sort of existence. This may be done by adopting either a
submissive or an aggressive attitude. The submissive child does what
his mother tells him and is a 'good* boy as far as appearances go :
but from his point of view he is by his good behaviour merely placating
his mother and his real life no longer consists in the actions which he
does for her but in the fantasies of his imagination. It is this
attitude which MacMurray sees as giving rise to a contemplative
morality. The motive behind this attitude is fear of the other. The
aggressive child, on the other hand, seeks to impose his will on his
mother and tries to gain his ends by force. His real life is the
practical life but it is a life of aggression in which other people are
used as means to his own ends. Here the motive of fear has given place
to hatred. The moral corollary of this is 'Might is .light1 and the
pursuit of power for its own sake. MacMurray describes these two
attitudes as 'ambivalent forms of negative or egocentric behaviour*
He says
'They have the same motive and the same ultimate objective - fear for
oneself in relation to the other, and the defence of oneself against
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the threat from the other.*
Both attitudes involve unreality. The interesting thing about these
attitudes is that they both spring from a refusal to participate in the
mutuality of personal relationships and they both lead to egocentricity
or a type of solipsism. In the submissive attitude the world becomes
something to be endured and I am the only person who is allowed to be of
any interest. From my point of view, other selves do not exist, for I
cannot admit them as independent agents interacting with me. Likewise,
with the aggressive attitude I am the only one that matters because I
cannot allow that other people may impose their wills on me. For all
practical purposes I must regard myself as the only one in the world.
1 Op. Cit. p.104. 2 Ibid. p.104.
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I agree with the general lines of MacMurray's analysis but not with the
details. From my own experience it seems unlikely that the rupture in
the mother and child relationship should occur in the way described. I
accept that there exists such a tension between the child's wishes and
the demands of the 'Other', in this case his mother, and that this
tension, when satisfactorily resolved leads to a greater maturity in
personal relationships, and further, that this instance gives a general
pattern of human relationship and personal existence. However,
MacMurray's account suggests that it is the mother who forces the
unwilling child to develop. I do not believe that this is ever the case
unless the mother has first discouraged and prevented the child from
following his natural interests, what in fact happens is that in
pursuit of his natural interests the child inevitably encounters certain
obstacles to the fulfiIment of his desires in the person of his mother
who for his own good forbids certain activities. It is his reaction to
this situation which leads to the attitudes MacMurray describes.
The moralities inspired by these attitudes are remarkably exemplified
in the implications of Shankara's Advaitism as found in Hindu life. In
the contemplative mode of morality a person
'can solve the problem of living in a world which appears dangerous by
withdrawing into reflection, and adopting the attitude of a spectator.
We have already seen that one of Shankara's ideals is that of the
impartial spectator, the 'witness-self'. But this spectator self cannot
completely withdraw into the realm of reflection. He still has to live
in the practical world and find a means to adapt himself to it. What
happens, if we adopt an analysis on MacMurray's lines is that for him
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the practical life becomes 'a means to the inner life of the mind.'
1 Ibid, p.123. 2 Ibid, p.124.
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This can be the case If 'the practical life oan be made automatic, a
matter of routine and habit.1 In this type of society there is
'a system of social habit, in which the activity of each member is
functionally related to the activity of the others, so that the practical
life of the society is a balanced and harmonious unity ••••. To maintain
this each member must have his function in the common life.'2
The morality which arises in this type of society is a morality of good
form. The right action is the 'fitting' aotion and the criterion of
fitness is aesthetic in that it depends on a vision of the good for all.
(Contrast the attitude of 'let justice be done though the heavens fall'.)
MadMurray's description of the contemplative morality, whose classical
exposition he finds in Plato's Republic, might well have been intended
to fit the morality of the traditional Hindu way of life. There is the
caste system, the ramifications of which do not concern us, but which in
its essentials is intended to divide society into four different classes
according to the intrinsio qualities of the members of soelety and
thereby to lay down the duties which are incumbent on each member. There
is also the ideal of the four stages of life whioh each man is
visualised as passing through, scholar, householder, forest-dweller and
wandering sage. Each stage has its appropriate behaviour.
Thus in Shankara's thought we start with the subject, the self as
thinker and flowing from this we have the morality of good form, the
right action being the one whioh is most fitting.
1 Ibid. p. 124. 2 Ibid, p.124.
There is yet another application of MacMurray's thesis. As we have seen,
he depicts two negative modes of morality, one in which the contemplative
attitude is adopted and the other in which the aggressive attitude is
adopted. When the aggressive attitude is adopted then the goal becomes
'the appropriation of power'. MacMurray shows how this type of morality
is evident in the type of society depicted by Hobbes where the original
state of man is pictured as being that of every man for himself. There
is another interpretation of the urge to appropriate power, however,
which is more relevant to Hindu ideals. The aim of the Yogin is moksha,
but this is obtained by an extension of the yogin's power over himself
and nature. It is no accident tha.t the practice of yoga is said to
result in the attainment of wonderful powers over the natural elements
as well as in mental control, and it is as a result of this power that the
teacher of yoga, the guru, is held in such esteem. Karl H. Potter says
that
'the ultimate value recognised by classical Hinduism in its most
sophisticated sources is not morality but freedom, not rational self-
control in the interests of the community's welfare, but complete control
over one's environment - something which includes self-control but also
includes control of others and even control of the physical sources of
power in the universe.'1
This idea is not confined to classical Hinduism but comes out clearly in
the writings of the modem Hindu, Aurobindo, whose ideal is that of the
'Superman', the man of self-control and power, who has achieved complete
self-realisation.
•A gnostic being will possess not only a truth-conscious control of the
realised spirit's power over its physical world, but also the full power
of the mental and vital planes and the use of their greater forces for
1 Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, p.3.
the perfection of the physical existence. This greater knowledge and
wider hold of all existence will enormously increase the power of
instrumentation of the gnostic being on his surroundings and on the
world of physical Nature.'^
(There is, of course, more to the 'Superman* than this.) Other writers
echo the same thought. For example, P.T. Raju says that
'almost all contemporary writers stress freedom by conquest and
2
assimilation.*
I have argued that Shankara's standpoint is that of the 'I think* and
that, in accordance with MacMurray's analysis, the type of morality which
issues from this standpoint is that where the supreme value is either
good form or the pursuit of power. Both these developments are amply
exemplified in Hindu ideals and the structure of Hindu society. In this
way, Shankara's philosophy provides a metaphysical basis for Hindu ideals
and values.
1 Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine. Arya Publishing House, 19V, p.870.
2 P.T. Raju, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p.440.
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CHAPTER FOUR - PHARMA AND MOKSHA
Introduction And Reoapitulation
Two main considerations have stimulated this study of the conception
of the personal in Hindu and Christian thought. In the first place,
conflicting assumptions regarding the nature of religious experience
frequently underlie the writings of both Hindu and Christian authors.
Christian writers generally view genuine religious experience as a
type of personal encounter. Many Hindu writers, on the other hand,
see religious experience in terms of the realisation of one's
identity with the ultimate reality and relegate any element of
personal encounter to a subsidiary place in the scheme of things.
The basic disagreement to which attention has been drawn in the
preceding Chapters is between a position which regards the highest
values as being generated in and through personal encounter and a
position where the significance of such encounter and the values
generated by it are a matter for debate. The second consideration
prompting the present study has been contemporary Hindu discussion of
social issues. Life and philosophy have always been regarded as part
and parcel of each other in the Hindu tradition however disparate the
elements encompassed by eaoh might appear. Philosophy was intended
to have a practical outcome and the ultimate aims of life were
clarified and understood in terms of philosophic thought. Now the
traditional structure of Hindu society has either broken down or is
in the process of change and the question arises of justifying what
appears as a new social ethic in terms of the traditional metaphysics
so as to preserve the continuity of Hinduism, One of the ways in
which this issue has been raised has been the use of Shankara's
monistic metaphysics to justify a this-worldly attitude to life and
morality rather than the traditional other-worldly attitude.
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These two considerations are interlinked in that both concern the
basis and significance of personal values. I have endeavoured in
the preceding chapters to throw some light on the matter by-
examining the way that different 'personal* and 'impersonal'
elements enter into two of the 'key' concepts of Hindu thought j
Brahman and Atman.
The Ambivalence In Christian Thought
In the first chapter we distinguished two strands in the Christian
acoount of the personal, that in which a person is thought of as
•an independent and fundamentally unchangeable individual* and
that in which the main thought is of 'social relationships and
voluntary activity'. The former strand stems from Greek influence,
the latter from Hebrew. The presence of these two strands in the
Christian tradition points to the faot that even there, where the
importance of relationship is central, there is a certain
ambivalence, whioh parallels the even greater ambivalence in Hindu
thought between pure consciousness and the conscious agent.
Since it is persons who experience the world any account of the
world must also imply an account of the nature of the personal.
That the personal is central in experience is indubitable : what it
is is a matter for debate. In Christianity we have 3een that the
central reality and value is grounded in personal relationship with
the corollary that love is the beginning and end of Christian
ethics. This is the central thought of Christianity that is reflected
in the account of a person as a being capable of voluntary activity
and social relationship. On the other hand, Greek philosophical
influence intervened. That which involved itself in activity could
not be changeless and that which experienced change oould not be
perfect. If God were to be regarded as in some sense a person then
He could not be regarded as active, but must be fundamentally
unchangeable. Likewise, that which expressed and found its nature
in social relationship must require something other than itself in
order to exist, and, therefore, could not be self-sufficient and if
not self-sufficient, must be less than perfect. God, therefore, if
personhood or personality were to be ascribed to Him in any way,
must be recognised to be fully independent from any other creature
and in no need of any assistance from them in order to express His
nature. Hence we get two diametrically opposed accounts of the
personal in Christian thought. The opposition was not openly
recognised and, in fact, the Hebrew strand was never given proper
philosophical expression. As we saw in Chapter Two, however, a
metaphysics which has for its central conception an immutable,
self-sufficient being, is faced with the problem of accounting for
existence of the empirical world. This was done by supposing that
out of the fulness of the Divine being the world necessarily
evolved as an expression of His perfection. This became in the
Middle Ages the philosophical expression of the doctrine of Divine
love, though that love was interpreted in a way which saw little
resemblance to the ordinary meaning of the term. In Medieval
thought the notions of God's 'love* and •goodness' frequently mean
•Not compassion, not the alleviation of human suffering, but the
immeasurable and inexhaustible prodigious energy, the fecundity of
an Absolute not conceived as truly possessing emotions similar to
man's. God's love ..... in one consists primarily rather in the
creative or generative than in the redemptive or providential
office of Deity.
Through the interplay of the notions of being and becoming the
1 A.O.Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. Havard University Press,
1936, P. 67.
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Christian God, as Lovejoy points out, became two-gods-in-one. The
notion of the creative fulness of God can be seen as an attempt to
give expression to the conception of God as an active being who enters
into relationship with the world. This is not satisfactory, however.
The doctrine of love is not adequately represented by an account of
this •immeasurable and inexhaustible prodigious energy1 and further,
the fact that this energy must be conceived as the necessary expression
of the nature of the Deity is in contradiction to the voluntariness
which is an essential characteristic of personal relationship.
The philosophical account of a person as *an independent and
fundamentally unchangeable individual* is, on the face of it,
completely opposed to our ordinary ideas as to what constitutes a
person. It was necessitated, however, by the need to conform in
letter, at least, to the accepted assumption that God was personal
in nature, while yet providing an account of Him which would
satisfy the philosophical conscience, 'tfe have seen that with very
little change it might very well equally be applied to Shankara's
nirguna Brahman. This leads to the conclusion that if Shankara's
nirguna Brahman is to be termed impersonal, then equally, one
Christian account of the personal which is intended to make the
concept of person applicable to God, may also be termed 'impersonal'j
and we get a dichotomy in Christianity, parallel to that in
Hinduism, between the position which takes a personal God, in the
ordinary sense of personal, as ultimate and the values generated by
such a God as fundamental and the position where merely personal
values and being must be transcended in order adequately to talk
about or experience God. The orux of the difficulty for the
Christian philosopher is that while the nature of Christian
experience demands that God be regarded as personal in the sense that
Its'
He acts and loves and desires to enter into a personal relationship
with man, yet from the philosophical point of view, such an account
appears to do less than justice to God's nature and, in fact, to
represent Him as necessarily less than perfect. If action is to be
meaningfully predicated of God then this implies some change in His
being and also that there is an 'other* to give context andmeaning
to His actions.
It may be argued that the problem of the relation between the world
and God, between finite things and the infinite divine reality, is
ultimately insoluble theoretically and can only be lived through
practically in the experience of loving relationship with God and
with one's fellow men. This view has been expressed by
F.C. Copleston."*" Copleston interprets Hegel theistically. Other
interpretations are, of course, possible.
Copleston thinks that Hegel, in attempting to express the truths
of religion in philosophical terms, attempted 'to do what cannot be
done, namely, to make plain to view what can only be simply
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apprehended through the use of analogies and symbols'. Certainly,
Hegel's philosophy is one of the most su stained efforts to
represent the identity-in-difference of the relation between God
and man without either assimilating man to God or reducing God to
man. On the other hand, Hegel's philosophy may be viewed as the
culmination of the tradition of two-gods-in-one to which we have
already referred and the conclusion to be drawn from his failure to
represent the relation between the empirical world and the Divine
1 Hegel and the Rationalisation of Mysticism, Royal Institute of
Philosophy Lectures, 1967-68, Vol. 2, Maemillan & Co. Ltd., 1969«
2 Op. Cit. p.132.
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reality satisfactorily may "be that his fundamental assumption and
starting point was wrong. The assumption that 'the Absolute must
be defined aB self-thinking thought'*' with what we have seen to
be the correlative notion that 'it must also be conceived as a
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dynamic process of self-actualisation' is simply a restatement of
Olato and we have argued in previous Chapters that such assumptions
cannot lead to a satisfactory account of empirical life.
Philosophy must take a new direction. We have argued, in agreement
with MacMurray, that the new standpoint will take agency as its
central concept. This is in line with our actual experience of the
world which is primarily practical. Thought is for the sake of
action and imaginative thought which does not issue in action is
parasitic on practical thought which aims to change the world in
some way. Even imaginative thought which may not directly affect
the world, does so indirectly hy its effect on the minds of those
who contemplate it. Copies-ton1 s suggestion that the problem of the
relation between God and the world admits of no theoretical
solution, but can only be lived through in the experience of love is
in line with this approach. Loving is primarily an activity which
includes thought as a constituent.
This answer, however, does not go far enough. It may he that the
correot approach to these fundamental problems is through active
commitment to a way of life rather than passive theorising, yet this
does not preclude the philosopher from offering a conceptual analysis
of the activity in question.
1 Op. Cit. P. 126
2 Op.Cit. P. 126
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We must reject Copleston's view that the truths of religion cannot
be adequately expressed in philosophical terms, but only through
the use of symbol and analogy. Philosophical analysis of religion
must tally with religious experience itself. If it does not, then
one or other must be shown to be mistaken. I have suggested that
the mistake has been made by philosophy. Philosophers have been
unwilling to start with the experience of personal interaction
which involves thought as a constituent, but have substituted
instead the apparent absoluteness of 1 self-thinking thought'. It
is not surprising that 'self-thinking thought' cannot account for
the mutability of the world and its relation to the infinite
Divine. Thought itself can only be an abstraction from a totality
of action and may be regarded as immutable simply because it is an
abstraction and not the concrete actuality. 'Self-thinking thought'
is an even greater abstraction so far as the notion can be
understood. In our experience thoughts do not think themselves, but
it is persons who think and they think as a part of their concrete
actuality. The expression 'only a thought' betrays the
insubstantiality of thought itself. However deep and wonderful our
thoughts, until they are given expression in some form they remain
insignificant. Once we realise the abstract nature of thought we
see that to think of the Absolute as pure thought is just as
deficient an aocount of the Absolute as the 'personal' account it is
intended to replace and this suggests that philosophy has yet to get
to grips with an adequate account of the personal.
Ambivalenoe in Hindu Thought
The problem of the relationship between God and the world as raised
by the religious need to think of Him in personal terms and the
philosophical conviction that such an account is not adequate to the
expression of the Divine perfection is found also in Hindu thought.
Here the difficulty is simplified by the principle of 'ishta
devata', i-e the freedom to worship the God of one's choice. As we
have already noted, a multiplicity of Divinities has always been a
feature of Hinduism and the important thing is the worship rather
than the worship of any particular God. This has made it much
easier to find the unity which philosophy demanded in a principle
that was not personal as the Gods were. The philosophical
difficulties, however, were the same. Action necessarily spelt
change and the necessity of an 'other* and hence imperfection.
Radhakrishnan has summed up the problem admirably. He says^if the
being is a positive activity, this activity has meaning only when
it is opposed or limited by conditions which are not created by
itself. Whether or not the contrast between self and not-self is
essential to personality, human or Divine, life of a personal being
is not possible except in relation to an environment. If God has
no environment on which He acts, He cannot be personal. If God is
personal, He cannot be the Absolute, which has nothing which is not
included in it in every possible sense of the word *
•The personality of God is possible only with reference to a world
with its imperfections and capability for progress. In other words,
the being of a personal God is dependent on the existence of created
order. God depends on creation even as creation depends on God.'1
In both traditions there is a conflict and tension between the
demands of religious experience and those of the philosophical mind.
We have already argued in Chapter Two that it is impossible to keep
these apart. The ultimate objects of religious experience and
philosophical analysis must be identical. To admit that the
1 Contemporary Indian Philosophy. George Allen & Unwin, 1936,
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ultimate goal of religious endeavour cannot adequately be described
in terms of personal relationship is to change that goal. In
Hinduism this is not so difficult. The ultimate aim of life in
much of Hindu thought is either the merging of oneself with the
Absolute in the sense of realising one's essential identity with
the Absolute, or else the realisation of one's essential equality
with the Absolute. This means that while the relationship between
the worshipper and his God may be important at the popular level, a
little thought soon shows that the multiplicity of Cods cannot
possibly be regarded as independent beings in their own right and
that, consequently, the aim of religious life must be in another
direction than relationship with such a Cod. //hat one might term a
reflective view of religion comes to coincide with the
philosophical view. On the other hand, within the Christian
tradition, suoh a change in religious aim is in general not possible.
The supreme object of religion is already the supreme object of
philosophy. What the Christian must do is find a metaphysical
starting point which will allow him to keep intact the essential
factor in his religious experience, viz. his experience of
relationship to the Almighty.
Ramanuja And Christian Theology
Ramanuja attempts to provide a metaphysics which will allow for the
ultimate reality of a personal Cod. In this respect his aims are
similar to those of Christian theology, but there are several
important differences in their respective positions.
Ramanuja has no doctrine of creation. He teaches that the world is
a part of Cod, His body. As the body of God, the world is an
instrument of Cod and necessary to God's self-expression. The
relationship between God and the individual 30ul is modelled on the
relation of the soul to the body. As the soul is the ruler of its
body so God is the inner ruler of the individual souls.
In oontrast, Christian theology teaches that the world is created
by God rather than being a part of God and that likewise the
individual souls are creations of God rather than parts of Him.
We have seen that Christian religious experience is centered on
personal relationship. Ramanuja also agrees that the worshipper's
relation to God must be regarded as fundamental. Does his account
provide a metaphysics which safeguards the ultimate value of the
personal encounter of the individual with God?
We have already considered the merits of the soul-body metaphor as
applied to the relation between Brahman and the world. In the
soul-body relation we have direct experience of the immaterial
acting on the material, spirit on matter, so that even if we cannot
understand how it works we can have no doubt of the fact that it
works. When we come to apply this to God the supreme spirit and His
relationship to the world, the soul-body analogy gives us confidence
of the possibility of such a relationship through our own direct
experience.
One of the basic presuppositions of a personal relationship, however,
is that there must be freedom on behalf of both parties to respond to
eaoh other. Action is incomprehensible apart from the supposition
that we are in some respects free agents. Unless this were the case,
we should have no way of distinguishing what happens to us from what
we make happen, and thus between ourselves and our environment.
Does the soul-body relation, with its attendant supposition that the
Ill
body is the instrument of the soul, allow for the possibility of the
freedom of the individual soul?
On the face of it, the fact that on Ramanuja* s account Sod and the
soul are related as whole to part would seem to militate against the
existence of a personal relationship between the two. How can I
have such a relationship with my hand or my foot? On the other hand,
it may be argued that it is unfair to lay too much 3tres3 on what is
only a metaphor. Any explanation of the totality of existence must
necessarily relate each part of the totality to every other : as part
of this explanation the soul must be shown to have some relationship
to God other than a personal relationship. It cannot be regarded as
a completely independent self-subsistent existence : it must be shown
to be dependent for its being on God or the ultimate reality. The
fact that Ramanuja explains this dependence on Brahman as a soul-body,
subject-attribute relation no more impairs the possibility of there
also being a personal relationship than the fact that in the Christian
account the relation between God and His people is described as being
that of a potter to the clay he manipulates, denies the possibility of
a personal relationship existing between God and man.
This, unfortunately, is a double-edged argument. If it is the case
that none of the dependence type relationships mentioned preclude the
possibility of a genuine personal relationship between God and man,
then it could equally be argued that a monistio type of metaphysics
in which God is the sole reality also in no way inhibits the reality
of a personal relationship between man and God? However the
dependence relationship be conceived, any attempt to work out the
details so as to make it comprehensible from the human side, must end
in apparently imposing limitations and finitude on the Divine.
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We must admit that what appears to he the case from the human side
must inevitably be inadequate from the Divine point of ivew. Once
this is admitted, however, the thin end of the wedge is driven in
and we allow for the possibility of Shankara's type of non-dualism.
In the light of our argument this is a defeatist line to take. As
we have seen Shankara's monism effects such a merging of the world
with God as to leave no room for action and empirical experience
in any commonly understood sense. And if we are to allow the
compatibility of personal relationship with any type of metaphysics,
then we lose much of the distinctive differences between religious
and philosophical points of view and end in a situation where
personal preference rather than rational argument determines one's
position.
We must try again to tackle the question of the relationship of the
individual soul to God or the ultimate reality and tackle the
question at its crucial point : the freedom of the individual to
respond to the personal approach of God. Is there an account of the
relationship between the divine and empirical which maintains the
freedom and responsibility of the individual agent?
Shankara's non-dualism must be ruled out. Any personal relationship
between God and the soul is confined solely to the empiricax world,
the realm of maya. There can be no question of a personal God being
ultimately real and as a corollary of this, no question of the
individual person having final significance. His choices and
decisions take place only in the illusory empirioal world. His inner
identity with Brahman rules out the possibility of a relationship of
any kind with Brahman, let alone a personal relationship.
Does Ramanuja'3 soul-body relationship fare better? There is no sense
in which I can distinguish between my body's decisions and ay
decisions. My decisions are my body's decisions in any sense of this
phrase. One might say that *1 wanted to climb to the top of the hill,
but my legs refused to carry me.' This type of talk is familiar, but
we realise that it is just a way of excusing ourselves from not having
performed a difficult task. My acceptance of my legs refusal to carry
me is simply my decision not to carry out my original intentions. It
may be that although I will my legs to carry on they simply collapse
under me, so that it becomes difficult to talk of my decision not to
olimb to the top of the hill. But if it is not my decision, it can
even less be described as the decision of my legs : it is simply
something that is happening to my legs, has happened to me. In other
words, we must conclude that although the soul-body analogy is helpful
in showing us the possibility of spirit acting on matter, of an
intentional purpose which informs the world, yet it cannot be taken as
the whole story. If we cannot distinguish between my decision and my
body's decisions, then if we pursue the analogy in relation to God and
the world, then what I take to be my decisions cannot really be so,
but only the manifestation of God's decisions and from there we come to
a position where it is impossible to give any sense to talk about
human action. Ramanuja would not subsoribe to suoh a conclusion and,
in fact, the conclusion itself involves a contradiction. By applying
the soul-body analogy to the relation between God and the world, we
reach a position where the original soul-body relationship is
invalidated. But if it is invalidated, then the whole argument
collapses. Ramanuja certainly wishes to ascribe a relative independence
to the individual soul and he does discuss the difficulty we have
enoountered : if God is the inner Ruler of all creatures then must He
not to be held to be responsible for each person's actions? This
Ramanuja strongly denies. While God is responsible for the capacities
of the individual soul, he is not responsible for what they do with
these capacities. God has given all beings the capacity for activity -
•So as to enable them to accomplish this, He has become their
substratum and has entered into them as the principal to whom they are
accessory, ..... The spiritual being, whose capacities are so
dependent on Him, performs of his own accord certain actions ..... But
while observing the soul in its doings, The Supreme Spirit himself
takes no sides.
Earlier Ramanuja has denied the Advaitic view that all individual souls
are illusory in the way in which people in dreams are illusory. We can
only talk about dream figures as illusory in contrast to real people,
but if real people are also to be regarded as illusory, then the
contrast can no longer be made and, therefore, the assertion of the
illusoriness of real people cannot be made.
In spite of Ramanuja'3 assertions concerning the reality and independence
of the individual soul, however, it is difficult to understand how this
can be compatible with a strict understanding cf the soul-body
relationship. The independence of action enjoyed by the individual
souls can be compared with nothing in our experience of the soul-body
relationship and we are forced to the conclusion that such an account of
the relation between God and empirical reality is inadequate in
accounting for the religious conviction of a personal God and our
empirical experience of ourselves as free agents.
What of the Christian position? Can the doctrine of creation provide
an account of the relationship between God and the empirical world
which will allow for the ultimate reality of a personal God and the
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ultimate reality of individual souls who are free to respond to a
personal relation with God?
The Christian account of creation is more of a declaration than an
explanation. Whereas in reading the Upanishads one is aware of a
concern with the perplexing questions of unity and multiplicity,
such an interest is absent from the Hebrew writers who were
concerned with the destiny and purpose of man in the world. The
account of the creation of the world out of nothing is a declaration
of the significance of the world, of its complete dependence on God
and man's indpendence as an agent. It is a declaration of 'ultimate
demand' and 'final sucoour' which sidesteps theoretical questions of
unity and multiplicity. God did not set to work on some inchoate
matter, neither did the world prooeed from God as a logically
necessary self-manifestation. Thus while man is an expression of the
will of God he is in no sense a mode of God and so his freedom of
action is maintained.
It may be objected that this account explains nothing since there is
nothing in our experience which corresponds to the notion of creation
out of nothing. Yet we may find some analogy here with our experience
of action.
In our ordinary experience of action we are constantly changing the
world while being at the same time changed ourselves by it. In a
limited way we are the creators of our future. Some activities such
as that of the artist are more obviously creative in the sense of
bringing into being something which is unlike anything in existence
previously. Nevertheless, all action is creation of one kind or
another. The doctrine of creation declares the agency of God, and
arising out of the creative agency of God, a similar agency in man so
that man as made in the image of God is free and able to respond to
the personal approach of God. Can this be adequately conceptualised?
It must be remembered that a concept, as a product of thought, is
always an abstraction from the fulness of the concrete reality which
can only be adequately appreciated in encounter. If this is granted,
it becomes legitimate to describe the world as God's action and the
relation between God and the world as that of agent to act. This is
an account which allows both for the world's complete dependence on
God for its being without making the relation between God and the
world a logically necessary relationship and at the same time allows
for the possibility of independent human agents who can choose
whether or not to co-operate with God in His purposes.
Since a concept is always an abstraction from the fulness of actuality,
this means that where the initiation of action is concerned there is
always an element of surprise and of the unexpected which is not
present in thought. In thought the conclusions follow logically from
the premisses and given sufficient expertise and care one can always
work out the conclusions. But there is no such logical sequence in
the case of action and in the course of any ongoingexperience there can
never be any absolute certainty as to the outcome. It can always be
said, as for example it is said about marriage, that one oan never know
what it will be like until one is married and actually experiences it
for oneself. This is because action involves personal encounter
without which life is an abstraction. Only within the framework of
personal encounter can thought be developed. Science, poetry, music,
to mention but a few of the products of thought, would be impossible
without people to read the scientific journals, listen to the music,
appreciate the poetry.
Summing up, we conclude that the Christian doctrine of creation
interpreted in terms which make action central, is the only satisfactory
understanding of the relation between Cod and empirical reality which
both allows for the reality of a personal Cod and for the ultimate
significance of individual persons. It is satisfactory because it
maintains intact the values which we take to be implicit in the personal
life of interaction with things and other people.
I said at the beginning of this Chapter that the consideration of the
nature of religious experience and the consideration of the basis of
social ethics, two of the questions which prompted the present study,
were interlinked in that both concern the basis and significance of
personal values. As it is to persons that experience ooours, the
personal element is allpervasive : the problem lies in elucidating the
nature of this personal element. If this can be determined we have a
clue to the nature of the reality which we apprehend. This has ethical
repercussions as an account of the nature of reality implies an account
of what is of ultimate and enduring worth and this must have
implications for our practical day-to-day existence. This does not
imply that there is one ultimate 'conception of the personal* to whioh
all accounts of experience must aspire. Nor does it imply that all
experience must be viewed in terms of the experiencing individual. An
individual is not necessarily a person. A person is an individual of a
very specific type and what may be termed roughly 'elements of the
personal' need not belong only to persona, and in fact in some views,
may not ocour first in persons.
The metaphysioal and ethical implications of the conception of the
personal were illustrated in terms of the analysis of the previous
Chapter. There two accounts of the nature of the personal were
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contrasted : that which regards the subject of experience as a knower
or thinker and that which treats the self as an agent. In the former
case it was argued that the reality of other people and of the world
became problematic and solipsism unavoidable. If other people were
to exist at all they must be identical with my self. Ethically, the
adoption of the standpoint of the knowing subject was found to imply
a refusal to enter into genuine relationships with other people.
This was the consequence of the denial of a genuine 'other' who
could respond to my actions as I respond to his. On the other hand,
starting from the standpoint of the self as agent the reality of the
'other', whether person or thing, was seen to be as indubitable as the
reality of myself, since it is only in relationship with the other
that I come to be aware of myself. For example, in walking I become
aware simultaneously of my foot touching the ground and of the ground
supporting my weight. The ethical corollary of this was found to be
a set of values grounded firmly in acceptance of and consideration of
the 'other'.
The concepts of dharma and moksha are important for both metaphysics
and ethics. An account of moksha is an account of ultimate reality
and also generates a standard against which to judge the values of
empirical existence. These are primarily delineated in the concept of
dharma.
Dharma And Moksha
The concepts of dharma and moksha are examined in two articles by
J.A.B.van Buitenen and Daniel H.H.Ingalls."^ The popular view of moksha
is of freedom from the shackles of empirical existence and the complete
transcendence of empirical life. Alongside this view of the end of life,
1 Both entitled Dharma and Moksha in Philosophy East and West, Vol-VII,
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however, stands a contrasting view. This centres on the values of
artha, kama and dharma and so affirms the reality of this present
existence. The concept which concerns us here is dharma. The dharma
of a thing is that whioh makes the thing what it is and whose
exercise gives that thing its characteristic excellence, (cf the
arete of Aristotle) It is the dharma of the sun to shine as it is
the dharma of the tree to bear fruit and likewise man has his own
characteristic dharma whioh is expressed in terms of the realisation
of his particular potentialities.
It emerges clearly from the two articles that although moksha became
accepted into the Vedic tradition at a fairly early stage and attempts
were made to show its continuity with other traditional aims (artha,
kama, dharma and moksha) there is really a basic oonflict between the
two sets of values. Dharma and its associated ideas is the older
conception and presents a this-worldly goal for man. It was the
standard and value of the Brahmins, the traditional upholders of Vedic
society. On the other hand, the goal of moksha involving the complete
transcendence of empirical life was propounded first by monks and
sannyasins who had in any case already opted out of life and society
with its attendant obligations.
The values associated with dharma imply the acceptance of a
pluralistic world in which individual things have their own natures
(svabhava) and must develop their own characteristic excellences.
These different natures, however, are not in conflict but each contribute
to the maintenance of a grand cosmic pattern. Van Buitenen says
'Dharma is the observance of the necessary acts that keep the world
intact (it) is the cosmioally or "religiously" determined
activity of all existing beings to maintain the normal order in the
world ..... These activities called dharmas are imposed as a kind of
natural law on all existent beings in the universe.'1
The concept of dharma has affinities with the older Vedic concept of
rta. Rta referred to the cosmic forces of law and order which operated
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over the whole of experience and which sometimes, but by no means
always, were thought to be divinely imposed. Like dharma, rta has both
natural and moral connotations. It signified both the regularity and
order in nature and the moral order. The law of nature writ large in
the universe is taken to be paralleled to the moral law written into
the being of man. These two aspects of rta are linked in the idea that
by perfectly fulfilling one's function in the universe one can bend
cosmic forces to do one's will. W.Norman Brown gives an excellent
2
account of this. He points out that the idea goes back to the Rig
Veda and attempts to explain the theory behind the belief. By
performing one's duty perfectly one thereby put oneself in complete
harmony with the cosmic forces and hence was able to aohieve a god-like
power over them.
•It put the performer in full accord with cosmic forces that cause .....
the whole range of natural phenomena and the powers inherent in them,
whioh constitute truth on a cosmic scale and are included in the concept
of rta. The gods themselves often seem to possess their power through
adherence to their Truth, whioh appears to be their function in the
cosmos. They are satyadharman. having Truth as their basic law or
principle.
By the time of the Upanisads the idea that knowledge brings power was
firmly established and this, linked with the text aham brahmasmi. I am
1 Op .Cit.P .36
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Brahman, provided the rationale for the Belief that
•the one who attains Brahman has power over all. Thus he who "by-
whatever means attains to perfection may he thought to have the
power of the Absolute, which he has become, and to influence cosmic
forces in whatever way he wills.'1
The notion of a unity of natural and moral law has many parallels. The
Stoics ooneeived the ideal of life to be expressed by •following
Nature1, where the nature of man was oonceived as part and parcel of
the wider nature of the universe as a whole. Likewise the Chinese
express the same thought in the ideal of conforming to the Tao. The
Hebrews in the Old Testament also had a similar idea. The phrase the
•path of Sod1 was used to refer both to God's path through creation and
also to the path which man ought to tread if he was to order hi3 life in
conformity to God's will.
Whereas dharma involves the acceptance of oosmic law, the pursuit of
moksha involves the abrogation of the natural law to which one is
subject and which gives one one's characteristic excellence. It is the
attempt to break free from the endless cycle of actions and their fruits
and, therefore, from the endless chain of rebirth. It is the fact that
each action must inevitably have a consequence of some form that results
in our being chained to empirical life by necessity. This doctrine of
act and fruit (karma and phala) is accepted as axiomatic by Hindus. It
is not so much that an opportunity must be provided for us to atone for
our misdeeds, as might at first sight appear to be the case, as simply
that each act must have its consequence as every cause is followed by
an effect. However perfectly one may fulfil one's dharma the final
result will still be a repetition of empirical existence in some form.
Only by reaching a state which is totally beyond action and, therefore,
1 IBID. P. 175
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totally beyond good and evil can one finally achieve the freedom which
is the aim of moksha. Moksha can be understood as the complete
rebellion against all forms of empirical existence, however perfectly
they may be expressed. It amounts to the view that while empirical
existence may be improved it has yet certain inherent defects and
limitations which mean that it can never be an ultimately desirable
end. This may be taken as holding for all accounts of moksha. While
there is considerable disagreement amongst the various schools of
philosophy as to the positive content of moksha, they are all agreed
that negatively it means freedom from the shackles of empirical
existence. This implies freedom from dharxna.
Superficially it might appear that the concept of dharma is life-
affirming and that of moksha life-negating and that consequently
ethical thought might be served better by the development of the
notion of dharma in conjunction with a metaphysics which was basically
pluralistic. Ramanuja's thought immediately suggests itself as a
possibility. Contemporary thought, however, has not in general looked
to Ramanuja to provide the inspiration for a dynamic social ethics,
but to the monism of Shankara.
This has generally involved a reinterpretation of the traditional
understanding of moksha and a re-emphasising of certain aspects.
Prom the traditional point of view the emphasis has fallen on the
essential unreality of all empirical characteristics. This has
resulted in the under-valuation of the individual person as such and
a lack of interest in improving the lot of the unfortunate.
This, of course, is not peculiar to Hinduism. At one point Christians
also tended to accept that G-od had appointed every man to his station
and that the under-dog should remain the under-dog.
This, as we saw in Chapter Two, was one of the consequences of the
acceptance "by Christian theologians of the 1 two-gods-in-one* of
Plato : the self-sufficient, immutable being and the being of a
limitless fecundity who wills that every possible being should have
existence. The 'principle of continuity* which stemmed from the
latter conception of Cod lead to the view that each order of
creation and station of life played a necessary part in the fulness
of Cod's creation and that, therefore, to rebel against one's lot
and to seek to better oneself was to rebel against Cod. We have
argued that this is not an adequate philosophical account of the
Christian conception of Cod «
In contemporary discussion, however, it is the underlying unity and
identity of each individual which is emphasised. Since moksha is
the realisation of one's self-identity with Brahman it follows that
every other person must equally be regarded as Brahman and, in
consequence, is entitled to the same respect that I give myself.
The oneness of humanity as essentially identical with Brahman is
used to provide the motive for social service. However, if one
remembers that the oneness of humanity on this analysis is a oneness
in which all empirical differences are transcended, it is doubtful
whether this fact can legitimately be used to provide the motive for
action in a world of empirical differences.
The point to be considered is whether a monistic metaphysics can
provide the motivation for a life in which empirical differences are
perpetuated. I am told to regard every man as an extension of myself
and, correspondingly, to extend the goodwill to him that I feel
naturally for myself. This undoubtedly does provide inspiration for
action, but it would be wrong to suppose that in acoepting it as such
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I am accepting a monistic metaphysics. It is only as long as a certain
degree of difference as well as a degree of identity is allowed that it
can provide a motive for action. I must suppose that as well as an
essential identity with myself which provides the motive for my actions
towards him, there is also a real degree of empirical difference which
will he removed or altered by means of my actions; and this provides
the intention of my action. If the empirical differentia by which I
consider this other person as a different person from myself are unreal,
then why should I attempt the futile task of changing something
essentially unreal? Further, my empirical characteristics must also be
regarded as unreal and this includes my feelings of benevolence
generated by the thought of our essential identity. So long as no
ultimate differentiation is to be allowed, none of these human feelings
can be allowed reality either.
Two Interpretations Of Dharma
In the appendix to the previous Chapter I suggested that it was possible
to view Hindu ethics and social customs as a direct corollary of the
adoption of the standpoint of the knowing subject, the mere spectator.
According to MaoMurray's analysis, one possible consequence of rejecting
a relationship with the 'other* was that one's actions and morality
became a matter of good form, of doing what was socially acceptable,
conforming in externals while one's real life becomes centered in
oneself and one's imagination. I argued that the description of the
morality of good form was applicable to many traditional facets of
Hindu life such as the caste system, the four stages of life, the
emphasis on ritual. Once Shankara's metaphysical position is adopted,
one's real life becomes viewed in terms of the blissful experience of
identification with Brahman. This outs directly across everyday
experience which, however, cannot be altogether neglected as the smooth
running of everyday affairs are a part of the conditions which allow
for the possibility of the mystical experience which is one's real
life. Consequently, while ordinary life cannot be treated with
absolute seriousness, it cannot be dismissed and the result is that
actions, and hence morality, become a matter of expertise and good
taste.
This interpretation, however, is a late development, the result of
adding moksha to the original trio of artha, kama and dharma. Only
when moksha is set in contrast to the other aims do they begin to be
interpreted negatively. So long as the concept of dharma is central
the reality of the present life is affirmed and dharma is
interpreted positively as expressing the natural law of society. On
this reading, the good for man oan be achieved and a harmonious
social order established, only if each person fulfils his own
particular dharma and plays his special part in the general pattern
of life. The same idea prevailed in Greek society and was expressed
by Plato in the Republic.
Whereas on the negative interpretation one's actions are primarily a
matter of doing the 'right* or expected thing rather than an
expression of one's real thoughts and feelings, on the positive
analysis one's actions must all be seen as a genuine expression of
one's nature and there is no remainder apart from one's public role
which could be regarded as one's 'real' life. This interpretation of
action, which makes the concept of dharma central, paints a somewhat
Hegelian picture. The concept of dharma is concerned both with the
good for the individual and the good for society as a whole. They
are inter-related in such a way that the total good determines the
individual good and the individual can only achieve his highest
potential by fulfilling his appointed role in society. This leads to
the possibility that the individual may not always be correct in his
interpretation of what is in his best interests and of what would be
the genuine expression of his dharma. Because there exists a general
and total cosmic pattern into which each individual fits and in which
each plays a particular part, he may need to accept the word of some
superior authority. This superior authority in classical Hindu
society appears to have been the king. The king was regarded as the
mediator of dharma and his presence as the stabilising and cohesive
force in society. The Hindus had a great fear of the break-down of
authority as represented by the king and the consequent dissolution
of society. This is expressed in the Ramayana. There, the fear is
voiced that when a country has no king it will come to destruction.
A long list of the evils attendant on a people who have no king is
given, and these range from drought to atheism. Not only does the
king 1 separate good and evil', but without him, even the simple
pleasures of life are neglected : 'there do not flourish festivals
and gatherings with many actors and dancers.'1
Criticisms
The idea of a general cosmic pattern into which eaoh individual
fits makes sense when applied to the inanimate world and is not
contradicted by the findings of science. Yet when we try to apply
it to human society there is nothing corresponding to the natural
laws of science which could be taken as an overall pattern for
human life. In the absence of settled and traditional ways of life,
the concept of society as a harmonious whole in which each individual,
by fulfilling his appointed role is able to benefit both himself and
society to the maximum, is little more than a dream.
Ramaya"a 2.61, Translation by Dr». J.L.Brockington
The concept of dharma encounters the same difficulties when applied
to society as does the Hegelian ideal and is subject in practice to
the same conniptions. Who is to be entrusted with the task of
'separating good and evil', of determining what is dharma for society
and the individual? Further, what is there to guarantee the
authority of this person or group of persons, and is there any
safeguard against the abuse of power by those in authority?
Apart from these practioal problems, the very concept of dharoa with
its associated concept of svabhava (own nature) of each class of
beings is no longer appropriate to Hindu society in the form in which
it has been traditionally interpreted. The caste system, which
constituted an important element in determining the dharma of each
individual has been officially disowned by the Indian government, and
is no longer regarded as an integral part of Hindu ethics. The
self-contained rural economy which gave stability to the forms of
society has given way to new forms of industrial life in which the
svahhava of the different classes i3 no longer apparent.
Dharma As Duty
The notion of dharma has been reinterpreted by contemporary Hindus
like S.Radhakrishnan so as to avoid reference to the notions of caste
and class. Dharma is conceived a3 an ideal of selfless devotion to
one's duty, without thought of any reward for oneself, in a way very
similar to that of Kent's categorioal imperative which demands
reverenoe and obedience without any thought to the possible benefit
that may accrue to oneself from doing the right aotion. His
interpretation of dharma is traced back to the Bhagavad-Gita. There
we find a synthesis of the originally conflicting ideals of dharma
and moksha.
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The ideal of dharma implies action in accordance with the law of one*s
nature. This is the path of karmayoga, the way of salvation through
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action. In contrast, the path of jnanayoga, salvation through
knowledge, implies the transcendence and abnegation of the empirical
world of action. These ideals were synthesised in the view that one
should act in accordance with dharma, but without any desire for the
fruits of one's actions. By acting without a desire for the fruits
of one*8 action, one inhibited the karma which would otherwise accrue
from action. Moksha was attained when one achieved the condition of
completely passionless action.
In the context of the Bhagavad-Gita the content of dharma, or duty,
was determined in part at least by consideration of caste. Thus
Arjuna is urged to fight because he is a warrior and he would be
untrue to his dharma as a warrior if he allowed himself to be moved
by his feelings of pity and refused to fight. Radhakrishnan, however,
interprets dharma in a more general way as adherence to the moral law.
The modern account of dharma then accepts the traditional ideal of
passionless action, but develops it without reference to its classical
context of caste.
Dharmg. A3 Self-Realisation
The concept of dharma implies an essentially differentiated universe :
there is no point ir talking about the dharma of anything if it cannot
be contrasted with the dharma of some other thing. The fundamental
contrast drawn at the beginning of the Chapter was between a
standpoint which took as its ultimate value self-realisation as
interpreted in terms of a monistic metaphysics, and a standpoint which
took ultimate value to be constituted by some kind of personal
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relationship and focussed, therefore, on the interpersonal. In view
of the fact that a value-system oriented around dharma and one
oriented around interpersonal relationships, both imply a pluralistic
account of the world, it may be useful to see if they are alike in
any other respects. In particular, does the concept of dharma allow
for the importance of the interpersonal element?
Although dharma derives its significance from the fact that other
people and other things also have their own particular nature
(svabhava) and are, therefore, able to fulfil their own dharma, yet
my pursuit of dharma in no way depends on the co-operation or
interaction of anyone or anything else, that is dharma for me is to
be found by my consulting the law of my own nature and not anything
outside myself. Dharma as an aim of life is as much a process of
self-realisation as is raoksha. As an illustration of this we can
take the famous example, which we have already mentioned, from the
Bhagavad-Gdta of Arjuna on the eve of battle, full of doubt and
despair over his proposed course of action. He is involved in
fighting a war of honour against his own kinsmen; rather than shed
fraternal blood he is ready to give up the whole undertaking.
Krishna as an incarnation of the God Vishnu, however, comes to his aid
with divine counsel. He points out to Arjuna that there are two ways
of looking at this situation, what might be termed the divine and the
human. From the divine or ultimate point of view, the bodies of the
men who will inevitably be slain if the war continues are not the
essential aspect of these men. The real self of each is something
other than the mind or body or any other part of what we would on the
ordinary plane recognise as human nature. On the divine level there
is neither a slayer nor a slain, for the empirical selves which are
affected by these actions are quite different from the real self which
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Is one and the same for all* This is not to be regarded as a divine
licence to do as one likes* The force of it is that from the divine
point of view, the empirical world of action is meaningless* In
Arjura's situation this thought may give him courage to do what is
right through the knowledge that any apparent ill-effects of his
aotions, such as the killing of kinsmen, is only apparent and that
their real selves remain untouched* While viewing things from the
divine standpoint may be a comfort and a reassurance, the decision as
to what is the right course of action must be made from the human
standpoint and taking into consideration the relevant empirical facts*
In Arjura*s oase, the correct deoision is that he should fight because
he is a warrior and it is his duty as a warrior to fight in this
situation. If he were to give up his honour would be lost, he would
not have realised his nature as a warrior and this is unthinkable.
Arjura*s dharma as a warrior consisted in his fighting honourable wars,
including this one, and the fact that his kinsmen were involved could
not alter this fact. Here we see that as it was Arjura's nature to be
a warrior so his dharma was to fight and only by so doing could he
achieve the realisation of his nature. The situation portrays doubt
and dilemma as to the right course of action, but the final decision
is made, not by a confrontation with an 'other' whioh forces him to
reassess himself and his aotions, but by a looking inward at his own
nature and thereby determining the correct means of expressing it.
In contrast we oould cite some Pauline statements which are clear
expressions of the interpersonal element in decision-making. For
example, 'the love of God constrains us* and 'I am all things to all
men in order that by all means I might save some.'
This is not the whole story however. We mentioned earlier the
affinities between the Hindu notion of dharma and other related notions
such as the Hebrew idea of the 'path of God*. The idea common to both
is that there is a certain moral order in the universe, it is only by
conforming to this moral order that one can realise one's full potential
as a human being. In both cases this might be interpreted to mean that
the good life is lived primarily for the agent'3 spiritual benefits.
This outlook might also appear to be perpetuated in the New Testament
in the teachings of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. The emphasis
on the spiritual rewards to be reaped by pursuing certain attitudes or
courses of action is remarkable. A full discussion of this question
would require an account of the relation between law and grace which
was one of the important problems for the early Christian writers. I
shall only offer a few comments. Perhaps one of the most important
differences between the concept of dharma and that of the path of God
is that the law of God was conceived as given by God as the means
whereby man could express his love for God v/hereas dharma, as we saw,
is a more impersonal notion connected with the general concept of truth,
satya, whioh has no need of a divine being to operate it. Thus while
the law and implicitly the agent's spiritual benefits are undoubtedly
of great importance in the Christian tradition, yet they are important
within the overall framework of a personal relationship, The personal
element is primary and the law is a means to the fulfilment of the
personal relationship, which may be overridden if necessary. Thus,
David's eating of the bread from the temple, although it was against
the law, did not result in a rupture in his relationship with God.
Can Non-Dualism Provide A Basis For Ethical Concern?
Ethics and metaphysics have traditionally been closely associated in
the Hindu thought. Amongst contemporary writers both Radhakrishnan
and Aurobindo endeavour to provide a metaphysical justification for
their moral views and it is common to find Advaitie philosophers
claiming that Advaitism provides the most convincing rationale for
an ethic of universal love. We must, therefore, ask whether this
is so and in this section I shall consider whether non-dualist
metaphysics, such as that of Shankara, can provide a basis for
ethical concern and personal value. It must be remembered that
Shankara himself was not primarily concerned with the ethical
consequences of his position. These were developed fully only by
later writers of the school.
The crux of the matter lies in the degree of reality which can be
attributed to the empirical world. Any metaphysics which is to be
relevant to contemporary thought must allow for the reality and
significance of the trials and struggles of life.
If the reality of the empirical world is guaranteed then prima
facie so is the reality and significance of what goes on in the
empirical world. For example, my worship of God is real; the
helping hand I offer to my neighbour does make some appreciable
difference to the amount of good in the general scheme of things;
it is worth my while to take a stand and struggle to maintain what
I believe to be the right. If empirical existence is to be judged
unreal, then these simple things do begin to appear useless and
trivial. This is what makes Shankara's non-dualism unappealing.
The world is simply maya, anirvacaniya.
But from Shankara's point of view there is a fundamental flaw in
this reasoning. He does not start from a premiss of little regard
for the world even though this may appear to be entailed by his
conclusions. Rather he starts from the self-luminous value of an
immanent and transcendent reality. The reality of Brahman is the
overwhelming truth of things and everything else must be fitted into
its own place in this scheme. The experience of the overwhelming
reality of Brahman implies the possibility of release, moksha. The
state of moksha is identical with the realisation of Brahman's
self-shining light. We have already noted the importance to Shankara
of the question, what must reality be like in order that moksha be
possible? His answer to this is that so long as karma, that which
binds us to Samsara, the round of empirical existence, be real, then
there can be no possibility of release. Karma is accumulated by
actions so that as long as the real nature of man is regarded as being
constituted by his actions then there can be no possibility of him
achieving moksha, the state of blessedness, which is quite beyond
actions. It follows from this that in the light of the self-shining
reality that is Brahman, the empirical world cannot be regarded as
real. But it does not follow from this that it is necessarily unreal
in the sense of being illusory and, therefore, trivial, though it may
be difficult not to draw this conclusion.
Is the whole controversy simply a play on words which can be settled
if we can only agree on the different senses in which the terms
'real* and 'reality' are being used? The issue may be compared in
certain respects with the argument between the idealists and the
exponents of commonsense in Britain at the turn of the century.
Ramanuja, as can be seen from his arguments, wishes to use the term
♦reality* so that we understand by moksha, the ultimate reality,
something which can be made sense of in terms of the reality that we
experience from day to day. His motivation is similar to that which
inspired G.E. Moore to his defence of the reality of the external
world. In the same way that Moore focussed attention on our ordinary
use of words and forced philosophy to reinterpret metaphysical claims
in terms of the ordinary sense of the words involved, so R&manuja
appealed again and again to commonsense and experience to hack up
his claims ahout the nature of consciousness. On the other hand,
Shankara could reply that Ramanuja was missing the point. In
claiming that consciousness was the only reality, he was not
intending in any way to deny the empirical validity of any of the
usual claims made about consciousness. Just as the idealists in
saying, for example, that time is unreal, in no way intended to
deny that an interval elapsed between one day and the next, so,
Shankara could argue, his claim that consciousness alone was real
was in no way intended to deny that, in our ordinary empirical
experience, consciousness was usually experienced as being the
attribute of a conscious subject. Once the sense in which certain
key terms such a3 'reality1 and 'consciousness* are being used is
ascertained, then it might be claimed that much of the argument is
seen to be simply about words. This is true, but at the same time
we are left with the question of what is in fact being referred to
by these terms if they are not being used in their ordinary sense.
It is an oversimplification to say that Shankara is logical without
being comprehensible, while Ramanuja is comprehensible without being
logical, yet there is a certain truth in this. On the question of
the reality of karma, critics of Ramanuja say that because he insists
on the reality of the empirical world and, therefore, of karma, in
order to explain how it is that the soul is finally freed from the
fruits of its actions, he has to invoke the grace of God, which by
an arbitary fiat, as it were, causes the karma of the soul to lose
its efficaoy. In Shankara's case, karma is not ultimately real and
so there is no problem in explaining how its effects cease to operate
on the liberated soul. We have here a oontrast between the actual
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and the ideal# On the one hand, we have the conditions of our
empirical life which make our aspirations possible, while on the
other hand, our aspirations seem to point to something beyond the
empirical world, to a state of perfection which can never be
attained in the empirical world. Karma is woven into the fabrio
of empirical existence. We cannot live without action and every
action must inexorably bear its fruit. We may act well, but also
we may aot badly. So long as empirical existence continues, both
possibilities must be equally open to us. The ultimate desirable
state, however, is one which is beyond action. This is aocepted
as axiomatic by both Shankara and Ramanuja, as it was by Plato.
Given this situation we oan reconcile the two aspects either by
denying the reality of one, as does Shankara, or as Ramanuja,
apparently having his cake and eating it, by accepting the reality
of both, but appealing to some external factor such as God to effect
the change from one to the other. Shankara then is logioal for he
does order reality in terms of one simple principle such that
relations between the parts are all internal. But it is doubtful
whether he is comprehensible. As we have pointed out on several
occasions, what he means by such terms as reality and consciousness
are not to be construed in their ordinary interpretations, yet no
satisfactory alternative is preferred. Ramanuja, on the other
hand, may be understood, for what he is talking about may be
spelled out in terms of ordinary experience. But the final picture
which he paints cannot be regarded as entirely coherent. The gap
between the actual and the ideal is not bridged, but only described.
Karma is eternal, the soul in its essential nature is free from
karma. The grace of God is invoked in order to effect the
transition from one state of the soul to the other, but this oan
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never provide a logical answer.
This connects up with the question previously discussed concerning
the relationship of the world and the individual soul with God. The
point raised there was whether it was possible to give an account of
the relationship between the empirical world and the ultimate reality
such as to allow for the ultimacy of a personal God and of individual
selves who were free to respond to the personal approach of God. We
contrasted on the one hand, Shankara and Ramanuja's accounts of the
relationship which we characterised as theoretical in that they were
concerned to give a logically satisfactory answer to the problem of
reconciling unity with multiplicity} and on the other hand, the
Christian account, which sidestepped the issue by the practical
declaration of God's action in creating out of nothing the world
which contains free agents who are capable of responding to God's
love. The significance of the Christian approach is that it starts
from the primacy of the practical and within this framework,
theoretioal activity can take its place.
It is not altogether fair to characterise Ramanuja's approach as
theoretical as we have noted the significance whioh he attaches to
action. We saw, in fact, that his insistence on the reality and
independence of action of the individual soul was, strictly
speaking, incompatible with his interpretation of the world and the
individual souls as together comprising the body of God of which God
is the Inner Ruler. Here we find Ramanuja breaking out of the
3trictly theoretioal framework in order to do justice to the facts
of experience as he sees them. The same thing occurs in his
doctrine of karma being dissolved by the grace of God. Shankara's
system attempts to order experience in such a way as to show a
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necessary logical connection between each aspect : in order to do
this we must treat action and karma as illusory. Ramanuja, as his
critics point out, is not able to show any necessary connection
between the empirical condition of the soul where it is bound by
karma and its condition in the state of release when it is
characterised by pure intelligence and bliss, and must perforce
invoke the grace of God in order to effect a transition. But is
this a criticism? Granted that the world must be conceived as
unity, need it be a unity of thought? Why not a unity of action?
We have already seen that the experience of action brings into
existence something new. Action always implies the possibility of
change and this is part and parcel of our everyday experience. We
can see on the human level the effeot of personal encounter on
another's life. The effect of one person on another may produce
changes which could never be accounted for in terms of pure logic.
This can all be put in another way in terms of the contrast between
necessary and contingent truths. A necessary truth is one which is
true no matter what the circumstances, whereas a contingent truth
depends for its truth value on particular circumstances. A great
deal has been made of this contrast in distinguishing the human and
the divine. Although man has need of other human beings in order to
exist and his existence is thus contingent, God has need of no-one
other than himself; he remains completely the same and unaffected
by all changing empirical circumstances. Once this absolute contrast
has been drawn, however, it seems difficult to express the
relationship between the empirical and the divine, the finite and the
infinite. Thus for Shankara the Absolute, Brahman, is being,
consciousness, infinity, sad cid anantam. Brahman is also the self
within man. But what of the obvious multiplicity around us? How is
it related to being, consciousness, infinity? For Shankara, the
effect is contained in the cause, the world as the effect of Brahman
must, therefore, be contained within Brahman and must, therefore, be
regarded as effectively the same as Brahman. This leads naturally to
the view that the world is maya, illusion, a false view of reality.
The interesting thing about this is the basic assumption that in
giving an explanation of the totality of existence, it is unity of
thought that is called for. The effect is said to be already present
in the cause in the same way that conclusions are contained in the
premisses of an argument. This implies that as the conclusions follow
necessarily from the premisses, so the world is necessarily related
to God. The unity of infinite and finite is a logically necessary
unity. This means that if moksha is the realisation of one* s
identity with Brahman there is no sense in which Brahman, by his grace,
needs to bring about this realisation. In fact, such a bringing about
would be an action and there can be no place for genuine action in the
doctrine that the effect is contained in the cause. For if it is,
then nothing really new is ever being produced and all relationships
amongst things produced and their cause must be necessary. It is
obvious, however, that actions do not belong to the class of things
which we regard as inevitable as conclusions from premisses are
inevitable. Actions are influenced by a multitude of different
factors and produce new states of affairs which are quite different
from the causes which lead to them. The upshot of this is that if
God is an Absolute, necessary being, such that there is no
contingency and relativity in Him, then this allows no place for
action. Action is unreal, and, ultimately, so is history.
But is there any reason why an account of the relationship between
the empirical world and the ultimate reality should contain nothing
but necessary relationships? This is to give primacy to thought
and to deny action. Whereas thought, taken by itself, excludes
action, aotion taken by itself, includes thought, as was shown in
the previous Chapter. Auiity of action would include a conceptual
element, but it would not proceed entirely in terms of logically
necessary propositions : it would allow a place for contingent
truths as well. These ideas have been developed at length by
various writers such as Charles Hartshorn® and John Maomurray.*
If we are considering Ramanuja'a account of the totality of existence
as a unity of action which includes thought, it would be no criticism
of him that the graoe of God is invoked in order to effect the
transition from the empirioal condition of the soul bound by karma to
its condition in a state of release. If action is an essential
feature of the world then the aotion of God on the soul in bringing
about moksha is scarcely surprising. On the other hand, although
Ramanuja allows a place for action and insists that the soul is a
conscious agent rather than sheer consciousness there are insufficient
grounds for supposing that he would want to describe the world as a
unity of action.
Salient features Of Shankara'a Thought
As we have argued above, Shankara*s position is both logical, yet
incomprehensible. No significant meaning oan be given to the key
terms beyond saying that they are not being used in their ordinary
1 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity. Yale University Press,
1948.
John Kacmurray, The Self As Agent and Persona In Relation.
sense. The reality to which they refer eludes us always : speeoh and
words draw back from it. We can only trust to the actual experience
of reality to make talk about it meaningful. Resulting from this, it
is also ambiguous. Opposite conclusions may be arrived at from one
and the same premiss. Traditionally the non-dualist position has
been taken to imply world-renunciation, yet in contemporary thought
there are those who take the opposite view and interpret it as
implying a positive attitude of concern for the world. I shall argue
that this ambiguity is an inherent feature of non-dualism and that it
arises because the argument does not allow for a sufficient number of
real terms. Certain issues are of such complexity that they cannot
be discussed, or even be meaningful, unless it be allowed that the
argument has a certain number of terms. If this is not so, the
argument becomes simply a play on words with no force.
Fallacious Arguments Based On Non-Dualism"*"
If there is one only, then it follows that there is no other. It is
impossible then to initiate any discussion which involves the •other'.
If, however, an 'other' is assumed there can be no internal link
between the other and the one and, therefore, there is no limit on what
may be predicated of the 'other' or the way in which it may relate to
the 'one*. This means that within the context of non-dualism, any
argument which involves an 'other' must necessarily be inconclusive
1 The ethical implications of non-dualism were not developed by
Shankara himself, but by later non-dualist thinkers. It has been
pointed out to me that the arguments in the following pages are
similar to those used by the Prasahgika school, a sub-school of
Buddhism, in the 5th century AD. This school accepted that it could
not logically establish its own views and used its opponents'
principles and procedure to demolish their views. Shankara must have
been aware of the arguments of the Prasangikas and so would be aware,
presumably, of the way they could be applied to a non-dualist system
such as his own.
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and its contrary may always be formulated. Thus it is possible both
to argue that non-dualism provided a basis for universal brotherhood
and that it must inevitably lead to self-love and neglect of the world.
The possibility of providing ambiguous and contrary arguments arises
because difference is illicitly imported into a context where, in fact,
it has no place. Thus it seems to follow from the proposition that
there is one only without a second that the person confronting me is
really myself. And from this one can argue either that since the
other person is myself, then his interests have as much right to be
consulted as have my own and that, therefore, I ought to take him into
consideration in everything that I do; or one can argue that since he
is identical with myself, then in helping myself I am helping him and
that, therefore, I am justified in neglecting his interests in favour
of my own. The fallacy in this reasoning lies in the initial deduction
from Lh- proposition that there is one only, to the conclusion that the
other person is myself. This reasoning is invalid since if there is
one only, then it is impossible to distinguish myself as a separate
being, let alone another person. There can be no deductions or arguments
from the premiss that there is one only. The proposition that the other
is myself is one which can only be made sense of and used to provide a
motivation for action in the context of a system in which there are a
number of terms, for example, there must be myself, the other, our mutual
environment, the relation between us, and the criteria for the
identification of us both. Once these several factors are made
determinate, then it becomes possible to discuss the question of whether
acceptance of the proposition provides or does not provide a motivation
for other regarding action. So long as these are not determinate, the
proposition is meaningless and arguments only appear to follow from it
as a result of jumbled thinking.
2*-,
Although the proposition, apart from a determinate context, may he
meaningless in the sense of not providing a basis for deduction, it
may yet be a useful proposition. On the assumption that one is
aiming at the realisation of the One, then meditation on the thought
that the other is myself may bring about the desired state of
illumination. We may compare the proposition, tat twam asi, that
thou art. This saying plays a major role in the ascent from the
world of plurality to the realisation of the one. From meditating on
this statement of oneness, the realisation of oneness may suddenly
flood in on the soul. But there is no deduction involved, either
♦upwards* or 'downwards*. The realisation of oneness i3 a matter of
intuition and not of reason • the statement, that thou art, has not
been arrived at by considering what is the case empirically.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that a metaphysics of non-
dualism cannot provide a reference for the discussion of ethical
problems or indeed of any problems. The reason for this is that
discussion inevitably presupposes the reality of more than one term
and non-dualism simply refuses to recognise more than one term
ultimately.
Why then, if non-dualism has this inherent deficiency, have there been
so many such systems and why does a system such as Shankara's have
such tremendous appeal? The answer may lie partly in the laziness of
the human mind which finds it easier to think a one-term system and
shrinks from the complexities involved in the acknowledgement of a
multiplicity of inter-related terms. Once a one-term account of
reality is assumed, then it becomes possible to iron out all that is
not apparently in agreement in the ways in which Shankara does. So
long as the basic mistake is overlooked, i.e. the mistake of trying
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to make any deduction whatsoever from the proposition that reality is
one, the resultant system is so closely knit as a result of being
based on one single term, that if it is the work of a subtle and
logical mind, it is bound to have tremendous appeal.
On the other hand, the interconnectedness of everything within the
frame of reference of a monistic system makes it difficult to resist.
We must think of everything in experience as interconnected and,
therefore, as a unity. When once we admit an ultimate pluralism or
dualism it becomes difficult to explain this interconnectedness.
Where we get a dualism of mind and matter in the West, for example,
the problem arises of explaining why mind should act on matter or
why matter should be moved by mind. In a similar way in the Samkhya
system, which admits an ultimate duality of purusha and prakrti, it
is impossible to explain why the presence of purusha should cause
prakrti to evolve.
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Emotionally, too, non-dualism has tremendous appeal. After the hard
wrestling with terms and abstractions which even 3ome of the most
subtle thinkers have concluded must inevitably leave us with
contradictions in reality and loop-holes in thought which can never
be plugged, it is an immense relief to conclude that the world is not
ultimately amenable to reason, and that, as the snake turns out to be
but a rope when viewed in daylight, so when experienced in terms of
the larger whole of reality, the contradictions and frustrations of
thought will be seen to be satisfactorily completed in a whole which
is not thought. Not least are the attractions of such an ideal from
the point of view of practical life. There are times when one looks
at the human situation and feels that reconciliation and
understanding between man and man is something that can never be
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achieved however much one or both parties struggle : when one
relationship after another is shown to be other than the understanding
of it by the parties involved : when the intricate network of human
relationships is taken simply as a means to one's own ends : in such
situations then an ideal in which the separate individualities of all
are no more, and the feuds and antagonisms which rack the human race
are seen as no more than ripples on the surface of the vast sea, is of
great appeal. The thought that all these perplexities need not be
accepted as ultimate may even give one a perspective whioh enables
one to face them with courage and enduranoe. However, the ineffable
nature of the experience also leaves it open to the objection that
there is no criterion by which it can be judged, as we have already
seen. Any experience must be judged in terms of its relation to
other experiences and to life as a whole. The difficulty with the
experience of sad cid ananda is that it cannot be related to any
other experiences as, in its classical interpretation, it does not
even allow for the recognition of any 'other1. Strictly, one should
keep absolutely silent.
Although non-dualism as a metaphysical system cannot be used to
further ethical deductions, yet this is not to say that the non-dual
intuition of the universe is thereby discredited. Far from it. The
argument has simply shown that pure non-dualism cannot provide a
basis on which disoussion of the empirical world can take place.
Reality may be one and undifferentiated and the intuition of this may
be the pearl of great price. If this is so then obviously all our
endeavours should be directed towards the realisation of this state,
but apart from this, nothing whatsoever follows about our conduct
towards our fellow human beings. It is not so much that non-dualism
is antagonistic to the possibility of the moral life as that discussion
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of moral issues oannot get started at all so long as we remain within
such a framework. It is only by surreptitiously introducing the idea
of the 'other* that it does appear possible to consider moral issues.
Contemporary Advaita Ethics
I have argued in the preceding pages that strict non-dualism cannot
provide a basis for ethical discussion and that the reason for this
is that the absence of an 'other' makes any arguments necessarily
inconclusive. This conclusion may be challenged by pointing to a
philosopher like, for example, Radhakrishnan, who has both strong
moral views and claims that they find their metaphysical justification
in non-dualism. It has indeed been claimed that only a non-dualist
metaphysics can provide the justification for an ethic of universal
love. Will my arguments then hold against the subtler version of
non-dualism stated by Radhakrishnan which does provide a specific
account of the moral life and insists on its importance?
Radhakrishnan's Ethical Standpoint
There can be no doubt that Radhakrishnan takes with absolute
seriousness the importance and significance of the individual person
and of the moral life. To quote from only one of his many writings on
the subject, he say3. 'Human personality is sacred. The human person
has a claim to be treated as an end in himself and is therefore
entitled to the rights to life, freedom,and security. Freedom to be
himself is the right of personality.* On the previous page, in
describing the lives of those individuals who have achieved liberation,
he says 'Selfish action is not possible for them ..... They are dead
to pride, envy and uncharitableness ..... They have simple
goodness ..... They are meek, patient, longsuffering Their life
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is socially minded.'
1 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Fragments of a Confession, from The
Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. edited by Paul Arthur
Schilpp, New York, 1952, p.66. 2 Op. Cit. p.65
Liberated persons do not ignore ethical distinctions, but they no
longer have to think about them because to do good and act correctly
has become second nature to the man who has achieved enlightenment.
The difficulty in Radhakrishnan's ethical position comes in answer
to the question of whether it is in fact justified on the basis of
non-dualism. I shall try to explain why I think that it is not.
My contention is that Radhakrishnan attempts to combine two
incompatible positions and that he must choose between abandonning
a strict non-dualism, as at times he seems inclined towards, or
abandonning the claim that his ethics has a metaphysical basis in
ultimate reality.
god And The World
Radhakrishnan distinguishes between different aspects of the supreme
and in particular between Brahman, 'Essential, Transcendent Being'
and Iswara, 'the Absolute in action as Lord and Creator*.1 Of Cod
he says that 'the Cod who is shaping the universe is not the
Absolute, free from all relativity, but the active personal being who
2
shares in the life of his finite creatures.' 'Cod is so intensely
concerned with this history that He not only looks on the human life
as an interested spectator, but He actively intervenes in it.''' The
world is meaningful because it is Cod'3 world and He responds to
every part of it. 'The Supreme is love and knowledge, goodness and
power. He is related to everything and everyone in the universe. He
responds to everything and to everything's response to Him.
We have argued that it is only by treating the self as primarily as
agent that we can give a satisfactory account of human experience,
and by extrapolation, only by giving a theistic account of God as the
1 Ibid. p. 39 2 Ibid, p.40 3 Ibid, pp.41-2 4 Ibid, p.42
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supreme agent and the world as His action can the meaningulness of
human life he maintained. We find that in this our position agrees
with that of Radhakrishnan who emphasises intentional interaction
as one of the essential characteristics of God. The point of
difference between us lies in Radhakrishnan's view that the moral
life and its values, however important in the temporal world, must
ultimately be transcended when •the mortal becomes the immortal
and time is taken over into eternity.•^ However akin to the
Christian position Radhakrishnan appears to be in his discussion of
God and the world when he comes to deal with ultimate things his
Hindu background is apparent and he asserts that 'The actual fabric
of the world with its loves and hates, with its jealousies and
competitions, with its unasked helpfulness, sustained intellectual
effort and intense moral struggle, are no more than existences
2
dancing on the stillness of Pure Being.1
God And The Absolute
If the cosmic process is to be transcended then the distinction
between God and the Absolute becomes important since God is the
Absolute in relation to the world. Is God also to be transcended?
On this point Radhakrishnan is far from clear and his use of the term
!God? adds to the ambiguity. It is because of his lack of clarity on
this issue of the transcendence of the world process that I have
contended that he is attempting to combine two incompatible positions
and must choose between them.
On the one hand there is evidence that both God and the Absolute are
simply different aspects of the Supreme. In discussing the question
of whether Isvara, God, is to be regarded as inferior to Brahman,
Radhakrishnan appears to repudiate this view and remarks that these
1 Ibid, p.43 2 Ibid, p.44
different aspects 'disclose great depths in the Supreme Being and only
logically can we distinguish them. They are all united in the
Supreme.'1 On this showing God is not to be transcended and this view
is confirmed when it is later on stated that the values of human life
will be 'preserved in the abode of all eternal values, the Absolute-
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God.* If this is the case, however, can this be regarded as strict
non-dualism? Is this the Supreme of which we can only say neti. neti?
Insofar as Radhakrishnan distinguishes different aspects of the
Supreme his position is little different from that of the theist. It
is clear also that it is only by making God an aspect of the Supreme
that Radhakrishnan preserves the significance of moral values. In other
words, Radhakrishnan recognises clearly that moral values can only be
justified on a theistic basis which acknowledges the agency of God,
so that only by admitting that the agency of God is as much a part of
His Nature as His Pure Being can he maintain the importance of moral
values. This means that for Radhakrishnan moral values are not in
fact justified on the basis of non-dualismbut of theism. This bears
out our previous conclusion that strict non-dualism cannot provide a
basis for ethical discussion.
Relationship And Solitude
We have already noted that the personal element is fundamental to
Christianity in terms of social activity and relationship. By
'personal' God the Christian means a God who is able to enter into
personal relationships with his people and to treat them in a
'personal' manner, rather than that God is actually a person.
In contrast, although personal relationship and social activity is
given a place in Hinduism, the Advaita view is that these things
must ultimately be transcended and give place to a condition in which
there is no 'other*. The difference in attitudes on these points is
1 Ibid, p.41 2 Ibid, p.43
"brought out clearly "by Peter Munz.1
Munz argues that the important insight in Hinduism is into solitude
and correspondingly the possibility of spiritual self-realisation,
whereas the Christian insight is that redemption comes about through
relationship and the outworking of absolute and incommensurable love.
This agrees with our own findings. The most striking difference in
attitude between the two traditions arises over the question of love.
While the Hindu recognises the supreme power of love this recognition
is equivocally expressed. Ultimately what is dear to the self is the
self, i.e. the self loves the self and this cannot be a genuine
relationship. Further, although Cod's love for man is expressed in
in his sending avatars to help them, an avatar does not have the
ability to redeem man as has Jesus in the Christian tradition, but
can only give a helping hand. This difference is important in
relation to moksha the goal of the spiritual life. For the Hindus
the love of Cod is only the means to release rather than a
constitutive element in redemption as it is for the Christian. This
is the case, even when the path adopted for the attainment of moksha
i3 the bhakti-marga, the path of loving devotion to Cod. Bhakti is
still only the means to the end and the end itself is to be found in
spiritual attainment rather than loving relationship.
The question which arises from the consideration of these two different
insights is whether there is any means of reconciling them or whether
they must be regarded as mutually exclusive. Munz does not attempt to
answer this question though his treatment of the subject suggests that
he would favour the incorporation by Christianity of some of the
insights of Hinduism rather than the reverse procedure which is that
adopted by Hindu writers suoh as Radhakrishnan.
1 Peter Munz, Relationship and Solitude in Hinduism and Christianity.
in Philosophy East and West, Vol. 6, No. 2, July 1956)
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Is there any explanation for these different emphases? One
possibility is that they represent different answers to the problem
of 'existential anxiety'. 'Existential anxiety' may be described
as a type of generalised anxiety over life as a whole to which man
is prone a3 a result of his possession of self-consciousness and
the power of discursive thought. The power of discursive thought
enables man to picture to himself the possible consequenoes of his
actions and future states of affairs, to speculate on the totality
of experience and on the interconnection of the different elements
in experience. These thoughts may give rise to questions to which
no conclusive answer can be given. As a self-conscious being, he
may also become aware of a variety and a conflict between the
demands made upon him by the social network of family, friends,
society, circumstanoes in which he finds himself. The type of
anxiety which may arise in this way can be termed 'existential
anxiety' to distinguish it from particular anxieties over particular
problems which may be resolved in quite specific ways. By contrast,
'existential anxiety* has no specific solution. Only by adopting a
certain general attitude to life can it be relieved. It may be that
the different insights of Christianity and Hinduism into relationship
and solitude can be understood as different ways of coping with
'existential anxiety'.
In the Hebrew-Christian tradition the dominant attitude has been that
of commitment and obedience to a personal Cod. The 'absolute demand*
and 'final succour' of a personal Cod has been the means whereby the
believer has been enabled to sort out his priorities, decide on his
values, and be reassured that at the last life has not been lived in
vain. Wholehearted devotion to the service of a loving Cod has
resulted in integration of the personality : all other claims are
Ill
subordinated to the one requirement of serving God and this leads
to the elimination of anxiety. •Perfect love oasts out fear.*
By contrast, such wholehearted devotion to a supreme, loving God
was far more difficult for the thoughtful Hindu. The variety of
religious praotices and the principle of ista devata, the worship of
the god of one's ohoice was not such as to favour commitment to a
single, personal deity. In the absence of a single, supreme being,
capable of demanding one's entire devotion some other method of
relieving 'existential anxiety* had to be found. The course taken
was that of self-knowledge and self-control, leading to a reduction
in the level of anxiety.
One of the basic assumptions of Indian religions, Hindu and Buddhist
alike, is that human existence involves misery and sorrow. This may
be taken in a straight-forward sense as referring to the problems of
disease, poverty, climatic conditions and so on. Yet this is not
convincing. Life may have been hard, but this by itself does not
seem enough to justify its being made the basis of a religious
philosophy. Further, there are many aspects of Indian thought which
show a positive appreciation of the joys and good things of life,
and the very fact that philosophy was able to reach the heights which
it did in ancient India scarcely suggests rock-bottom conditions of
existence. It is more plausible to suppose that the sorrow and misery
whioh bothered the Hindu philosophical mind was an existential anxiety,
the problem of the meaning of life. This question was answered in
the Hebrew tradition by a looking outward to a personal God, in the
Hindu tradition it was answered by looking inward to the mind of man.
This leads to detailed analyses of every aspect of man's mental
existence and to the development of a tradition of yogic practices
designed to reduce the level of anxiety and to integrate the personality.
The practice of yoga involves a combination of physical and mental
exercises which lead to the ability to control one's thoughts and
physical reactions. As well as being able to exclude undesirable
thoughts from one's consciousness one becomes able to control
undesirable physical reactions such as pain and discomfort. The
unshakeable serenity of the yogin comes from the practice of
complete mental and physical control. Another feature of the yogic
method is the elimination of rational and logical thought.
Discursive thought has no place in meditation and instead there is a
regression to a state where thought and feeling become one. Since
existential anxiety is largely the result of man's propensity to
discursive thought which allows him to range so freely over the
panorama of existence, it follows that the elimination of
discursive thought will also eliminate existential anxiety. The
fragmentation of thought gives way to the integration of feeling
and a sense of the unity of being and of one's own merging and
identity with existence.
The concept of the 'witness self', the detached isolated observer
who takes no part in what goes on about him is an implication of
this attitude. As increasing control over one's physical and
mental processes is obtained, so one increasingly is able to
dissociate oneself from them and to experience oneself as something
separate and distinct from them.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding Chapters the emphasis has been on exposition. In the
course of this we have encountered various problems. In this final
Chapter I attempt to show how some of these problems may be answered
by adopting the standpoint of the self as agent.
It is no accident that the bulk of the Chapter is concerned with the
question of giving an adequate account of God or the ultimate reality.
The account which a religious believer gives of the self or person is
dependent on his interpretation of his religious experience and the
question of what this experience is and how it should be interpreted
is essentially a question of how to describe the highest reality and
value.
As I have remarked before, this may seem to some an odd way of
proceeding. Would it not be better to start from our ordinary experience
of persons and then judge religious experience and its interpretation in
the light of this? The answer to this is that there is no reason to
assume that an account of the person which takes no account of his
religious experience should take priority over an account of the person
which treats his religious experience as the determinative factor in his
existence. The assumption that we should do this is common only to a
small minority, and in any case, the context of the present study is
specifically religious.
In the first and largest part of the Chapter I am concerned with the
comparative merits of non-dualism and theism as accounts of the ultimate
reality. I argue that non-dualist accounts which regard the ultimate
reality as indescribable are inadequate, as are theistic accounts
which place the main emphasis on God's immutability as a knowing subject.
Only by regarding God as an agent and the world as His act is it possible
to do justice to God's transcendence and at the same time give a
satisfactory account of the relation between God and the world which
maintains the reality and significance of human life.
In the final part of the Chapter I examine some of the implications of
regarding the individual person as an agent rather than a knowing subject.
I argue that it is only the agency of the person which guarantees unique
individuality and significance. Nevertheless, problems remain. An
understanding of the self as agent is anchored in the bodily activity
of the self and in these terms it is hard to make sense of religious
expectations of an after-life in which the identity of the person is
preserved in some recognisable form.
'Person* As The Key Metaphysical Concept
One of the tasks of philosophy is to give an account of experience as a
whole and to explain the unity which experience has. My contention is
that persons create the unity of experience. Any adequate metaphysics,
therefore, must give an account of the nature of the person.
Two of the most important constituents of any account of the person
are the ethical and the ontological. The completely isolated person is
an exception. Normally, people are interdependent in a variety of ways.
They affect other people by their actions and are themselves affected by
other people's actions. The interaction of people with one another is
the field of ethics. Any account of the concept *person' will have an
effect on one's interpretation of the interaction of persons and,
therefore, of one's ethical attitudes. It is persons, individually,and
jointly,who create the disciplines of science, art, history. Each of
these disciplines has its own internal principles of unity, but linking
them all is the fact that they all exist for some person or group of
persons. An account of the person is an account of the principle of
unity underlying human life.
It is perfectly possible to study these questions without reference to
religion but in the context of religion both these issues are brought
sharply into focus. Since religion involves man's total response to
the world as a whole it is concerned both with his behaviour and with
his relationship to the ultimate power and reality of the universe.
The concept of the person must therefore occupy a key place in religious
thought as the link between its metaphysical position and its practical
ethics.
Ethics And Metaphysics In Hinduism And Christianity
One point in which Hinduism and Christianity are in broad agreement is
in both subscribing to an ethic of universal love. The exact details do
not concern us at the moment : the important thing is the adoption of a
this-worldly attitude which values the individual person and seeks his
good by co-operation with him. In the case of Hinduism this is a new
formulation of the ethical attitude and the task facing contemporary
Hindu philosophers has been that of showing that Shankara's traditional
non-dualist philosophy was capable of adaption to the claims of a this-
worldly social morality rather than an other-worldly asceticism. One
of the tasks of the present study has been to ask whether non-dualism
can provide a satisfactory justification for personal values or whether
this task is better performed by some form of theism. The Christian
religion does justify personal values on the basis of theism but it is
arguable that the metaphysics of theism have never been adequately
stated. Central to this question is the nature of the person for what
is taken as essential to the nature of the person cannot have its
reality denied at a deeper level. For example, if agency is taken as
essential to the person then it must be shown how individual agents can
be integrally related to the larger whole of experience without denying
their significance as agents. Likewise, if consciousness be regarded as
the essential feature of a person then it must be shown how consciousness
qualifies experience as a whole.
Thus the justification of an ethic of universal love raises two important
issues : a metaphysical account of the person which shows love to be
possible, and a metaphysical account of experience as a whole which
maintains the significance of love.
We have noted an overall difference in emphasis between Hinduism and
Christianity, Whereas in the former the goal centres on self-realisation
with personal encounter treated mainly as a means to that realisation, in
Christianity interpersonal relationship and love tend to be seen as ends
in themselves. This difference is linked with non-dualism in the one
case and theism on the other. Nevertheless, on closer examination we find
that there is sufficient similarity in their metaphysical views to make
the interchange of ideas between both traditions worthwhile. Each side
is faced with similar metaphysical problems concerning the relation of the
whole to the part.
Non-Dualism And Theism
Two of the most influential philosophers on the recent Hindu scene have
neither of them attempted a metaphysics of theism. Both Radhakrishnan
and Aurobindo have put forward a form of non-dualism, but it is
significant that each of them has given a prominent place to theistic
considerations and have been concerned to refute the view that the
doctrine of maya entails the illusory nature of the world.
The distinctive feature of non-dualism is the belief that it is
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impossible in the last resort to conceptualise the real : it is neti,
neti, beyond speech and mind. We can only refer to it inadequately by
means of symbols, for example, the symbol of theism. Many Christian
theologians would agree with this. We can only know God through his
works and in relation to us. God as He is in and for Himself must
always remain a mystery. Aquinas, for example, says that we cannot
come to know what God is (His essence) but only that He is (His
• i ' '
existence).
'the divine substance exceeds by its immensity every form which our
X
intellect attains;•
Calvin says of God that
'His essence ..... is incomprehensible, utterly transcending all human
2
thought* and that 'Those who ..... propose to enquire
what the essence of God is, only delude us with frigid speculations, -
it being much more our interest to know what kind of being God is, and
what things are agreeable to his nature What avails it ..... to
know a God with whom we have nothing to do?'^
As far as this feature of their thought is concerned, Hinduism and
Christianity have a great deal in common. The difference lies in other
directions such as their account of the way in which the real becomes
accessible to human consciousness. Whereas :,he non-dualist becomes
aware of the real primarily through the medium of mystical experience
the Christian claims that God has acted in history and is continually
encountering mankind through the medium of his total experience, prosaic
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. 1, 14; quoted in The Philosophical
Texts of Thomas Aquinas, ed. by T. Gilby, O.U.P., 1951.
2 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion. 5.1, transl. by
Henry Beveridge, Calvin Translation Society, Edinburgh, 1845.
3 Loc. Cit. 2,2.
or otherwise. (For example, give us this day our daily bread.) While
both Hindu non-dualism and Christianity agree that we can speak with
confidence concerning God's manifestation in the world, it seems to both
that it is presumptions of man to think that he can in any way fathom
God's transcendence.
The danger in this view has already been noted in the conflict which
may arise between the demands of the religious awareness and the dictates
of philosophical analysis. Theism is grounded in the experience of
worship in which God is met as one who responds to the worshipper and
thus guarantees both the reality of the worshipper and the reality of
the values implicit in personal relationship. If, however, philosophical
analysis claims to show that reality is not ultimately amenable to
interpretation along the lines posited by the theist, then this implies
a change in the religious goal. The god of philosophy and of religion
must be one and the same. The theist who wishes to justify his particular
religious awareness must find a metaphysics which will preserve the
ultimacy of persons and personal relationships while it does not impair
the transcendency of God. While the non-dualist is happy to see theism
as a partial truth and to ground his spiritual experience on the mystioal
awareness of the non-dual, the theist must beware lest a too great
emphasis on God's transcendence should lead to a belittling of what the
theist experiences as the revealed personal nature of God.
Although it may seem presumptuous of man to pry too deeply into the
mysteries of the Divine Nature or to suppose that by his intelleot alone
he can fathom the nature of ultimate reality, yet the contrary declaration
that the real is utterly beyond the comprehension of man's intelleot has
its own difficulties. If we are intellectually unable to comprehend the
real then why should we think that anything we say about it is true?
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Can we even take seriously the statement that it is beyond comprehension?
The terms which we use are our own human terms even though they refer to
something which itself comprehends rather than is included in human
experience. .Either these terms have meanings with implications which
can be discussed and argued about, or they are meaningless and should be
abandoned altogether. There is a basic contradiction involved in a
position like that of Aurobindo who assigns the intellect to a
comparatively lowly place in the general scheme of things yet who goes
on to discuss cosmic entities and supra-intellectual beings quite freely.
Ifce question of whether the real is discussable is of great importance
for both Hinduism and Christianity. Both wish, though with different
emphases, to affirm a supreme reality behind the world of change and
becoming which is the source of any value which this world can have. They
are not concerned, as say original Buddhism, with simply putting forward
a way of life, but wish to relate their ethical views to a more general
metaphysical picture of the way things are. If they have to admit that
in the last analysis reality is not amenable to human conceptualisation,
then it becomes exceedingly difficult for them to refute alternative
viewpoints like atheism, agnosticism or humanism. Neither side will
consider grounding faith on preference but hold their beliefs because they
consider them to be true. If true, however, there must be ways of showing
their truth to the non-believer. Otherwise he can turn round and accuse
the religious believers of inconsistency : of criticising the non-believer
because his beliefs lack clarity and consistency while ignoring lack of
clarity and inconsistency in themselves.
Theists may agree here with the Advaita claim that there is an aspect of
the divine which is completely 'other' than us and indescribable in
human terms. God may have a significance in and for himself which is
beyond our human comprehension. But this is mere speculation and can
have no practical concern for us. The difficulty comes when the
Vedantist claims that this transcendent aspect of Brahman is connected
with the ultimate goal of human life. Everything which is connected
with human existence and has significance for human life must be able to
be referred to in some way. If the concepts we use are confused then
they must be clarified. The defender of the faith who wishes to convince
others cannot rest his arguments on silence and mystery, though there may
well be a place for the acceptance of both in the practice of religious
life. His opponents can only too easily turn such an attitude to their
own advantage.
Non-Dualism
Y&iat are the considerations which lead to the non-dualist affirmation
that the real is what is not determined by anything else'5 and that,
therefore, it is beyond speech and mind?
Two factors enter into this. One is connected with the attempt to
maintain the absoluteness of reality and the other is connected with the
endeavour to do justice to the nature of the religious experience which
the non-dualist takes as central to his faith. I shall deal with each
of these in turn.
The Absolute
There are various paths by which we arrive at the notion of an ineffable
absolute. If object A is determined by object B then A cannot be the
whole of reality. Generalising this argument we find that the whole of
reality must be something which is not determined by anything else. The
parts of reality which we know, however, are always determined by
something else and the language which we use to describe reality can make
sense only when applied to part of reality. Our concepts, therefore,
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are inadequate to describe reality as a whole. Inoluded amongst the things
which are determined by other things are people and their actions, from
which it follows that agency or personality cannot qualify the world as
a whole.
This conception of the absolute is indeed composed of 'bloodless categories'.
It is empty of all positive content and it must be so for any positive
content would relativize it and make it less than the absolute. It may
be characterised as sad cid ananda but these terms cannot be taken in
their everyday meaning. It is more aptly desoribed as the undifferentiated
One without a second.
This metaphysical account of the absolute traditionally derived its
significance for the Vedahtists from the mystical experience which was
taken as central and interpreted as the intuition of identity with the
supreme Brahman. Mysticism was traditionally accompanied by asceticsm
and a turning from the world and metaphysically this was translated into
a doctrine of maya, which viewed the world as illusory.
Mysticism
The ineffability of the mystical experience which is central to Advaita
Vedanta is taken to warrant the description neti. neti to Brahman, that
which transcends speech and thought. It has been claimed by some
Vedsntists and others that all mystical experiences are essentially
similar and that on this basis it is possible to construct a 'perennial
philosophy' which is the distillation of the essentials of all religions
and demonstrates their essential unity. 'This view implies that it is
possible to arrive at a purely phenomenological account of mystical
experience which allows of only one metaphysical interpretation. This
view has been cri ticised by Ninian Smart.* Smart agrees that all mystical
1 Ninian Smart, Religious Studies. Vol.1, No.l, Oct. 1965, pp.75-87,
Interpretation and Mystical Experience.
experiences of the monistic or theistic variety are essentially similar
but he argues that the interpretation of mystical experience must
depend on other non-mystical considerations. We must distinguish, he
says, between the actual experience and its interpretation, but this
distinction is not clear cut. This is because the concepts used in
describing mystical experiences vary in their degrees of ramification,
i.e. in the number of propositions which are presupposed as true by the
use of the concept. For example, a description of a mystical experience
as 'a cloud of unknowing' has a low degree of ramification, whereas a
description as 'union with God' in the context of Christian theism has
a high degree of ramification as it presupposes a considerable number
of propositions about God, the acceptance of which is not based on
mystical grounds, but takes into consideration such varied things as
certain historical happenings, the experience of worship and devotion,
and so on. This means that
'the higher the degree of ramification, the less is the description
guaranteed by the experience itself.•
Further, we must also distinguish between the interpretation which the
mystic himself places on his experience and the interpretation which
someone from a different tradition could place on it. Both the auto-
interpretation and the hetero-interpretation may contain a high degree
of ramification and may thus interpret the mystical experience in terns
drawn from outside that experience. By making these distinctions and
seeking a low auto-interpretation which coincides with a low hetero-
interpretation, Smart hopes to facilitate the attempt to arrive at an
agreed phenomenological account which will enable experience to be
separated from interpretation. The upshot of Smart's argument is that
1 Op. Cit. p.80.
'monistic and theistic experiences are essentially similar it is
the correct interpretation of them which is at issue.'^" and that
•the question of what is the hest hetero- and auto-interpretation of
mystical experience turns on whether devotion and worship are important.
Or more generally : the question of interpretation is the question of
God. One cannot answer this by reference to auto-interpretations of
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mystical experience alone.'
Smart's arguments have far-reaching implications for the Vedantistfe
account of religious experience. While he corroborates the Vedahtist's
contention that all mystical experiences are fundamentally similar, the
conclusion to be drawn from this is uncongenial to the Vedantist's hopes
of a universal religion based on nQrstical awareness. V.hen we rule out
interpretations of mystical experience with a high degree of ramification
i.e. which imply propositions which are accepted as true on other than
mystical grounds, then we are left with an account of an experience
which, it may be generally agreed, is uplifting and even transforming,
but which by itself is insufficient basis on which to build metaphysical
claims. Iftis is not to say that mystical experience has no value or
that it has no part to play in religious life. 'Hie significance of
mystical experience in the religious life of the individual must be
reckoned with, but at the same time it must also be recognised that the
doctrinal framework within which the mystical experience i3 interpreted
depends for its acceptance on factors which are not derived from the
mystical experience. As Smart puts it the question of the interpretation
of mystical experience is the question of God, and it is to this
question that we must now turn.
Aurobindo And The Relative
Traditional asceticism and its accompanying account of the world as may'a,
illusion, has been repudiated by Aurobindo. It has been replaced by an
1 Ibid. p.85. 2 Ibid
an emphasis on the reality and significance of empirical life as part of
the self-evolution of the absolute. This means that for ..urobindo, the
metaphysical concept of the Absolute has ceased to find its prime
significance in ascetic mysticism. Mysticism remains central but it is
a mysticism which is integrated with and which finds expression in the
realities of practical life. Corresponding to this the emphasis has
shifted from the undifferentiated Absolute to the differentiated
expression of the life of the Absolute.4n the1 world. As Aurobindo points
out, the ancient texts not only say Tat twam asi. 'That thou art', but
'Brahman is this all.' Both aspects of the truth must be incorporated
into our account of Brahman. True to his Vedantic heritage, Aurobindo
gives pride of place to the undifferentiated Absolute, but to the
dispassionate reader, the Absolute in its differentiated expression is
of far greater practical importance.
Inadequacy Of Non-Dualism
Aurobindo's revised account of non-dualist metaphysics is itself an
indication of the inadequacy of the traditional version. We have seen
that on two of the central issues non-dualism is too vague to provide an
adequate basis for a metaphysical account of reality which will maintain
the significance of human life and love. On the theoretical side the
doctrine of the inconceivability of ultimate reality says nothing
definitive and by itself provides no reason for any further assertions
about reality. On the practical side, if we accept Smart's arguments,
the mystical experience which is central to Hinduism can by itself provide
no basis for doctrinal statements. These deficiencies are remedied by
Aurobindo by his stress, on the one hand, on the importance of the
relative and differentiated aspect of the divine, and on the other, by an
expansion in his conception of the goal of human life, which while it
continues to make mysticism central, at the same time makes it the pivot
of a full and active life of self-expression and co-operation with others
in the Self-expression of the Absolute.
Although superficially this revised non-dualism may seem a far cry from
theism, yet when we examine it in more detail we find that some of the
important convictions to which it aims to give expression are just the
convictions which theism has been traditionally concerned to safeguard
and express, and that there is in fact considerable similarity in
general direction of thought between some of the important thinkers on
both sides. For example, the emphasis on the agency of the divine, on
the intentions and purposes of the divine as expressed in the world, on
the importance of the individual, not in and for himself, but within the
framework of a larger whole, which is both a constitutive factor in his
life, and in whose constitution he himself has a part to play. In
particular, one of the dominant ideas which finds expression in Aurobindo,
and in MacMurray and Hartshorne on the Christian side, is that each
individual is a centre of purposeful action, who finds his fulfilment in
co-operation with others for the sake of the harnony and purposes of
the whole; and whose spiritual growth consists in an increasing
appreciation of this fact which leads to an increasing ability to
comprehend the whole as something of which he is an integral part,
coupled with a greater capacity for sensitive and appropriate interaction
with the whole.
Absolute And Relative
We have said that the justification of an ethic of universal love demands
a metaphysical account of experience as a whole which will maintain the
significance of love. Traditionally interpreted non-dualism will not do
this. The exclusion of any genuine differentiation and, therefore, any
genuine 'otherness1 rules out the possibility of even raising the question
I'l
of love. This is not to say that there was no ethioal awareness in
traditional Hinduism. Par from it. The epics and other literature bear
ample testimony to the Hindu awareness of moral issues. In Aurobindo's
account of non-dualism, however, his emphasis on the positive and world-
affirming aspects of life lead him to stress the manyness and
differentiation within the One. Multiplicity is an integral part of the
unity of the One.
'We must accept the many-sidedness of the manifestation even while we
assert the unity of the Manifested.'1
It is only by stressing the many-sidedness and multiplicity of the
manifested divine that Aurobindo is able to show the reality of personal
values. In other words, only by stressing the relative aspect of the
Absolute is a basis found for discussion of all that is characteristically
human. This is scarcely surprising. We have already noted that one of
the primary objections to theism, i.e. the view which holds that God is
personal in nature, is that it relativises the Divine and so produces an
inferior conception. Theism is grounded in the experience of worship and
devotion and so must take seriously the existence of an 'other' and the
possibility of action. In other words, it must reckon with the relative,
Aurobindo balances his synthetic account of human life with a corresponding
metaphysical synthesis of the absolute and the relative.
Religion In Search Of A Metaphysics
Any general account of the nature of reality which is to satisfy a
religious outlook must satisfy certain conditions. It must adequately
represent the object of religious seeking. It must take account of man's
life in the world. And it must give a satisfactory account of the
relation of the finite to the infinite.
1 Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine. Calcutta, Arya Publishing House,
1939, p.60.
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ihese problems are faced by both Hinduism and Christianity. It is my
contention that there is a greater similarity in their metaphysical
positions than might at first sight appear, and that in their current
development they are faced with similar problems which demand similar
answers.
Any ultimate object of religious attention must be thought of as that
than which no greater can be conceived. Both religions are in
substantial agreement over the transcendence of God or the Absolute,
although they differ in the way in which they emphasise this
transcendence. God or the Absolute must be more than the world and
other than the world.
In the .est the philosophical question of transcendence finds its origins
in Plato and the theory of forms. The divine forms transcended the
particular instances of which they were the forms. The question of how
exactly the instances were related to their forms was fraught with
difficulties, but the popular understanding of the relationship was that
in some way the particular instances were images or copies of the
corresponding form. This understanding is reinforced by Plato's passage
in the Timaeus in which he speaks of time as a 'moving image of eternity'•
The world of becoming is an image of the world of being. This same
understanding is repeated in Aquinas' account of the divine nature and
the doctrine of analogy. What we affirm of the divine nature is not to
be understood as applying univocally to both God and creatures. On the
other hand, the terms which we use are neither equivocal nor meaningless.
The creatures, as effects of God, manifest him imperfectly and therefore
the terras are used analogically. The foundation of this analogical use
of concepts is the likeness of the creatures to God and not simply that
God is their cause. Transcendence in this instance has meant net a complete
negation of all human qualities, "but the attempt to understand a greater
and more perfect expression of the best of human qualities. Although
this has been the main emphasis in the Christian account of the
transcendence of Cod, the view of transcendence as complete 'otherness'
has not been neglected. We have already referred to Calvin's statement
that God's essence is 'incomprehensible, utterly transcending all human
thought*. In Christian thought the recognition of this aspect of
transcendence has been coloured by the remembrance that man is made
'in God's image'.
In oontrast, the Vedantic account of the transcendence of the Absolute
has its roots in neti. neti - the absolute is inconceivable. Everything
to which we point must be negated in order to arrive at the intuition of
Brahman. It is from this standpoint that Aurobindo criticises the
Western conception of God as antropomorphic and inadequate. Aurobindo's
understanding of the .estern tradition on this issue, however, is itself
inadequate as it fails to take account of the doctrine of analogy and the
way in which this doctrine conceives of God as more than man. Indeed
there are places in the Hindu account of the Absolute where some form of
doctrine of analogy seem3 called for, or even directly implied. The
designation of Brahman as sad cid anandam immediately springs to mind.
We have already noted the difficulty which Shankara experiences in
explaining how these human terms may be applied to nirguna Brahman.
Sad cid anandam is the heart of Vedantism. It is the application of
these terms to Brahman which prevents the Vedahtic account of the
transcendence of the Absolute from lapsing into meaninglessness or a
nystery which is indifferent to any kind of behaviour. Yet what are
we to understand by these terms? It is the ascription of being,
consciousness and bliss to Brahman which gives the goal of identity
with Brahman its human interest. Yet the being, consciousness and bli3s
which are Brahman's cannot be identical with the limited and imperfect
being, consciousness and bliss which is our experience as human beings.
The only kind of answer to this which preserves the meaning of the terms
seems to be to say that our being, consciousness and bliss are limited
and imperfect copies of the absolute being, consciousness and bliss.
This is not to say that what is called the analogical use of concepts is
clear or perfectly comprehensible, but only that the Hindu teaching on
this point seems to demand this sort of analysis. If this analysis is
given, however, it is tantamount to the admission of a 'personal* element
in the Absolute. There maybe differences of opinions over the details,
but so long as the admission is made that the terms sad cid anandem are
meaningfully applied to the transcendent Brahman, then there is a
substantial amount of agreement between Vedahtists and Christians on the
question of transcendence. Again, this is not to say that either side
have produced an adequate analysis of the transcendence of God or Brahman.
At the opposite pole to God's transcendence is His immanence. God is
greater than the world but He is also present in the world. Or to use
the Hindu statement, All this is Brahman. The accounts which each
tradition gives of the divine immanence in the world are complementary
to their accounts of the divine transcendence.
The Christian account of divine transcendence emphasised that the human
was an imperfect copy of the divine and implicitly that the divine was
different from and other than the human. The account of divine immanence
expresses itself in two forms : in the belief in the 'great chain of
being' and the doctrine of encounter, corresponding to the Greek and
Hebrew elements in the Christian conception of God. Leibniz' doctrine
can be taken as a representative expression of the former belief. The
world is the best possible because it is the best possible combination
of the infinite potentialities inherent in the divine nature. The world
is composed of monads. Each monad exmplifies in its own nature a facet
of the divine nature and each monad, as well as being in itself the
focus for some particular characteristic, reflects in itself the nature
of the totality of the other monads which constitute the world. Here
again in this account of the immanence of the divine there is a likeness
of the human to the divine in that each human monad reflects imperfectly
the totality of the divine. The difficulty in this account of divine
immanence, which Leibniz does not escape, is that in positing the
realisation of all possible compatible potentialities within the divine
nature no room is left for development of human effort. The other
expression of the immanence of God is in the doctrine of encounter. The
belief that God is encountered in the history of the world is a distinctive
feature of the Christian faith. It i3 more than the recognition of God as
the creator and sustainer of the world, a belief which is recognised in
the doctrine of the *great chain of being' : it is the conviction that
in certain historical events God has manifested himself in a unique manner.
Linked with this is the belief that God is one with whom we stand in
personal relationship, and that we become aware of God's presence in the
world in terms which are most aptly described as a personal encounter.
This account of divine immanence is in line with the preceding account of
divine transcendence. Both recognise that there is a likeness between the
human and the divine, a likeness in which the human is an imperfect oopy
of the divine; it is on the basis of this likeness that there can be a
coming-together of the human and the divine.
Again Aurobindo has criticised the western account of the immanence of
God because it lacks spirituality. It is conceived too much in human terms.
We can reply that any account must use human terms, and to negate
the personal aspect of human experience in describing the immanence
of the divine is to risk making the divine sub-human rather than
super-human. Divine immanence has been conceived along different
lines in Hinduism but we must admit the validity of the analogy of
personal encounter.
In any human relationship there is an element of both transcendence
and immanence. There is a part of the other person which presents
itself to us and there is a part that standB over against us and, as
it were, hides itself from us. This latter element is more than
simply the aspects of the other person of which we are not currently
aware. The totality of these aspects, which together constitute the
life-history of the person, make up that person's immanence. They
express the nature of the person and enable us to know that person.
The life-history of a person, however, taken in itself is incomplete
without reference to what I have termed the transcendent element;
transcendence and immanence are complementary notions. The
transcendent element is the nature or character of the person which is
expressed in his external actions.
It may be said that there is no other way of understanding the
character of a person other than in terms of his actions so that to
think of a person's oharacter as something different from his actions
is to revive the mistake of thinking that there is a ghost in the
machine. This is not so, however. Unless a person's nature or
character is thought of as something which transcends his actions, and
is therefore something other than the sum of his actions, the very
notion of action becomes meaningless. Action presupposes choice and
therefore the possibility that we could always have acted otherwise.
That we must choose to do an action has at least two implications. It
implies, as we have noted, that there are a variety of possibilities
open to us. It also implies that in choosing, we have a reason for our
choice. In acting, therefore, we are expressing ourselves in one way
out of a variety of possible ways, and also we are expressing a
character which could have been given expression in other possible
ways. This means that the possibility of action implies that there is
an agent who transcends the expression of his character in his actions.
A person's transcendence is linked with his ability to make decisions,
and hence with his potentialities, expressed or unexpressed. The more
fully developed a person is, the greater his transcendence. Although
both transcendence and immanence increase together in the development
of a person, there is a sense in which they are also in inverse
proportion to each other. At one end of the scale we could put the
baby, whose self-awareness is minimal? at the other end, a fully-
developed person who is aware that his life expresses only one of its
many possibilities. In the latter example, transcendence exceeds
immanence whereas in the former, it is immanence which predominates.
A baby is almost all immanence. His being lies open to the other, his
mother, in this instance. A baby, in fact, may be regarded at birth
as being completely the expression of his parents. He has &b yet no
personality in and for himself. This is something which is only
developed as a result of the behaviour of the mother, and to a lesser
degree the rest of the environment towards the child. (Some
qualification may be necessary here. The extent to which a baby
expresses any personality at birth is a matter of debate. Since, in
the terms of my argument, immanence and transcendence are complementary
ideas, it is not logically possible to regard the baby at birth as
completely lacking any transcendent element, since without the
transcendent element it would not be possible to regard what the baby
manifests as immanence.) The mother behaves towards the child in such
a way that the child is encouraged to initiate activity and to make
decisions for himself. She evokes a response from the child and
initiates the basic personal relationship with the world within which
the child will grow up to be a person in his own right. While in one
sense the child does not cease to be his parents' child and thus a
part of their self-expression, he also begins to express his own
nature and to develop his own transcendence. His immanence is the
expression of his nature in terms of his activities in the world,
while his transcendence is his character and the potentialities of
his nature which may or may not be expressed in action.
The notion of potentiality requires further explanation. A distinction
must be made between the potentialities of a baby and the potentialities
of a mature person. It is the latter which is linked to the idea of
transcendence. In the baby's case, it may seem that potentiality is
at its maximum. His whole life stretches ahead, apparently unlimited
in its scope. The grown man, on the other hand, has encountered
circumstances and formed habit patterns which have set a limit to his
initial potential. Yet it is the self-awareness of this limited
potential that is relevant to the notion of transcendence rather than
the unlimited abstract possibilities of the baby. The baby's
transoendence is minimal because his actual ability to make choices
and initiate action is minimal. As he matures his ability to express
himself increases, and his activities become a more complete expression
of his character. He becomes more self-aware of his potentialities and
of his ability to translate potentiality into action.
The complementary notions of transcendence and immanence are
parallelled by the distinctions absolute and relative, independent and
dependent.
Transcendence tends towards absoluteness and independence, whereas
immanence tends towards relativity and dependence. The transcendence
of a person includes his character and we admire a person the more he
is independent of circumstances in his character and wills to do the
right in all situations. On the other hand, while the will to do
right should be absolute, the question of what is the right action in
particular circumstances is relative and varies with the variety in the
circumstances. Again, the maturity of a person is exhibited in his
sensitivity to the different circumstances which he meets, which shows
itself in the fitness of his response to these circumstances. Thus
the more sensitive he becomes the more his actions will be relative,
but the more they will be suitable to the situation and at the same time
a true expression of the man's character.
These lines of argument and suggestions are not new. They have been
developed by, for example, John MacMurray and by Charles Hartshorne in
the books already referred to. In Chapter 1, we quoted a passage from
MacMurray which sums up these thoughts : 'The more universal a person
becomes in his self-transcendence, the more unique does he become in
his individuality.* In terms of this analysis it becomes possible to
give a meaningful account of the Christian interpretation of God's
relation to the world in His transcendence and immanence.
God is both transcendent and immanent. This means that He must be both
absolute and relative. He must be absolute in his character and
relative in the expression of it. No greater than God can be conceived
because God is supreme in His absoluteness and in His relativity in a
way that no human person can ever be. His will is unshakeably good
while the expression of this will shows God's infinite sensitivity in
meeting the need of each particular situation. The relation of man
to God is similar to the relation of the baby to his mother. As the
baby may be regarded as the self-expression of the mother so man is
part of the self-expression of God. He is a part of God's immanence
and can rightly say that in God 'we live and move and have our being'.
There is no part of the worlt. or of human life which is excluded from
God : it is all a part of God. But this does not mean that man is a
cipher, a puppet manipulated by an all-inclusive fate. As the mother
by her actions towards the baby develops the baby's transcendence and
so leads him to the point of decision-making for himself, and
ultimately the possibility of fulfilling himself in terms of a personal
relationship, so God acts towards man in such a way that man can
initiate action for himself, and in other words, have freewill. This
means that traditional queries regarding the omnipotence and goodness
of God are based on a misunderstanding regarding the relation of God to
the world. We cannot regard God as being responsible for everything in
the world, but must recognise what is the consequence of man's actions
and therefore man's responsibility. In God we live and move and have
our being, but the very fact that we can make such a statement implies
that we can separate ourselves from our environment and so transcend
our 3heer givenness. A corollary of this analysis is that as one end
of a personal relationship lies in the mutual pleasure of the
participants in the relationship, so one end of the relationship of God
and man is in their mutual pleasure. This means that man can add to
the measure of God's enjoyment, and that service to God is not simply
for the benefit of man because God, by definition, cannot be bettered
in any way; but service to God does benefit God and add to His
enjoyment of Himself.
In the light of this interpretation of Christian thought it is
interesting to turn to a Hindu thinker like Aurobindo and find many
similar ideas expressed. Aurobindo, as we have seen, criticises
traditional Hindu asceticism and turning away from the world, and
points out that the text, All this is Brahman, has equal validity.
®iis expresses the immanence of Brahman. The Ved&ntic interpretation
of the immanence of the divine is not in terms of encounter but of
identity. Whereas the tendency of the Christian worship of God is to
the experiencing of nature as something alien to man, the Hindu point
of view leads to man feeling himself to be part of the great cosmic
harmony and himself akin to the whole of nature. This finds expression
in several ways. The traditional set-up of Hindu society was regarded
as the expression of the cosmic harmony in which each member plays his
necessary part. In a different context the equation of Atman and
Brahman can be understood as the affirmation of the Absolute as the
essence of being in this world.
In Aurobindo the notion of the immanence of the Absolute in the world
takes a new turn and is developed in terms of the ideas of relativity
and dependence. While the absolute transcendence of nirguna Brahman
is insisted on, it is recognised that there must be an aspect of Brahman
which is relative and therefore variable and which is capable of self-
development. This aspect of Brahman is no less real than the absolute
aspect and in fact the two are complementary. The concept of evolution
is applied. Brahman descends into the world and the world ascends to
Brahman. The unchanging eternal Brahman is real but so also is the
evolving world and of equal importance as an aspect of Brahman. The
concept of progress in the moral and spiritual sphere is linked to that
of evolution, and the reality of both ideas is reinforced by Aurobindo's
repudiation of the traditional Hindu view of time as cyclical. If time
is cyclical there can he no real progress, and liberation must lie in
the complete transcendence of time. But if time has a genuine part to
play in the self-development of the absolute then our liberation must be
linked to our temporal existence, and the liberated man, like Brahman
himself, has both a temporal and an eternal aspect. The emphasis on
the reality of time gives the traditional notion of the dependence of
the world on God a new turn. As we have noted, both Shankara and
Ramanuja were anxious to insist that, although the world was dependent
on Brahman, Brahman was himself independent of the world and unaffected
by it. If the world in its temporality is equally an aspect of Brahman,
however, then we can no longer hold to the view that it has no effect on
Brahman. On the contrary, if the world is the self-development and self-
expression of Brahman then the spiritual development of man directly aids
the self-expression of Brahman and contributes its share to the divine
fulness and bliss. This is of great importance in the motivation of
moral and social endeavour. Self-interest cannot be the ultimate motive
of the spiritual life but rather the desire to co-operate with, and to
participate in the self-expression of the divine nature.
Towards An Adequate Account Of The Divine Nature
Both religions wish to found their metaphysics on a single all-inclusive
reality which both transcends the world but of which the world is an
expression. The prime problem which each faces at the present time is
that of conceptualising the way in which the world is contained in (God
.in such a way that the reality of the world with its strivings is
maintained without thereby jeopardising the absoluteness and supremacy
of the divine. The direction in which the solution of this problem lies
involves both sides in a reappraisal of the relative side of the divine
nature. The relative, with its multiplicity is just as much a real part
of the divine nature as is its absolute unity. Aurobindo says,
' We must accept the many-sidedness of the manifestation even while we
assert the unity of the Manifested.'
This recognition of the reality of the manifestation of the divine
issues in a realisation that to affirm solely the immutability of the
absolute is to have a less than absolute conception, and that the
absolute must also contain an absolute mutability.
'It is "Absolute" in the sense of being entirely free to include and
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arrange in Its own way all possible terms of Its self-expression.'
It is my contention that this account of the divine nature which is
suggested by both Hindu and Christian writers is an account which
portrays the divine nature as essentially 'personal'.
Summing Up
Both Hinduism and Christianity hold that experience has an over-all
unity which is constituted by the supreme object of religion, Brahman in
the one case and God in the other. This faces them with several problems
in common. One problem is that of giving an account of Brahman or God
which will maintain His absolute supremacy and transcendence and yet
leave room for His relationship to the world. This leads to the second
problem, that of relating the infinite to the finite, the absolute to the
relative. Md finally, they need to give an account of human life which
will maintain its significance and the significance of the individual
participants.
I have argued that the traditional approaches to these questions are
inadequate on both sides and that the most promising way of reaching
satisfactory answers is to conceive of God or Brahman as personal and
the unity of the world and God as a personal unity. It is one thing,
however, to say that it is persons who create the unity of experience and
persons for whom religion can provide a goal in life, and another thing
to say what is meant by persons and the personal element which is vital
1 Pie Life Divine, p.60. 2 Ibid. p.60.
in human experience. My contention has been that it is only by recognising
that agency is central to being a person and standing in a personal
relationship that we can arrive at an account of what it is to have
personal characteristics, which is adequate both to meet the demands of
ordinary experience, and also to provide a satisfactory religious
metaphysics where such a metaphysics is demanded, as it is by both Hinduism
and Christianity.
In Christianity it has always been recognised that the worshipper stands
in personal relationship with his God, but the understanding of the
concept of 'person1 has varied. On the one hand, 'person* has been under¬
stood as a self-sufficient, rational being and on the other, as a centre
of voluntary, intentional social activity. The former conception has been
the mainstay of Christian metap; ysics to its detriment. By emphasising
the self-sufficiency and immutability of the divine nature it fails to
explain why the world exists and why God should have concern for the
world. Thus the relationship between God and the world is not adequately
stated and their basic unity is in danger of falling apart. Finally, by
conceiving of the person as primarily a knower rather than an agent it
effectively removes him from the real world of action by making the
existence of the 'other' problematical. These deficiencies have been
pointed out by MacMurray, Hartshorne and ethers. The remedy is not to
reject completely the account of a person as a self-sufficient rational
being, but to subordinate this aspect to the practical, concrete element
of voluntary social activity. To do this is to recognise that God has a
relative aspect as well as an absolute character, and the recognition of
God's relativity in no way detracts from His greatness.
We have argued that the relativity and absoluteness of God can be
conceived of as human absoluteness and relativity carried to their limits.
The human is an imperfect approximation to the divine. In the same way,
the transcendence and immanence found in human persons may be conceived
as perfectly expressed in the divine nature. This line of thought
enables us to give an account of God which includes the world, yet which
allows a real element of independence to man's action in the world.
In Hinduism the element of personal encounter has tended to be
subordinated to an 'impersonal' goal, the realisation of the tman/Brahman
identification. When it comes to recent exponents of Hinduism such as
Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan, however, their insistence on the
impersonality of the religious goal seems more a matter of words than of
substance.
Our criticism of Shankara has been that in his efforts to safeguard the
transcendence of Brahman he has adopted a position which makes it
impossible to give an adequate account of the empirical world. If nirguna
Brahman is beyond speech and thought then there is no way of relating
Brahman significantly to the world, and with the addition of the premiss
that nirguna Brahman is the ultimate reality and power, the world must be
regarded as an illusion to be negated and transcended in the realisation
of Brahman. We have argued that the interpretation of Brahman's
transcendence as neti. neti. 'not this, not this,' must be rejected. If
the world and Brahman are to be meaningfully related and if the religious
goal is to be significantly described, then it must be possible to give
an account of Brahman in human terms. We have seen that in fact Shankara
does attempt to relate nirguna Brahman to human experience by using the
terms sad cid ananta to refer to Brahman, albeit with the qualification
that these terms are not to be understood in their usual sense, but must
be applied to Brahman without the limitations involved in their use in
referring to human experience. This expedient, however, has similarity
to the Christian doctrine of analogy in referring to God. Both agree
that certain human terms may be used to refer to the nature of God or
Brahman though these terms are not to be understood as being either
univocally applied nor yet sheer equivocation. This admission on
Shankara's part reduces the gap between the Christian and Hindu
conceptions of God so that it becomes possible, if we accept Boethius'
definition of a person as a self-subsistent entity of a rational nature,
to apply this definition to Shankara's nirguna Brahman. On this
reading, Shankara's Brahman becomes 'personal' in nature and the
difference between Christian and Hindu doctrine becomes largely a
matter of words.
We have, however, rejected such an account of the 'personal' nature of
God. Instead of the standpoint of a self-subsistent knowing self we
have adopted the position of an agent whose being can only be fully
realised in interaction with others. We have argued that it is only the
latter account of 'person' which will enable both an adequate account of
the nature of God as personal to be given, and also an account of the
world which will preserve its significance and value. The recognition
of the agency of the self involves the admission of relativity in the
self, and applied to God, reoognises that there is a relative aspect to
his nature. The relativity of the self is the self in action and is also
the immanence of the self. We have argued that the conception of the
person as an agent rather than a knower brings together the concepts of
transcendence and immanence and that, applied to God, enables an account
of the relation of God to the world to be given which maintains the
transcendence and absoluteness of God, and at the same time accounts for
the world of becoming and the relative independence of human persons.
When we turn to the thought of Aurobindo we find a reappraisal end
reassessment of the relative and immanent aspects of Brahman. I have
tried to show that this implies an account of Brahman's nature which oan
only be termed 'personal'.
The adoption of this account of 'person' raises several questions which
we must now attempt to answer.
Objections
One of the main objections to conceiving of God or Brahman as personal
is that personal life as we experience it is always within an
environment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to give meaning to the
idea of personal life out of relation to something which is other than
the person or individual whose life it is. Personal life is constituted
by interaction, direct or indirect, with something which is other than
ourselves. If God is personal this seems to imply that He too needs
an environment and that therefore there must be something other than,
and co-existent with, God. If there is something other than God which
co-exists with Him, this implies that God must be less than the Absolute
since the Absolute 'has nothing whioh is not included in it in every
possible sense of the word. •"i" A corollary of this is that if God
interacts with an environment then He must be subject to change and,
therefore, less than perfect. Also, interaction with an environment
implies that God's life is in time and not eternal as traditionally
conceived.
My contention in answer to these objections is that without an
environment we can give no account of God which will genuinely relate
Him to the world and so provide a possible human goal. The problem is
to explain how the environment of God can be both created by Him and yet
1 S. Radhakri3hnan, Contemporary Indian Philosophy. Allen & Unwin, 1936
p.283.
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independent of Him. I have tried to show that personal relationships
provide us with a formal model which maintains both the transcendence
and immanence of God. The idea of the world as the act of God allows
both for the otherness of the world from God while yet making the world
totally dependent on God for its being.
We have already referred to W.C. Kheale's discussion of the incoherence
of the doctrine of timeless life. We cannot make sense of a life which
does not involve incidents in time, or intelligent life which is not
aware of the passage of time. To attribute timeless life to God is to
remove Him from the arena of human action and from involvement in
affairs. Yet the specific actions of God in the world are fundamental
to the Christian understanding of history. To suppose that God does
interact with the world is to imply that He is subject to change, but
this does not mean that He must be less than perfect. God's interaction
with the world is the expression of His relativity, and His responses to
the world must be supposed to be always perfectly appropriate to the
situation, unlike our human responses which are limited and often
misguided.
Only by incorporating an element of change into God Himself can the values
encountered in the changing world be maintained. Otherwise we are faced
with the problem of how a timeless eternal being can be the cause of a
changing finite world and Shankara's illusionism becomes the only
plausible answer.
Charles Hartshorne discusses the way in which God may be supposed to
change while yet remaining absolute.^ He considers the implication of
describing God as 'unsurpassable by another', one of the traditional
ways of describing God. It has generally been argued that this definition
1 'Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity', Union Seminary Quarterly
Review, Vol.XX. No.3. (March 1965). The Divine Relativity, Yale
University Press, 1948.
of God implies that He is immutable in the sense of being absolutely
unsurpassable* There can be none greater than God. Hartshorne points
out that while it is essential to God's nature that he should not be
surpassable by any other, there is no reason why he should not be
continually surpassing Himself. If we allow that God is strictly
all-surpassing in this way, then we must suppose that in some sense he
ha.s a past and a future.
The admission that God can have a past and a future has been unwelcome,
since if God exists in time, this seems to imply that his existence is
subject to the contingency which affects other temporal beings, and
theologians have traditionally wished to attribute necessity to God's
existence. The supposition that God might not have existed is curious,
to say the least : if God exists, his existence must be necessary.
Ihis is certainly a problem to which the answer would seem to be to
remove God's existence from time and treat it as eternal. Yet as we
have seen, this move creates even greater difficulties when we come to
give an account of the relation of God to the world. Only by admitting
change, and therefore temporality in God is it possible to give an
account of the relation of the world to God in such a way as to maintain
the significance of the world.
Hartshorne in the article referred to above develops the notion of the
unsurpassability of God in terms of his interaction with His creatures.
He argues that as human beings are individuals who interact with and
influence each other in encounter, a characteristic which is surpassable
in all of us, and since God is described as unsurpassable, we get, by
contrast,
•the idea of an individual interacting with others, not for a time but
always, not with some, but with ideal wi3dom, not with a mixture of love,
hate snd indifference, hut with unsurpassable love for all*'
This leads us to a conception of God as
•the unique because unsurpassable individual ..... interacting with all
others, relevant to all contexts, and in this sense absolutely
universal •
If God interacts with His creatures, this implies that He is aware of
them and affected by them. He is unsurpassably responsive to them
because He is unsurpassably aware of their needs.
If we admit that temporality and change are net synonymous with
imperfection then the sting is taken from Hadhakrishnan's criticism. We
3
can agree that 'God depends on creation even as creation depends on God.'"
But this does not mean that God is less than the Absolute. On the
contrary, God's absolute nature is a part of God Himself, who in His
creation is always surpassing Himself and expressing His infinite
relativity which finds expression in intentional interaction with his own
creation.
I have been concerned in this first part of the Chapter to argue that
any adequate account of God or the Absolute Reality which has a
meaningful content such that it can provide the goal and motivation for
human life, and which can provide a satisfactory analysis of the relation
between the infinite and the finite, must conceive of God a3 personal and
of the relation between God and the world as a personal relationship. I
have tried to show that serious thinkers in both Hinduism and Christianity
are tending to think along these lines and to make the concepts of agency
and intentional interaction central in their thinking about ultimate
reality. It remains to consider the implications of these lines of thought
on the conception of the personal as exhibited in the account of the
individual self and in the account of the goal of human life as conceived
by Hinduism and Christianity.
1 Op. Cit. p.267. 2 Ibid. 3 Op. Cit. p.283.
The Differentiae Of The Personal
In Chapter Three we saw that both Shankara and Ramahuja, representing
the non-dualist and thei3tic aspects of Hinduism, considered that thought,
consciousness or self-awareness, various translations of the same idea,
was the distinctive element in man. We compared this to the concept of
rationality which plays a similar role in ?/estem thought. Both ideas
refer to an awareness and intentionality in human experience. There are,
however, certain important differences. Whereas rationality is something
distinctively human which separates man from the rest of creation, pit or
consciousness is something which is manifested throughout the universe.
This is brought out by Deussen when he defines cit or caitanyam as
'a potency which lies at the root of all motion and ohange in nature,
which is therefore also ascribed, for example, to plants, and means
thus rather the capacity of reaction to outer influences. a potency
which in its highest development reveals itself as human intelligence,
as spirit.'1
This means that the realisation of one's essential being as cit.
consciousness, is accompanied by the realisation of one's essential
oneness with the rest of the universe. The implication of this is that
cit is an impersonal power or reality in the sense that it is not the sole
prerogrative of the human race nor of individual persons. On the other
hand, it must be recognised that the idea of consciousness manifesting
itself in the universe in varying and increasing degrees is not found
only in Hinduism, but also in the West in the writings of philosophers
who are avowed theists. Leibniz's petits perceptions and Hegel's
dialectic of reason are two major examples. (There are, of course,
important commentators on Hegel, for example, Professor Findlay, who
interprets him in non-theistic terms.) We, therefore, have an apparently
1 Deussen's System of the Vedanta. p.59, quoted by S. Radhakrishnan,
History of Indian Philosophy, p.532, fn.
anomlous situation in both traditions where on the one hand it is
asserted that God is personal, meaning amongst other things that He cares
for the individual, and on the other hand, that the essence of the
individual, is an impersonal something of which it does not make sense
to talk; of its responding to God's care. Here it is non-dualism which
gives the more logical answer in asserting that persons as we understand
them are not ultimate, and the reality of human life and of the rest of
the universe is more aptly described in impersonal terms.
A/
The ideal man of traditional Hindu thought is the sthitaprajna, the man
of steady understanding. This is the man who views life dispassionately,
who is unmoved by what he sees and experiences, who acts without desire
for the fruit of his actions. From the philosophical point of view this
is linked with the concept of the sakshin, or witness self which describes
the self as essentially a knower. This means that the essence of his
being lies outside the world which for him is only an object of
contemplation. It is acknowledged that the self must act but the force
of this acknowledgement is taken away by the insistence that he must not
allow himself to become emotionally involved with the consequences of his
action. In other words, he must act without a motive and in doing so
treat his actions, not as actions but as events. He must not identify
himself with his actions and think that he is bringing about some change
in the world, but he must experience both the bodily expression of his
actions and their consequent effects in the world as events which are
simply happening around him and of which he is the unmoved spectator. In
this ideal of human life, we have a concept which is essentially impersonal,
i.e. in which the individual i3 not important for his own sake but only as
a representative of his kind, and consequently which regards each
individual as essentially similar.
MacMurray's analysis of the standpoint of the self as knower may be
applied to the concept of the witness-self. If thought or intelligence
is the characteristic of the self then this must he the same for all.
So long as we are all thinking correctly all our thoughts must he
identical. V.hereas in the West solipsism has heen an inevitable problem
this is not so for Shankara. He starts from the presupposition of the
identity of all selves.
It might he questioned, however, whether a solipsistic conclusion is
inevitable. Supposing that thought or intelligence is the characteristic
of the self, with its implication that when we are thinking correctly
all our thoughts are identical, would it not be possible to have
numerically different episodes of thought which were identical? If this
is possible then we can still insist on the reality of the individual
selves and resist Shankara's conclusion that all selves are identical
with the one universal Self. This is, in fact, Ramanuja's position.
He insists that there is a plurality of selves, all of whom have
consciousness as their principle attribute. This means that when they
are all thinking correctly and so exhibiting their true nature, there
must be a number of numerically different, yet identical, episodes of
thought.
Logically there can be no objections to this conclusion so long as one
has abandoned the principle of identity of indiscernibles, and the case
for or against this principle would have to be argued separately. Prom
the practical point of view, however, there are insuperable difficulties
and these in Ramanuja's case mean that in the end he is unable to
reconcile his religious convictions with his philosophic assumptions.
The very notion of a plurality of selves implies a corresponding
plurality of qualitative differences which is denied in the assumption
of numerically different, yet identical episodes of thought. Although it
is the same world, which is experienced by different selves, one of the
features which distinguishes my experience of the world from your
experience of it, and thus derivatively, myself from your self, is the
fact that we experience the same world from different points of view,
what I make of the world, though similar in important ways to your
experience, is yet different from what you make of the world. If we
are to regard both experiences as identical, since they are experienced
by identical subjects, the point of insisting on the ultimate importance
and significance of the individual 'I* seems to be lost. One might reply
that from 'my' point of view, since I cannot have any direct experience
of other knowing subjects, the only important 'I* is myself, and I can
be aware of my significance of other possible 'Is', purely from a
consideration of my own experience. This will not do, however. As a
conscious subject, the 'I* of which I am aware has no positive content.
Such an 'I* cannot provide me with the uniqueness which guarantees my
significance and still less can it provide me with a reason for
generalising to the significance of other identical 'Is*. If I am faced
with the possibility of a number of selves identical with my self, then
the natural conclusion to draw is that somehow they are all the one self.
Ramanuja's insistence on the reality of the individual selves stems from
his religious convictions, and these are based on his experience of
worship and henoe of the relation of the worshipper to the supreme
reality. The 'I' which the religious consciousness takes seriously is
an *1' which is unique in its action on and interaction with the world.
But the 'I* which is implied in the standpoint of the knowing subject is
empty of content. As such it oan never justify the existence of a
plurality of unique selves and therefore can never be regarded as an
adequate explication of the 'I* of the religious conscousness.
We have seen, then, that there has been a similar philosophical
development in each tradition in that each has adopted the standpoint of
the self as subject for whom the world is primarily an object of
contemplation. I have tried to show that this has led to difficulties
on the Christian side in so far as its consequences have clashed with
other assumptions implicit in theism. Within the framework of non-
dualism, however, it has been possible to develop the standpoint of the
self as thinker to its logical conclusions and this has resulted in an
analysis of the self which divests it of all positive content.
Ramanuja
We have seen that there is a conflict within Christian theism between
the position which stresses the importance and ultimacy of the
individual person, and the philosophical standpoint of the 'I think'
which cannot account for a plurality of individual selves. Is there a
similar contradiction in Ramanuja's thought? We have seen that he
stresses that the self is primarily an agent but we must ask whether the
implications of this assertion are fully worked out or whether the basic
background of non-dualism finally wins the day.
Ramanuja's starting point is a revulsion against the implications of
non-dualism, which he sees as denying the significance of the individual
life and as being unable to provide a satisfactory aim for human life.
What is the point of liberation if 'I* will not be around to experience
it? Such a goal can have no meaning for me. This means that Ramanuja
must safeguard the ultimacy of the individual, and he does this, as we
have seen, by asserting that individuals are parts of God rather than
identical with God, and by insisting that the selves are acting subjects
of whom consciousness is the principle attribute rather than pure
consciousness, Ramahuja insists that the 'I' is ultimate as a permanent,
conscious subject, for if this were not the case, release could have no
meaning.
If each individual 'I' is ultimate, however, there must be some means
of distinguishing between different 'Is'. On the empirical level we
distinguish between different people on the basis of their different
life histories, i.e. by means of the varying patterns of empirical
features which make up their life. This implies that the basis of the
distinction lies in the different choices of action which constitute a
life. If I speak then of liberation as 'I* experience it, or hope to
experience it, my tinderstanding of the 'I' cannot be separated from ny
understanding of the past sequenoe of actions and events which go to
make up 'my' life. Does Ramanuja's account of the nature of the
individual self allow for an understanding of 'my* liberation along
these lines? The answer is no. By making consciousness the essence of
the self, Ramanuja provides no means of differentiating between selves.
So far as each self possesses consciousness fully it is identical with
every other self. Ramanuja wishes to ensure the ultimacy of individual
persons, but his analysis of the nature of the self does not depart
sufficiently from the basic non-dualist standpoint to do this adequately.
So long as thought or consciousness is regarded as the fundamental
characteristic of the self then the logical conclusion is that there can
be only one self. To deny this conclusion it is not enough sinply to
assert the reality of a plurality of selves : we must adopt a radically
different analysis. This new analysis starts from the standpoint of the
self as agent.
The Self As Agent
We have argued that the notions of pure thought or pure awareness are
unintelligible. We cannot understand thought without a thinker or an
object of thought and we cannot understand awareness without there being
something which is aware and something to be aware of. Also, thought
and awareness make no sense except in the context of the passage of time.
Further, the notions of thought and awareness, even when given
significance by being anchored to the thought and awareness of someone,
are still only comprehensible when understood as the negative aspect
of action. Action is first and foremost the determination of the
world which involves thought, whereas thought can only be the
contemplation of that which is already determined. Aotion as that
which determines the world is the source of the differentiation amongst
persons, whereas thought which comprises what has already been
determined, must, insofar as it is correct, be the same for all. My
contention has been that agency must be regarded as the differentia
of the personal, and that it is only by considering the self as an
agent that a true understanding of personal relationship can be achieved,
and also a true understanding of what the theist takes to be the
relation of God to the world.
I have endeavoured to develop these ideas in the preceding sections.
There I argued that action exhibited both the transcendence and
immanence of the self and that it was possible to conceive of an agent
who was both transcendent and immanent in a supreme degree; and that
this agent was God.
Because each action is a unique determination of the world, the history
of the actions of each person provide a means of distinguishing him from
all other persons and ensure his unique individuality. Because action
involves not only the self but also the 'other', an understanding of
action enables us to understand the unity of the world and the integral
relationship which each person has to the rest of the world. The
'other* is integral to me because it provides the medium in which I
express myself; but this is not a one-way traffic as my actions are
also influenced by my understanding of the 'other* and the action of the
•other' on myself. Just because the 'other* is integral to myself, if
I am to aot correctly I must take account of the 'other* as far as I
am able. This is obvious in the simple fact that in order to achieve
our intentions we have to choose the correct physical means. But it
has another important application. Insofar as we recognise the 'other'
as another personal being rather than an inanimate object, then we
have to take account of his actions, not just as events which have
occurred in the past but as part of a sequence which includes his
present awareness and potentiality for action. This is not to say that
we can foresee the other's actions, but only that we must feel ourselves
in the other's place. The more that I can do this, the more sensitive
my response to each situation will be, and the more my actions will
contribute to the working of a vast harmonious whole. G-od is the
supreme agent, not primarily because He is more powerful than a human
agent but because He is more sensitive. Because He is more sensitive
He can share our joys and sorrows as no human agent can and can answer
our needs as no human agent can.
What this implies, if we are to take both our own agency and G-od's
agency seriously, is an expansion in our self-awareness. G-od as the
infinite agent is aware of the whole world : we as finite agents are
only aware of a very limited area of experience and it is to an even
more limited degree that we adopt the attitude of personal relationship.
But G-od stands in personal relationship to the whole world if we are to
understand His agency aright. On the human level we see how personal
relationships of various kinds expand our experience and enable us to
relate ourselves in increasingly complex ways to our environment, so
that we experience it to a certain extent as an integral part of
ourselves. Our self-awareness is expanded to include a larger area of
experience. We must suppose that the personal relationship of the
worshipper to the infinite agent will have the effect of increasing
the awareness of the worshipper to an even greater degree, so that
the more his interaction with God is allowed to proceed, the more will
his awareness of the world expand to approximate in some faint degree
to that of God Himself.
Personal Existence
One reason for regarding selves as subsistences of some kind is that
it seems to guarantee their continuing existence and individuality. It
is tempting to look for one constant impression of the self which is
the source of our self-identity. We have agreed with recent writers,
however, that we can form no coherent conception of the self apart
from its agency and that this agency is expressed primarily in its
bodily aspect of interaction with the 'other*.
One of the main reasons for supposing that there is a 'something* behind
our bodily expression which is independent of the body is that this
supposition has provided reason to suppose that our personal existence
may continue after death. But what can this 'something' be? As we have
seen, if the self is primarily a knowing subject then this makes all
selves essentially identical, and this is not the kind of personal
existence which it is intended to safeguard. On the other hand, if the
self is primarily an agent then its agency cannot be understood apart
from its bodily expression. Whereas thought or consciousness could be
regarded as a permanent 'something* behind the bodily facade, action can
only be a never-ending flux. It may be replied that this takes us back
to the subject of action : there must be someone who has the intentions
and performs the actions. But when we try to analyse this someone we
get nowhere. It is simply the bare consciousness which spans this moment
and the next.
We have rejected the account of the self as a subsistance, intuition or
impression which is the subject of our experience, and have argued that
the only account of the self which does justice to the religious
consciousness as well as to empirical experience is that which starts
from the agency of the self. There remain, however, difficulties which
can only be briefly indicated here. The religious consciousness seeks
for an account of the self which will guarantee its continuing survival
in some recognisable form after death. The analysis of the self as an
agent apparently gives us little comfort here. We have largely concurred
with recent philosophical analysis which links our personal existence as
agents inextricably with our bodily experience. Strawson, for example,
in Individuals analyses 'person' as a basic particular to whom both
bodily and mental predicates are equally applicable. He suggests that
the only form of personal survival which is plausible on this basis would
be based on memories of our past life, which must be supposed to fade and
eventually perish with the passing of time. This would not meet the
demands of theism which calls for a positive continuation and
consummation of life.
Personal Identity
The question of personal identity is crucial. Hie theist needs an account
of the self which will show its unique significance. I have argued that
an account of the self as an agent can provide this, for the uniqueness
of the self is provided by the unique pattern of choioes and actions
which constitute its life. On this basis, however, it becomes difficult
to account for personal existence after death. There are two possible
criteria of personal identity : memory or bodily experience. Since
bodily experience ceases with death, the only possible criterion of
personal identity after death would seem to be memory. Apart from the
difficulty that a personal survival based on memory would be purely an
individual survival which could have no knov/ledge of any other disembodied
beings, it is difficult to see how memory by itself could act as the sole
criterion of personal identity.^" Memory may be mistaken. It is essential
to the concept of remembering that there should be a distinction between
remembering and only seeming to remember. In order to check on the
correctness of my memories I cannot refer to other of my memories. I
must refer to the testimony of others and this will refer to bodily
experience, which can be correlated with what I remember. It is true
that in accepting the testimony of others I am accepting their memory
claims without a check. Nevertheless what the memory claims of others
testify to is my bodily identity, the continuity of my bodily existence
in time. In a disembodied existence there would be no way for me to
check whether or not I was remembering correctly. I would not be able to
distinguish fact from imagination. Consequently there could be no
certainty that the self which I remembered myself to be was the same as
the self which was doing the remembering and thus no means of
establishing my personal identity. My memories would all be mine but in
cases of doubt I would have no means of knowing whether they were
memories of what really happened or not.
One way of approaching this problem would be through an analysis of the
personal identity of Cod. We have already noted that for the Christian
at any rate, it is the assurance of the continuance of his relationship
to God which gives most significance to accounts of the after-life. As
it is the nature of God which gives the believer a clue as to his own
nature, so an analysis of the criteria for the self-identity of God may
give an indication of how his own continuing self-identity may be
regarded.
1 See, for example, Sydney S. Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Memory
and Terence Penelhum, Personal Identity. Memory, Survival, both in
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56 (1959).
Another possibility is to re-examine the meaning which is attached to
the traditional concepts which deal with the end and meaning of life
with the object of seeing whether they retain their significance when
interpreted in terms of this life rather than the next. It might be
that the emotive aura which pertains to one interpretation could
equally well pertain to an alternative reading. This procedure has
been followed by, for example, Professor R.W. Hepburn.1 Professor
Hepburn discusses the difficulties involved in construing eternity as
a kind of atemporal existence, and examines ways in which discourse
about eternity may be a means of drawing attention to features of our
present experience.
This line of approach has obvious relevance to a contemporary
reinterpretation of Shankara and Ramanuja. The interests of modern
thinkers have shifted from other-worldly ideals to the concerns of this
world. It is a fairly short step from showing the compatibility of
this-worldly concerns with traditional metaphysics to the reinterpretation
of traditional metaphysics in such a way that it throws light on this
world rather than the next. In Shankara's case there is in fact
traditional precedent for this move. The concept of the jivanmukta.
the man who has achieved liberation in this life, has always been
important. In focussing attention on what can be achieved in this life
Shankara gives experiential content to his metaphysical ideas.
The jivanmukta is the embodiment of the witness-self, the spectator of
existence who is unmoved by what he experiences. We have already seen
the incoherence of interpreting this as an existence which is out of
time. The jivanmukta, however, still exists in time so his experiences
must be describable in temporal terms. In what way can time be
1 B.B.C. Talks, Trouble with Bternity. 1968.
transcended by one who still exists in time? The practical significance
of the urge to transcend time lies in the tyranny which time appears to
exercise in our lives. Because life occurs in a temporal sequence our
immediate experience is limited. The motivation of our lives continually
directs our thoughts to see the consummation of our purposes in the
future, yet the future is fraught with uncertainty so that our efforts
may appear to be mocked. The emphasis on the future causes us to
neglect the present until our lives begin to seem eaten up by time. If
only we could achieve a condition which was out of time yet in which we
experienced time as panoramically before us.
There are moments in this life when we do have such an experience.
Listening to music is one such experience when the music is heard as a
total created unity and not just a background : a similar experience
may occur when watching a play or reading a novel. In these experiences
we are able, dependent largely on our own skill and experience, to
contemplate a temporal sequence as a whole. .Although the events in the
sequence have occurred successively they are present to our consciousness
all at once. One of the features of such experiences is that we our¬
selves are not personally involved : we are spectators. This means that
our actions do not affect the situation in any way apart from the fact
we have already noted that our comprehension of the situation may depend
upon our own powers. Another feature of such situations is that since
our actions cannot affect the development of the temporal sequence, we
are free to give full attention to each individual moment in its own
right. Paradoxically, as spectators who are in a position to appreciate
the full significance of the temporal sequence, we are also in a
position to view each of the individual events as a timeless 'now'. As
R.W. Hepburn puts it in the talks referred to earlier, 'The allusions,
back and forth ..... are contained schematically in one's posture of
consciousness at that very moment .....'
Hie concept of the witness-self may be construed as the injunction that
we should regard our own lives as if we were the spectators of a drama
on the stage. This has links with Shankara and Ramanuja's description
of the world as lila, the play of God. As play, the world and our
experiences in it are to be regarded as things which exist in their own
right, and with which we are not to regard ourselves as personally
involved. As our understanding of a play is something which may be
increased by our own efforts to appreciate it, so this attitude of the
spectator is something which may be cultivated in ourselves with respect
to our own lives until a more synoptic standpoint is arrived at. Here
we see the relevance of the ideal of the sthita-prajna, the man of
steady understanding. He is the man who has achieved this synoptic
standpoint and maintains it consistently. Consequently he is not
tyranised by time. He does not allow himself to become anxious over the
future but he is able to appreciate each moment as it comes as a time¬
less 'now'.
The foregoing represents one way in which time may be transcended in this
life and the level of existential anxiety reduced. The merits of this
attitude are many. It may be objected, however, that it does not treat
empirical life adequately since the transcending of time is only
achieved by denying the reality of action. If it is correct that the
self is first and foremost an agent rather than a knowing subject, then
however attractive the ideal of the witness-self is, it cannot be
regarded as the whole story.
It may be that it is a mistake to attempt a philosophical account of the
possibility of personal survival outside the setting of the more specific
theological statements which each faith has made on the subject. In
Christianity the emphasis has been on resurrection rather than after¬
life and in Hinduism we have the belief in transmigration to reckon
with. We shall end with a brief comment on each of these.
The doctrine of resurrection is in full accord with the understanding of
the agency of the self as manifested in its bodily activity. It has of
course, enormous difficulties of other kinds which are not our concern
here. The believer may well feel that the promise of 'new heavens and
a new earth*, with which the promise of resurrection is linked, is
sufficient to dispose of difficulties of a practical nature. On the
philosophical side, the problem is that of re-establishing the identity
of persons after an interval of time in which there has been no bodily
activity, and under conditions which, while they may reasonably be
supposed to bear some resemblance to present conditions, must also be
supposed to be radically different in various vital respects.
We have already noted the axiomatic character of the Hindu belief in
reincarnation. Re-birth is necessary because each action produces
fresh consequences and so the cycle of life must continue to repeat
itself until the chain is broken and the self becomes free from the world
of action. One problem concerns the identity of the self from one
existence to the next and further, the identity of the self who finally
achieves liberation or moksha. The fact that people seldom claim to
remember their previous incarnations does not seem to have been felt as a
serious problem. The important point has been the belief that what I
start from in this life is the result of a set of actions in a previous
life, and that how I act in this life will have an important bearing on
my station in the next. Here we see the importance of the viewpoint
I* I
which regards the self as primarily a knowing subject. As a knowing
subject rather than an agent I can dissociate myself from my actions.
They are something that happen to me and not anything for which I may be
regarded a3 responsible. They only appear to be mine because I falsely
associate myself with my bodily and mental activity. One of the
consequences of this view is to make the existence of the self atemporal
from the start. As the Christian doctrine of resurrection reflects an
essentially temporal view of life in which life can only be significant
within time, so the Hindu account of transmigration reflects a view of
the self which places its real life beyond time.
Yihat differences do these views make to the understanding of the
significance of personal existence? In particular, is it possible to
interpret these views in terms of our analysis of the self as an agent,
so as to give expression to traditional religious expectations?
What of Ramanuja*s theism? As we have seen, Ramahuja stresses the
importance of the relationship between the worshipper and his God and
hence the ultimacy of the individual "I*. His criticism of Shankara is
that his account of the end of life can have no appeal if 'I* am not to
be there to experience it. Yet some of Ramanuja's basic assumptions
run counter to the claims he wishes to make. There is no evidence that
he found difficulties in the doctrine of transmigration, yet on the
assumption that the experiencing •I* is ultimate, it does not make sense
to talk of my being reborn unless I can recognise myself as the same
individual who was present in a previous existence. (On 3hankara*s
account such recognition is not necessary since the actions which make
up a life are simply a sequence of cause and effect in which the true
self really plays no part.)
We have argued that although non-dualism is the official creed of the
majority of contemporary Vedanta philosophers, yet theistic considerations
play an important paid: in their thinking, and further that the recognition
of the importance of empirical life implies the acceptance of the agency
of the self. In spite of the similarity in the metaphysical problems
faced by each tradition, the terms of their practical outworkings are
radically different in each case. The fact that an adequate metaphysics
of the personal is required by each tradition does not imply that their
understandings of the unique significance of the individual person are
alike.
The important point of divergence stems from a difference in the
understanding of the relationship of the world to God. In Hinduism the
world is part of the self-expression of God and therefore in some way
necessary to His being. In Christianity, in spite of the attempts of
Idealist philosophers, the world remains the act of God and external, to
His being. The consequence of thi3 is that within Hinduism the
individual is important and unique as an expression of the Absolute
Reality, Brahman. In Christianity he is important because God has
created him as a unique individual with a unique destiny. This
difference is vital. It means that the Christian expectation regarding
the after-life is greater than the Hindu. It is a tragedy to consider
the individual to have perished at death since he is God's creation,
made to walk in fellowship with his Creator. For the Hindu, the
individual, even when his uniqueness is recognised, is still an evanescent
expression of Brahman, who is continually expressing Himself in myriad
ways in the lila of the world. Even in an evolutionary philosophy such
as that of Aurobindo, whioh ropudiatoo a oyolioal view of time and
the individual is still only one stage in Brahman's self-development
and will inevitably be superceded by a more complete expression of the
Absolute.
These considerations mean that if an account of the agency of the self
runs into difficulties over the question of personal survival, the
problem for the Hindu philosopher is of slighter magnitude than for
the Christian. Even the Hindu theists are not committed to the
continued survival of unique individuals, but only to the existence on
different occasions, of different manifestations of the divine. 'All
that is Brahman' and it is the individual's realisation that he is a
part of 'all this' and hence a part of Brahman which gives meaning to
his existence.
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